Lai v. Radnor Twp. Police Dept

NICK A. LAI, Plaintiff, v. RADNOR TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPT., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-2451

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

July 11, 2016

OPINION

Slomsky, J.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Nick A. Lai, proceeding pro se, brings this suit against Defendants Radnor Township Police Department, Superintendent of Police William Colarulo, Lieutenant Andrew Block, Sergeant Mark Stiansen, Officer Steven Bannar, Officer Patrick Lacey, and Sergeant Joseph Maguire (collectively, "Defendants") for alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 ("NLRA").¹

In Count I of the Third Amended Complaint ("TAC"), Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against him based on his race and national origin in violation of Title VII. In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants created a hostile work environment also in violation of Title VII. In Count III, Plaintiff asserts unfair labor practices in violation of the NLRA. Finally, in Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against him based on his race andnational origin in violation of Title VII. (Doc. No. 22.) Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss the TAC in its entirety. (Doc. No. 24.) The Motion is now ripe for disposition.²

II. BACKGROUND³

In May 2013, the Radnor Township Police Department ("Radnor PD") hired Plaintiff, a man of Asian descent, as a Probationary Police Officer. (Doc. No. 22 ¶¶ 16-17.) Plaintiff had previously worked for the Philadelphia Police Department for approximately eighteen years. (Id. ¶ 30.) During Plaintiff's tenure at the Philadelphia Police Department, he received only positive evaluations and was not the subject of any disciplinary action. (Id. ¶ 35.) After Radnor PD hired Plaintiff, he was assigned to train with Officer Bannar and Sergeant Stiansen. (Id. ¶ 17.)

Shortly after Plaintiff was hired, he witnessed Sergeant Stiansen and other Radnor Police Officers engaging in what Plaintiff refers to as "racial profiling." (Id. ¶ 18.) Subsequently, while on patrol with Officer Bannar, Plaintiff reported the racial profiling to Officer Bannar. (Id.) Officer Bannar ignored Plaintiff's concern. (Id. ¶ 20.) One week later, Plaintiff and Officer Bannar were dispatched to assist a person with a locked vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 22.) Both Plaintiff and Officer Bannar noticed several pill bottles inside the person's car with no prescription labels. (Id.) The pills were confiscated, but no property receipt was prepared, and the driver of the vehicle, who was Caucasian, was released without arrest. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.) Plaintiff expressed concern about the improper handling of narcotics, but Officer Bannar ignored his concern. (Id. ¶ 23.) According to Plaintiff, his concerns were ignored by Officer Bannar on four occasions. (Id.)

During his employment, Radnor Police Officers also subjected Plaintiff to negative treatment. During two separate and unrelated conversations in the computer room at Radnor PD, Officer Bannar and Sergeant Stiansen both said to Plaintiff, "If you don't like it here you can go back where you came from." (Id. ¶ 27.) Another time, Officer Lacey "outwardly and publicly belittle[d] and embarrass[ed]" Plaintiff after Plaintiff asked whether there was a "community relations officer" at the Radnor PD. (Id. ¶ 29.)

Plaintiff alleges that on various occasions, he was derided "for his speech, made fun of for the jobs women in his culture engage in," and was the subject of jokes regarding his culture. (Id. ¶ 41.) Plaintiff alleged that during a twelve-hour training session with Officer Bannar, Bannar "made remarks about Chinatown massage parlors after he received a personal call from [an] unknown female." (Id. at 17.) According to Plaintiff, Officer Bannar made a comment about the caller working in a massage parlor and said, "I want to go [to] Chinatown massage parlors to get a happy ending." (Id.) Plaintiff considered this a racist comment. (Id.) Plaintiff states that his coworkers generally would "talk, laugh, and constantly point in his direction." (Id. ¶ 41.)

Plaintiff further alleges that he informed both Officer Bannar (his superior officer), and Sergeant Stiansen of various "incidents and inappropriate acts of but not limited to racial profiling." (Id. ¶ 32.) Instead of addressing his concerns, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made it impossible for him to complete his work, causing him to become "broken to the point of being forced to resign." (Id.) Specifically, Sergeant Maguire began to ignore Plaintiff during roll call, which precluded Plaintiff from accessing an overtime sheet that was being passed from officer to officer. (Id. ¶ 33.) Additionally, Plaintiff was instructed to drive a "patrol sector"⁴ for twelvehours without a break. (Id.) Plaintiff's fellow officers did not assist him. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he began to receive negative performance reports, which included false statements about him. (Id.) As a result, he suffered serious mental stress. (Id. ¶ 34.) Ultimately, he was forced to resign from the Radnor PD. (Id. ¶ 38.)

On May 4, 2015, Plaintiff initiated this action pro se after exhausting his administrative remedies under Title VII. (Doc. No. 1.) He filed an Amended Complaint on May 26, 2015. (Doc. No. 2.) On June 17, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 12). The Court held a hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on September 16, 2015. Prior to the hearing, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 15), and he presented the Second Amended Complaint at the hearing. Following the hearing, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion (Doc. No. 15), ordered that the Second Amended Complaint be filed of record, and granted Plaintiff leave to file a Third Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 19.) Upon the filing of the TAC on October 7, 2015 (Doc. No. 22), the Court denied Defendants' pending Motion to Dismiss without prejudice as moot. (Doc. No. 23.) On October 27, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the TAC. (Doc. No. 24.) Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition on December 22, 2015. (Doc. No. 26.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The motion to dismiss standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). After Iqbal it is clear that "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice" to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id. at 663; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Labs., 707 F.3d 223, n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp.,609 F.3d 239, n.27 (3d Cir. 2010)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Applying the principles of Iqbal and Twombly, the Third Circuit in Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2010), set forth a three-part analysis that a district court in this Circuit must conduct in evaluating whether allegations in a complaint survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss:

First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief."

Id. at 130 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679). "This means that our inquiry is normally broken into three parts: (1) identifying the elements of the claim, (2) reviewing the complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-pleaded components of the complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements identified in part one of the inquiry are sufficiently alleged." Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).

When determining a motion to dismiss, the court must "accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006). Where, as here, the complaint is filed pro se, the "complaint, 'however inartfully pleaded' must be held to 'less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Fatone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 193 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). It should be dismissed only if it appears "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [his] claim that would entitle [him] to relief." Olaniyi v. Alexa Cab Co., 239 Fed. Appx. 698, 699 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing McDowell v. Del. State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3d Cir. 1996)).

IV. ANALYSIS

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Defendants seek to dismiss the TAC in its entirety. (Doc. No. 24.) The Court will address each of Plaintiff's claims in turn.

A. Plaintiff Has Plausibly Alleged a Claim of Racial Discrimination

In Count I of the TAC, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against him in violation of Title VII. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, . . . or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination,⁵ a plaintiff alleging intentional discrimination may establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Rodriguez v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 532 F. App'x 152, 152 (3d Cir. 201...