LaFrantz v. ST. Mary's Roman Catholic Church

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JEANNE LAFRANTZ, Plaintiff, v. ST. MARY'S ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH, DIOCESE OF BROOKLYN, Defendants.

No. 21-CV-04920 (NGG) (CLP)

United States District Court, E.D. New York

January 19, 2024

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Jeanne L. LaFrantz (“Plaintiff' or “Ms LaFrantz”) brought this action against St. Mary's Roman Catholic Church (“St. Mary's”) and The Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn (the “Brooklyn Diocese”) (collectively, the “Defendants”) under the New York Child Victims Act (“CVA”) 2019 N.Y. Sess. Laws c. 11, § 3, as a result of sexual abuse she suffered as a minor at the hands of the Defendants' employee, Father John F. Campbell (“Campbell”). Both Defendants separately move to dismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND^[1]

Plaintiff alleges that, from approximately 1960 to 1966, she was subjected to sexual abuse by Father Campbell, a diocesan priest who was employed by Defendants to work at St. Mary's. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (Dkt. 28) ¶¶ 3-5, 15.)

According to the FAC, Campbell began abusing Plaintiff when she was in sixth grade and approximately ten years old. (Id. ¶ 19.) At the time the abuse began, Plaintiffs father was sick with terminal cancer, and Campbell began providing “spiritual guidance” as well as financial support to Plaintiffs mother. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.) While Plaintiffs mother tended to Plaintiffs ill father, Plaintiff was entrusted to the Defendants and Campbell's care. (Id. ¶ 24.)

Plaintiff alleges, however, that Campbell was a “regularly ... touchy man” with students at St. Mary's, including Plaintiff, (id. ¶ 27.) Campbell would lure Plaintiff to St. Mary's rectory “under the guise of needing [Plaintiff] to run errands for him.” (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff frequented the rectory so often that the housekeeper allowed Plaintiff to take a shorter route through the kitchen and a back passageway. (Id. ¶¶ 34-36.) Plaintiff alleges that she often passed other priests and visitors who sat in the communal areas of the rectory and watched her walk to Campbell's “private area” which consisted of an office, pantry, couch, television, and bed. (Id. ¶¶ 37-40.) Once alone, Plaintiff alleges that Campbell would sexually abuse her, instruct her not. to tell anyone about their encounters, and send her off with $2-5. (Id. ¶¶ 41-48.) Plaintiff asserts this abuse occurred three to four times a week and coincided with changes in her behavior at school. (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff alleges that her teacher, Sister Mary Anselm, noticed how much time Plaintiff was spending alone with Campbell and rather than prevent t he abuse, Sister Anslem warned Plaintiff that if she “continued on the path she was on” and her “behavior” did not improve, she would “end up in jail.” (Id. ¶¶ 29, 32-33.) Plaintiff recalls the abuse continuing for six years and only stopping when she left St. Mary's to attend high school. (Id. ¶ 49.)^[2]

During freshman year of high school at Mater Christi Diocesan High School, Plaintiff disclosed the sexual abuse by Campbell while in confessional. (Id. ¶¶ 51-52.) The school's priest did not believe Plaintiff and told her that she was “shameful” and “would go to Hell” for the lie she told. (Id. ¶ 54.) Plaintiff asserts she never spoke of the abuse again, fearful that she would be ex-polled and bring shame on her mother. (Id. ¶ 55.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 13, 2021, Plaintiff commenced this action by filing her Complaint in the Southern District of New York. (See Complaint (Dkt. 1).) Following transfer to this court, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (See generally FAC.) The FAC alleges five causes of action against Defendants: CD negligence, (Id. ¶¶ 59- 82); (ii) negligent training, supervision, and retention, (FAC ¶¶ 83-95); (iii) gross negligence, (Id. ¶¶ 96-111); (iv) premises liability, (Id. ¶¶ 112-18); (v) and breach of fiduciary duty, (id. ¶¶ 119-32). On June 27, 2022, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's FAC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (St. Mary's Not. of Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. 36); St. Mary's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“St. Mary's Mot.”) (Dkt. 36-1) at 1; Brooklyn Diocese's Not. of Mot. (Dkt. 40); Brooklyn Diocese's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. (“Brooklyn Diocese's Mot;”) (Dkt. 40-4) at 1.) Plaintiff submitted an Opposition, (Opp. (Dkt. 41)) and Defendants filed Replies in support of their motions to dismiss. (St. Mary's Reply (Dkt. 39); Brooklyn Diocese's Reply (Dkt. 42).)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) .^[3] “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Plausibility depends on a host of considerations: the full factual picture presented by the complaint, the particular cause of action and its elements, and the existence of alternative explanations so obvious that they render plaintiff's inferences unreasonable.” L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 430 (2d Cir. 2011). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court will accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Fink v. Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d 739, 740-41 (2d Cir. 2013). However, allegations that “are no more than conclusions [ ] are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). Thus, “at a bare minimum, the operative standard requires the plaintiff to provide the grounds upon which his claim rests through factual allegations sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 56-57 (2d Cir. 2008).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Group Pleading

As a threshold matter, Defendant Brooklyn Diocese argues that Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 because it docs not distinguish the acts of each Defendant. (Brooklyn Diocese's Mot. at 6-7.) Plaintiff asserts that she has properly alleged that the Defendants acted in unison and are jointly liable for the conduct of Father Campbell. (Opp. at 5-7.)

Rule 8 requires a complaint to give each defendant “fair notice of the grounds for entitlement Lo relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561. “A complaint generally fails to meet that minimum requirement where allegations lump all the defendants together in each claim and provide no factual basis to distinguish their conduct.” Gomez-Kadawid v. Lee, No. 20-CV-01786 (VEC) (DF), 2022 WL.676096, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 20-CV-1786 (VEC) (DF), 2022 WL 558125 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2022).

Here, the Brooklyn Diocese asserts that Plaintiff overlooks the fact that it. is a separate legal entity from St. Mary's and fails to specify which Defendant engaged in what misconduct. (Brooklyn Diocese's Mot. at 6.) Tellingly, of the six times the Brooklyn Diocese is mentioned in the First Amended Complaint, none of them are within the “Facts Common to All Counts” section, but rather in sections describing the nature of the claim, the parties, and die causes of action. (See FAC ¶¶ 1, 10-11, 60, 84, 104.)

While true that “nothing in Rule 8 prohibits collectively referring to multiple defendants where the complaint alerts defendants that identical claims are asserted against each defendant,” New York Am. Water Co., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 19-CV-2150 (NG), 2020 WL 9427226, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2020), the rule requires, “at a minimum, that a complaint give each defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the ground upon which it rests.” Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 Fed.Appx. 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001) (Summary Order).

The Brooklyn Diocese argues that Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint improperly conflates the Defendants without specifying which Defendant engaged in which acts. (See. Brooklyn Diocese Mot. at 6.) While the court notes that Plaintiff could have alleged in greater detail conduct specific to each Defendant, the court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs complaint failed to give any notice to the Defendants. In particular, Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that Campbell was a diocesan priest employed by St. Mary's and “under Defendants' direct supervision, employ, and control when he committed die wrongful acts.” (FAC ¶¶ 5, 84.)

Thus, while vague, the group pleading alone does not rise to the level of a Rule 8 violation sufficient to dismiss the First Amended Complaint in its entirety at this stage. See Vantone Grp. Liab. Co. v. Yangpu NGT Indus. Co., No. 13-CV-7639 (LTS), 2015 WL 4040882, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2015) (noting that the test for Rule 8 pleading is “simply whether Defendants have received adequate notice of the claims”). Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs favor, the court declines to dismiss the First Amended Complaint on group pleading grounds and considers the Brooklyn Diocese and St. Mary's as joint employers for purposes of this motion. The court now turns to the merits.

B. Negligence

‘To establish a prima facie case of negligence under New York law, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach thereof, and (3) injury proximately resulting therefrom.” Curtis v Gates Cmty. Chapel of Rochester, Inc., No. 20-CV-06208 (EAW), 2023 WL 1070650, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Jan....