Lahood v. Stephens

MICHAEL GEORGE LAHOOD, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM STEPHENS, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:13-CV-1874

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

March 3, 2015

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Petitioner Michael George Lahood was convicted of aggravated kidnaping and aggravated sexual assault in the 185^th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas. That court sentenced him to 30 years imprisonment.

This case is before the Court on Lahood's first amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus and respondent William Stephens' motion for summary judgment. Having carefully considered the petition, the motion, all the arguments and authorities submitted by the parties, and the entire record, the Court is of the opinion that respondent's motion should be denied and Lahood's petition should be granted.

I. Background

The background facts are not in dispute. As summarized by the Texas Court of Appeals in affirming Lahood's conviction:

Complainant, Shelly Boyd Mitchell, testified that she and [Lahood] began living together in Aransas Pass in August 2003. She said that they spent their time fishing and taking illegal drugs and that they shoplifted and borrowed money when they needed things.

In September 2003, they discussed leaving Aransas Pass, but Mitchell told [Lahood] she did not think it was a good idea. One day, [Lahood] packed Mitchell's car with fishing gear and dirty clothes, leading Mitchell to believe they were going to fish and wash laundry. When she realized [Lahood] intended to take her outof town, Mitchell told him that she did not want to go, and he replied that "it wasn't a question of whether [she] wanted to or not. [She] was going." As they drove, she insisted that she wanted out of the car, but he wouldn't stop and became very angry. She tried to open the door and get out while the car was moving, but he pulled her back. She tried several more times to get out of the car, but he told her that he would kill her if she didn't "mind" him. [Lahood] made various threats to Mitchell, including that he would cut her throat, beat her beyond recognition, and cut her tattoos out so that no one would recognize her. [Lahood] physically attacked Mitchell by pulling her hair, beating her head into the car's console, biting her arms, and choking her. Mitchell was terrified and believed that [Lahood] would carry out some of these threats. She said that he had a knife with him. She made several more attempts to escape, including by putting the car in park, trying to take the keys, trying to climb out the window, and telling him to pull over. Near Wharton, [Lahood] stopped the car, gave Mitchell some pills, tied her wrists together, and told her to go to sleep.

[Lahood] told Mitchell that they were going to get "good dope." She testified that at this point she was sick and tired, and she told him she didn't want any "dope." Once they arrived in Houston, [Lahood] stopped in a parking lot, made Mitchell lie down in the back seat, and tied her ankles together. Mitchell said that she felt like she could have gotten out of the car at that time but that she couldn't have gotten away because she was not familiar with the Houston area. [Lahood] then drove to another parking lot and sexually assaulted her. Afterwards, [Lahood] fell asleep next to Mitchell in the back seat of the car. She later woke [Lahood], and they checked into a motel room. They made several trips to buy alcohol and drugs. At one point, when they exited the motel room to go buy drugs, they saw a police car near the motel, and [Lahood] and Mitchell hurried back inside the room. When [Lahood] and Mitchell later got in their vehicle to drive away, police pulled them over because of a faulty inspection sticker. Mitchell told the officers that she had been kidnapped, and [Lahood] was arrested.

Lahood v. State, 171 S.W.3d 613, 617 (Tex. App. - Houston [14^th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd.). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ("TCCA") refused Lahood's petitions for discretionary review. Lahood v. State, Nos. PD-1344-05, PD-1345-05 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 2006).

Lahood filed state habeas corpus applications on May 7, 2007. The TCCA denied the applications on June 26, 2013. Ex Parte Lahood, 401 S.W.3d 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

On June 26, 2013, Lahood filed this federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Respondent moved for summary judgment on July 31, 2014. Lahood filed a response to the motion on September 11, 2014, and filed an amended response on October 2, 2014.

II. Applicable Legal Standards

A. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

This federal petition for habeas relief is governed by the applicable provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). Under the AEDPA, federal habeas relief based upon claims that were adjudicated on the merits by the state courts cannot be granted unless the state court's decision (1) "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Kitchens v. Johnson, 190 F.3d 698, 700 (5th Cir. 1999).

For questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact adjudicated on the merits in state court, this Court may grant federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) only if the state court decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established [Supreme Court precedent]." See Martin v. Cain, 246 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 2001). Under the "contrary to" clause, this Court may afford habeas relief only if "'the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by . . . [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than . . . [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materiallyindistinguishable facts.'" Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 740-41 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000)).

The "unreasonable application" standard permits federal habeas relief only if a state court decision "identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme Court] cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner's case." Williams, 529 U.S. at 406. "In applying this standard, we must decide (1) what was the decision of the state courts with regard to the questions before us and (2) whether there is any established federal law, as explicated by the Supreme Court, with which the state court decision conflicts." Hoover v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1999). A federal court's "focus on the 'unreasonable application' test under Section 2254(d) should be on the ultimate legal conclusion that the state court reached and not on whether the state court considered and discussed every angle of the evidence." Neal v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683, 696 (5th Cir. 2001), aff'd, 286 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Neal v. Epps, 537 U.S. 1104 (2003). The solitary inquiry for a federal court under the 'unreasonable application' prong becomes "whether the state court's determination is 'at least minimally consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case.'" Id. (quoting Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335 (7^th Cir. 1997)); see also Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 551, 560 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Even though we cannot reverse a decision merely because we would reach a different outcome, we must reverse when we conclude that the state court decision applies the correct legal rule to a given set of facts in a manner that is so patently incorrect as to be 'unreasonable.'").

The AEDPA precludes federal habeas relief on factual issues unless the state court's adjudication of the merits was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(2); Hill v. Johnson,210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000). The State court's factual determinations are presumed correct unless rebutted by "clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1); see also Jackson v. Anderson, 112 F.3d 823, 824-25 (5th Cir. 1997).

B. The Standard for Summary Judgment in Habeas Corpus Cases

"As a general principle, Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, relating to summary judgment, applies with equal force in the context of habeas corpus cases." Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir. 2000). Insofar as they are consistent with established habeas practice and procedure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to habeas cases. See Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. In ordinary civil cases, a district court considering a motion for summary judgment is required to construe the facts in the case in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) ("The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor"). Where a state prisoner's factual allegations have been adversely resolved by express or implicit findings of the state courts, however, and the prisoner fails to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the presumption of correctness established by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) should not apply, it is inappropriate for the facts of a case to be resolved in the petitioner's favor. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 432 (1983); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981); Foster v. Johnson, 293 F.3d 766, 777 (5th Cir. 2002); Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 741 (5th Cir. 2000); Emery v. Johnson, 940 F.Supp. 1046, 1051 (S.D. Tex. 1996), aff'd, 139 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 1997). Consequently, where facts have been determined by the Texas state courts, this Court is bound by such findings unless an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is shown.

III. Analysis

Lahood contends that he was incompetent to stand trial. He argues that his...