Ladoucier v. City of N.Y.

JOSEPH MALACHI LADOUCIER, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, a municipal entity, REITRED NEW YORK CITY POLICE OFFICER CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS, NEW YORK CITY POLICE SERGEANT JIMMI HERNANDEZ NEW YORK CITY POLICE OFFICERS "JOHN DOES 1-9," CHERYL NICHOLS, RAFAEL REVERON, Defendants.

10 Civ. 05089 (RJH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Dated: June 6, 2011

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Richard J. Holwell, District Judge:

Thanksgiving is a "national holiday that is preeminently part of American history . . . [commemorating] the feast held by the Pilgrims and the American Indians to show thankfulness for the harvest." Doe v. Wilson Cnty. Sch. Sys., 524 F. Supp. 2d 964, 982 (M.D. Tenn. 2007). It is also "a day in which many people do not go to work to kickoff the holiday buying-spree season." The Formula, Inc. v. Mammoth 8050, LLC, No. 07-61708-CIV, 2008 WL 60428, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2008). But just two days prior to Thanksgiving 2009, plaintiff Joseph Malachi LaDoucier was not in such a festive mood. "On the morning of Tuesday, November 24, 2009, Mr. LaDoucier had a truly terrible morning commute. After inadvertently bumping into a postal worker, Defendant Cheryl Nichols, while exiting a crowded rush hour train, Mr. LaDoucier was verbally abused and stalked by [Nichols], then tackled, stuck and choked in front of his office by [Nichols's] colleague, Defendant Rafael Reveron. To put the proverbial cherry on top of a trulyterrible morning," police were called to the scene and LaDoucier was arrested. (PL's Opp'n at 1.) LaDoucier now brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging false arrest and related federal and state claims; and Defendants the City of New York (the "City"), Police Officer Christopher Williams, and Police Sergeant Jimmi Hernandez (collectively the "City Defendants") move to dismiss. Because police had probable cause to make the arrest based on the putative victim's corroborated account, this motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

The following facts, drawn from LaDoucier's First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), are accepted as true for purposes of this motion.

On the morning of Tuesday, November 24, 2009, at 8:30 a.m., LaDoucier was riding a crowded uptown Lexington Avenue express train to work. (FAC ¶¶ 18, 22, 24.) As the train pulled into Grand Central Station, LaDoucier sought to exit and switch to the uptown Lexington Avenue local train. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 45, 58.) In exiting the crowded train, however, LaDoucier "unintentionally made contact with" Nichols, a United States Postal Service employee. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 32.) Nichols took offense and thereafter began a verbal barrage directed at LaDoucier, while also "bumping up against [LaDoucier] in an instigatory [sic] manner." (See generally id. ¶¶ 36-48.) The altercation continued as the two waited for the uptown local train, apparently ceased while both rode that train, and then continued again after the two exited the train at Fifty-First Street. (See generally id. ¶¶ 46, 57-69.)

Upon reaching the street, LaDoucier was able to separate himself from Nichols. (Id. ¶ 70.) He then made two stops while walking towards his office; first at a cafe topurchase coffee for himself and his coworkers and second at a street "donut cart." (Id. ¶¶ 71-72.) After these purchases, LaDoucier continued towards his office, now with hands full of coffee and donuts. (Id. ¶ 73.) Walking down the street, however, LaDoucier saw Nichols outside a post office conversing with Rafael Reveron, another postal worker "considerably larger than" LaDoucier. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 74, 83.) Reveron began following LaDoucier, pushed him, and made "offensive and threatening remarks" to him. (Id. ¶¶ 79-81.) Just as LaDoucier was reaching his office, Reveron tackled him, scattering the coffee and donuts across the street. (Id. ¶¶ 85-86.) Reveron then struck LaDoucier repeatedly and choked him while sitting on his chest. (Id. ¶¶ 87-88.) Thereafter, security guards from LaDoucier's office called the police and instructed Reveron to cease his assault. (Id. ¶¶ 92-93.)¹

Police officers, including Officer Williams and Sergeant Hernandez, arrived at the scene a short time later and questioned several people including LaDoucier, Nichols, Reveron, and a third postal worker, Jerry Pompey. (Id. ¶¶ 95, 98, 99, 105, 115, 118.) Nichols claimed that LaDoucier struck her, Reveron claimed that LaDoucier had struck him in the street, and Pompey claimed that LaDoucier screamed threats at Nichols. (Id. ¶¶ 95, 98, 105, 126.) LaDoucier denied all of the assertions. (Id. ¶¶ 95, 99-104, 125, 127-128.) LaDoucier alleges that police undertook no further investigation, despite "multiple security cameras [being] located at and around the site" of Reveron and LaDoucier's struggle. (Id. ¶¶ 122, 126, 127, 141-142.) Instead, police proceeded toarrest and handcuff LaDoucier, and charged him with two counts of third degree assault. (Id. ¶¶ 106-107, 113-114.) LaDoucier was released on his own recognizance, and twice again returned to court before those charges were dismissed. (Id. ¶¶ 145-148.)

LaDoucier filed this suit on July 2, 2010, and filed his amended complaint on December 6, 2010. He brings several claims invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including false arrest, failure to intervene, malicious abuse of process, and malicious prosecution, along with related state law claims. The City Defendants have now moved to dismiss.²Nichols has neither made any such motion, nor answered the complaint.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entertainment, 592 F.3d 314, 321 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). If the factual averments permit no reasonable inference stronger than the "mere possibility of misconduct," the complaint should be dismissed. Starr, 592 F.3d at 321 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950). Thus, "[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quotingTwombly, 550 U.S. at 557). In applying this standard of facial plausibility, the Court takes all "factual allegations to be true and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 2009). But the Court does not credit "mere conclusory statements" or "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action." Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.

False Arrest and Probable Cause

"It is well settled that the existence of probable cause is a complete defense to claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution under § 1983." D'Olimpio v. Crisafi, 718 F. Supp. 2d 357, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Police have probable cause when they have "knowledge of, or reasonably trustworthy information as to, facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant" the reasonable belief "that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested." Williams v. Town of Greenburgh, 535 F.3d 71, 79 (2d Cir. 2008). A district court must analyze the "totality of the circumstances" then known to the arresting officers in deciding whether probable cause exists. Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 162 (2d Cir. 2002); Howard v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 6085, 2010 WL 1914747, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2010) ("In considering whether there is probable cause for an arrest, courts 'must consider those facts available to the officer at the time of the arrest and immediately before it.'" (quoting Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 569 (2d Cir. 1996))). Moreover, "it is well-established that a law enforcement official has probable cause to arrest if he received his information from some person, normally the putative victim or eyewitness, who it seems reasonable tobelieve is telling the truth." Rodriguez v. New York City Transit Auth., No. 06 Civ. 13762, 2009 WL 3817298, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2009). In addition,

[o]nce a police officer has a reasonable basis for believing there is probable cause, he is not required to explore and eliminate every theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest. Although a better procedure may be for the officers to investigate Plaintiff's version of events more completely, an arresting officer does not have to prove plaintiff's version wrong before arresting him. Nor does it matter that an investigation might have cast doubt upon the basis for the arrest.

Murray v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 437, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395-96 (2d Cir. 2006)). Finally, a mere lack of an ensuing criminal charge does not undermine the existence of probable cause. Brogdon v. City of New Rochelle, 200 F. Supp. 2d 411, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Rowe v. City of Rochester, No. 00-CV-6333, 2002 WL 31974537, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2002) ("[T]he eventual disposition of the criminal charges is irrelevant to the probable cause determination.").

LaDoucier's own allegations in the FAC demonstrate that probable cause existed here. A "person of reasonable caution" who (1) heard the corroborative testimony³ of three eyewitnesses, including the putative victim; and (2) saw the signs of a struggle such as food and drink spilled across the street; "would possess sufficient information tobelieve" that LaDoucier had, in fact, attacked or threatened Nichols. See Williams, 535 F.3d at 79; Blair v. City of New York, No. 03 CV 1485, 2009 WL 959547, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009) (corroborative testimony of three witnesses sufficient to establish probable cause); Rizzo v. Edison, Inc., 419 F....