Ladnier v. Nelson

1

KIPPY ANTHONY LADNIER, JR. PLAINTIFF v. TYRONE NELSON, et al. DEFENDANTS

Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-00167-RPM

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Southern Division

May 24, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL

ROBERT P. MYERS, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Plaintiff Kippy Anthony Ladnier, Jr., proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 5, 2022. [1] at 3; [5] at 1-2. Ladnier is housed at the Jackson County Adult Detention Center (“JCADC”) in Pascagoula, Mississippi, and he names Captain Tyrone Nelson and Sheriff Mike Ezell as Defendants. [1] at 1-2. After an Omnibus Hearing,^[1] Defendants filed a Motion [32] for Summary Judgment, to which Ladnier has not responded. For the following reasons, the Court finds that Defendants' Motion [32] for Summary Judgment should be granted and that Ladnier's claims against them should be dismissed with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Ladnier's Account of Events

On the afternoon of June 19, 2022, Ladnier was using the telephone in the dayroom at JCADC. [1] at 4. He “was sitting on the stool that comes out of the wall,” when suddenly “the stool broke at the base” and came “out of the wall.” Id. Ladnier then “hit the floor real hard.” Id. Ladnier claims that he injured his “back and head,” id. at 5, and an “area just above [his] left hip,” (Tr. 8). Four other inmates, who each witnessed the fall, testified by affidavit that these events occurred as Ladnier reported them. [8-1] at 1-4.

Ladnier says that he immediately notified deputies and medical personnel about his injuries, (Tr. 8), but they “refused to do anything,” [1] at 4. Specifically, another inmate “told the officer on duty through the wall mic,” but “[m]edical never showed up.” [8-1] at 3. Later, Ladnier says that he submitted a medical request on the kiosk, (Tr. 9), but he claims that he did not see a nurse until “about six or seven weeks later,” (Tr. 11). At that time, he allegedly received ipuprofen “for about four days.” (Tr. 14). By the Omnibus Hearing, Ladnier said he still experienced pain in his “whole right leg.” (Tr. 15). He testified that his leg went “completely numb” when he tried to sit on the stools in the day room, and he “cannot sleep on that side either because it goes numb in the middle of the night.” (Tr. 15).

Ladnier claims a violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. [1] at 3. Ladnier sued Captain Nelson because “he is the head of the jail.” (Tr. 16). But Ladnier testified that he never “communicated directly with Captain Nelson about [his] desire for medical treatment.” (Tr. 18). Likewise, Ladnier sued Sheriff Ezell simply because he was Captain Nelson's boss. [7] at 1; (Tr. 16). He “never had any communication with Sheriff Ezell” either. (Tr. 32). He is not “suing [Captain] Nelson or [Sheriff] Ezell because the stool came loose from the wall,” but simply for the alleged denial of medical care. (Tr. 22). Ladnier seeks $300,000.00 in compensatory damages for his “pain and suffering,” and he wants his custodians to “get [him] to a doctor so [he] can be treated for [his] injuries.” [1] at 5.

B. Defendants' Summary Judgment Evidence

Defendants submitted excerpts from Ladnier's medical records in support of their Motion [32] for Summary Judgment. A nurse reported seeing Ladnier on June 22, 2022-three days after his fall. [32-2] at 1. Ladnier told her that he had “fallen in [the] floor when [the] stool broke,” and that he now suffered “back pain and stiffness.” Id. And Ladnier testified that he remembered having this conversation. (Tr. 24 (“I do remember discussing it with the nurse.”)). The nurse offered Ladnier a course of anti-inflammatory medication, and he “agreed to pain medication and rest.” [32-2] at 1. That day, Ladnier was prescribed two 200-milligram doses of ibuprofen daily for three days, specifically to treat his “back pain.” Id. at 2. That order was renewed three days later, giving Ladnier another three-day course of twice-daily ibuprofen for “back pain.” Id. at 3. Ladnier conceded at the Omnibus Hearing that “these . . . medicines . . . were given to [him] from the medical cart.” (Tr. 29).

Ladnier complained about back and leg pain three more times over the next three months, and his prescription for pain medication was renewed three more times-for another seventeen days' worth of ibuprofen or acetaminophen. [32-2] at 4-8. Again, Ladnier conceded at the Omnibus Hearing that he received the medication ordered for him, but he complained that it was “for [a] different reason other than [his] back pain”-namely, his “bad sinuses and headaches.” (Tr. 31).

During discovery, Ladnier was asked to “admit [that he] was seen by the medical department on October 18, 2022 for follow up on [his] hip and back pain.” [32-4] at 2. He was asked to “admit that when [he was] seen by the medical department on October 18, 2022, [he] informed the nurse that the previous protocol had helped with [his] pain.” Id. He was also asked to admit that a “nurse . . . educated [him] on massage and stretching for [his] . . . back pain” and that he was “prescribed Ibuprofen and [Acetaminophen] for an additional seven days” at this time. Id. Ladnier did not respond to these Requests for Admission. [33] at 12-13.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Westfall v. Luna, 903 F.3d 534, 546 (5th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.” Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P., 627 F.3d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 2010). “On a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor.” E.E.O.C. v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2007).

“Summary judgment is proper if the movant demonstrates that there is an absence of genuine issues of material fact.” Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir. 1992). “The movant accomplishes this by informing the court of the basis for its motion, and by identifying portions of the record which highlight the absence of genuine factual issues.” Id. “Rule 56 contemplates a shifting burden: the nonmovant is under no obligation to respond unless the movant discharges its initial burden of demonstrating entitlement to summary judgment.” Mack v. Waffle House, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-00559-RHW, 2007 WL 1153116, at *1 (S.D.Miss. Apr. 18, 2007) (quotation and brackets omitted). “[O]nce a properly supported motion for summary judgment is presented, the nonmoving party must rebut with ‘significant probative' evidence.” Id. (quoting Ferguson v. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc., 584 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1978)). “Conclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments are not an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Amerson v. Pike Cnty., Miss., No. 3:08-cv-00053-DPJ-FKB, 2012 WL 968058, at *1 (S.D.Miss. Mar. 21, 2012).

III. DISCUSSION

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against those who violate a plaintiff's constitutional rights while acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ladnier sued both Captain Nelson and Sheriff Ezell in their individual and official capacities, [1] at 2, which are discussed in turn below. In sum, Ladnier has failed to meet his burden to “go beyond the pleadings” and “designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” See Amerson, 2012 WL 968058, at *6 (quotations omitted). Captain Nelson and Sheriff Ezell are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and Ladnier's claims against them should be dismissed with prejudice.

A. Individual-Capacity Claims

Ladnier's individual-capacity claims fail because he has not shown that Captain Nelson and Sheriff Ezell were personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation. “There is no vicarious or respondeat superior liability of supervisors under [S]ection 1983.” Rios v. City of Del Rio, Tex., 444 F.3d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original). “Under [Section] 1983, . . . a government official can be held liable only for his own misconduct.” Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 189 (5thCir. 2011). That is, “[a] supervisory official may be held liable only if (1) he affirmatively participates in the acts that cause the constitutional deprivation, or (2) he implements unconstitutional policies that causally result in the constitutional injury.” Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011) (alterations omitted). “A supervisor may also be liable for failure to supervise or train if: ‘(1) the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference.'” Id. (quoting Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009)).

At the Omnibus Hearing and elsewhere in the record, Ladnier expressly disclaimed the personal involvement of Captain Nelson and Sheriff Ezell in the events giving rise to this lawsuit. He never “communicated directly with Captain Nelson about [his] desire for medical treatment or the denial of medical treatment for [his] low[er] back.” (Tr. 18). Nor did he have “any communication with Sheriff Ezell.” (Tr. 32). He sued both Defendants simply because they were in positions of authority at JCADC. [7] at 1; (Tr. 16-18)....