Lagares v. Miller

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JOSE LAGARES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SETH ELLIOT MILLER, et al., Defendants.

JUANITA MERCADO, Plaintiff, v. AIRWAY SERVICES INC., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL Nos. 20-cv-1435 (BJM), 20-cv-1489 (BJM)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico

April 25, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER

BRUCE J. MCGIVERIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiffs Jose Lagares (“Lagares”); Josefina Maldonado (“Maldonado”); Erick Padilla (“Padilla”); Jose Raul Molina Gonzalez (“Molina”); Mayra J. Padilla Jordan (“Padilla”); EPL and DPL, two minor children represented by Molina and Padilla; and the conjugal partnership Molina-Padilla (“the conjugal partnership”) filed an amended complaint for damages arising from a car accident in Juana Diaz, Puerto Rico against Seth Elliot Miller (“Miller”); Airway Services, Inc. (“Airway”); Airway Services Puerto Rico, LLC (“Airway Puerto Rico”); Liberty Mutual (“Liberty”); Federal Insurance Company (“Federal Insurance”); and Endurance Assurance Company (“Endurance”). Dkt. 62. Alleging damages arising from the same incident, Juanita Mercado (“Mercado”) sued the same defendants as well as American International Insurance Company (“American International”), AIG Insurance Company-Puerto Rico (“AIG Puerto Rico”), and additional unnamed defendants. Dkts. 38, 61; See also Mercado v. Airway Serv's Inc., et. al, 20-CV-1489-BJM. After a joint motion by the parties, this court consolidated the two cases. Dkt. 46. In their amended complaints, Plaintiffs and Mercado seek damages under Puerto Rico Civil Code Article 1802, 31 L.P.R.A. § 5141, and Article 1803, 31 L.P.R.A. § 5142. Dkts. 61, 62. They further assert Airway is liable under Puerto Rico Law 230, 9 L.P.R.A § 5621, as the owner of the vehicle Miller was driving at the time of the accident. Id. After a joint stipulation by the parties, this court dismissed Plaintiffs' and Mercado's claims against Airway Puerto Rico and Mercado's claim against AIG Puerto Rico Dkt. 93. Accordingly, this court has diversity jurisdiction. This case is before me on consent of the parties. Dkts. 39 41, 49.

Airway moved for summary judgment, Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 105, and filed a proposed Statement of Uncontested Material Facts (“SUMFs”) with exhibits. Dkt. 106. Plaintiffs opposed Airway's SUMFs, Dkt. 114, and motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 115. Mercado joined both oppositions. Dkt. 116. Plaintiffs later filed a clarification regarding an incorrect citation in their motion accompanied by a new copy of an exhibit. Dkt. 121. Airway replied to Plaintiffs' opposition to its motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 128, and its proposed SUMFs. Dkt. 130. Plaintiffs surreplied, Dkt. 144, and Mercado joined. Dkt. 145. Plaintiffs and Mercado subsequently refiled their surreply and joinder. Dkts. 149, 151.

After Airway moved for summary judgment, Endurance and Federal Insurance adopted Airway's motion and SUMFs. Dkts. 107, 108. Plaintiffs and Mercado opposed. Dkts. 122, 125. Endurance and Federal Insurance replied, Dkts. 129, 143, and Plaintiffs surreplied. Dkt. 148.

For the reasons discussed below, Airway's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the parties' Local Rule 56 submissions and presented in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., In re Oak Knoll Assocs., L.P., 835 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 2016). I have omitted portions of the proposed facts that state conclusions of law or that I deem irrelevant, but I otherwise resolve any conflicts between the parties' versions of events in favor of Plaintiffs and Mercado.

Miller began working as a Wind Turbine Technician at Airway in March 2018. Defs.' SUMFs ¶ 1. His duties included providing on-site maintenance and repair services for wind turbines. Id. ¶ 3. Airway transferred him to Puerto Rico in April 2019. Id. ¶ 1. During his stay, Miller lived in a rented house in Guayama. Pls.' SUMFs ¶ 22. Further, he obtained a Dodge Ram 1500 pickup truck from an Enterprise rental car location in Carolina. Id. ¶ 13. Miller contacted his supervisor to obtain Airway's approval before renting the vehicle, Dkt. 106-1 at 10:8-10, and Airway paid for the vehicle rental, Dkt. 106-4 at 3. Miller obtained the Dodge Ram because Airway did not own any vehicles in Puerto Rico. Dkt. 114-1 at 12:14-21. He used it to drive to and from his job in Puerto Rico. Pls.' SUMFs ¶ 6. Given that he needed to commute from his house in Guayama to his worksite in Santa Isabel, and no alternative transportation was apparently available, Miller was obligated to take the vehicle home to perform his duties. Dkt. 106-1 at 14:1415; Dkt. 114-1 at 8-9.

When he obtained the Dodge Ram, Miller signed a Rental Agreement with Enterprise. See Dkt. 106-4. Miller signed the document's first page in three places and initialed it in four. Id. at 1. The phrase “Renter's Rep.” appears next to two of his three signatures and all of his initials. Id. The word “Renter” appears next to one of his signatures. Id. On the following page, Miller is twice-more identified as the renter's representative. Id. at 2. On the final page, Enterprise input Miller's driver's license number and his name under the word “Renter” and identified Airway as the entity to be billed. Id. at 3.

Back in 2014, Airway and Enterprise signed a Global Corporate Services Agreement (“Services Agreement”). Dkt. 106-3. Since then, they have executed five amendments to this agreement, one of which occurred after the relevant dates in this case. Id. The Services Agreement states that if its terms conflict with those in a Rental Agreement, the Service Agreement's terms prevail. Id. at 33. Under the Services Agreement, Enterprise agreed to make vehicles available to “Eligible Renters” at stipulated rates. Id. at 20. The Services Agreement referred to “Eligible Renters” using male and female pronouns. Id. at 3. Miller's Rental Agreement displays the same account number as the Services Agreement. Compare 106-4 at 3 with 106-3 at 1. Miller testified he understood the Services Agreement to control the terms of his rental arrangement, which was made through Airway's account. Dkt. 106-1 at 12:2-23. Airway was required to insure vehicles rented by “Eligible Renters” per the terms of the Services agreement. Dkt. 106-3 at 23.

On October, 5, 2019, Miller left his rented house in Guayama to buy a knife sharpener at the Plaza del Caribe mall in Ponce, Puerto Rico. Pls.' SUMFs ¶ 21. Miller testified he made the trip because he noticed his knives were dull while preparing dinner for himself the previous evening. Dkt. 106-1 at 13:23-16:4. He was not scheduled to work on October 5 and was not on call that day. Pls.' SUMFs ¶ 24. While returning to Guayama, he collided with a Volkswagen Jetta parked in the emergency lane km 89.4 of Highway 52 in Juana Diaz. Id. ¶ 22. Erick Padilla and Griselle Lagares, who were inside the parked Volkswagen Jetta, died in the crash. Dkt. 105 at 2; Dkt. 115 at 1. Airway and its insurers concede that Miller caused the accident. Defs.' SUMFs ¶ 30.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” only if it “is one that could be resolved in favor of either party.” Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). A fact is “material” only if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of “informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions” of the record “which it believes demonstrate the absence” of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

The court does not act as trier of fact when reviewing the parties' submissions and so cannot “superimpose [its] own ideas of probability and likelihood (no matter how reasonable those ideas may be) upon” conflicting evidence. Greenburg v. P.R. Mar. Shipping Auth., 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st Cir. 1987). Rather, the court must “view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990). And the court may not grant summary judgment “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

DISCUSSION

Airway and its insurers, Endurance and Federal Insurance, moved for summary judgment arguing (1) Airway is not vicariously liable for Miller's actions as his employer and (2) Airway is not liable as the Dodge Ram's “owner” under a Puerto Rico law treating car renters as owners responsible for tortious acts involving the vehicle because Miller, not Airway, rented the truck Miller was driving when the accident occurred. Dkt. 105. Plaintiffs and Mercado (collectively “Plaintiffs” for the remainder of this discussion) dispute both claims. Dkts. 115, 116. I discuss each contention below. I find Airway is entitled to summary judgment on the vicarious liability theory, but not the on statutory liability theory. Because I deny Airway's motion for summary judgment regarding one of Plaintiffs claims, I find its insurers are not entitled to summary judgment.

I. Airway

A. Vicarious Liability

In cases arising under diversity jurisdiction, “state law controls the substantive outcome.” Vernet v Serrano-Torres, 566 F.3d 254, 258 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, (1938)) (applying Puerto Rico's negligence and vicarious liability statutes to determine damages...