Lainez v. Wilhelm, LLC

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JOSE LAINEZ, Plaintiff, v. WILHELM, LLC, Defendant.

No. 4:23-cv-04421-KAW

United States District Court, N.D. California

September 25, 2024

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND; ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION; ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS RE: DKT. NOS. 18, 31, 34

KANDIS A. WESTMORE United States Magistrate Judge.

Defendant Wilhelm, LLC removed this case to federal court on August 25 2023. On December 11, 2023, Plaintiff Jose Lainez filed a motion to remand on the grounds that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. (Pl.'s Remand Mot., Dkt. No. 18). On February 15, 2024, Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings (Def.'s J. Mot., Dkt. No. 31) and a motion to compel arbitration. (Def.'s Arbitration Mot., Dkt. No 34.)

Upon review of the moving papers, the Court finds this matter suitable for resolution without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), and, for the reasons set forth below, DENIES Plaintiff's motion to remand, GRANTS Defendant's motion to compel arbitration, and DENIES Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Defendant provides tree and debris removal services with locations in Petaluma, CA and Oroville, CA. Plaintiff worked as a machine operator and driver. (First Am. Compl., “FAC,” Dkt. No. 1 at 35 ¶ 10.)

On March 24, 2021, Plaintiff Jose Lainez, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated and the general public, filed a class action complaint in Sonoma County Superior Court. (Not. of Removal., Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 1.) On December 9, 2021, Plaintiff file an amended complaint (“FAC”) via which he dismissed all class claims, leaving in controversy only the claims for PAGA civil penalties. (Not. of Removal ¶ 2.) Therein, Plaintiff alleges that he and all other aggrieved employees were not paid for all hours worked, including overtime hours worked, due to pre- and post shift off-the-clock work, including but were not limited to gathering tools and materials, cleaning the job site, filling out forms, receiving work instruction, and putting on personal protective equipment (“PPE”). (FAC ¶ 11.) Instead, Defendant only paid for scheduled shifts, not actual hours worked. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that employees were denied adequate meal and rest periods, that Defendant failed to issue accurate, itemized wage statements, and that former employees were owed waiting time penalties because they were not paid all monetary compensation owed at the time of separation. (FAC ¶¶ 14, 17-19.) Wilhelm answered the FAC on March 22, 2022. (Not. of Removal ¶ 3, Ex. C.)

Defendant contends that, “[t]throughout his pleadings, Plaintiff omitted the fact that he was a member of a union and whose employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) since January 1, 2020, and then onward until his separation from Wilhelm on July 13, 2020.” (Not. of Removal ¶ 5.) On July 26, 2023, in the process of gathering information requested by Plaintiff, Defendant identified facts suggesting that Plaintiff was a member of a union. (Notice of Removal ¶ 6.) Thereafter, Wilhelm conducted an investigation to confirm Plaintiff's union affiliation and the date on which Plaintiff was inducted to a union. Id. On August 25, 2023, Wilhelm confirmed that Plaintiff was a unionized member of the Local Union 1245 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO since January 1, 2020. (Not. of Removal ¶ 7; see Collective Bargaining Agreement, “CBA,” Not. of Removal, Ex. D.) On August 25, 2023, within 30 days of this discovery, Defendant removed this case to federal court. (See generally Not. of Removal.)

B. Procedural Background

i. Motion to Remand

On December 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand. (Pl.'s Remand Mot., Dkt. No. 18.)

On December 26, 2023, Defendant filed an opposition. (Def.'s Remand Opp'n, Dkt. No. 20.) On January 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply. (Pl.'s Remand Reply, Dkt. No. 22.)

ii. Motion to Compel Arbitration

On February 15, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration. (Def.'s MTCA Mot., Dkt. No. 34.) On February 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. (Pl.'s MTCA Opp'n, Dkt. No. 40.) On March 7, 2024, Defendant filed a reply. (Def.'s MTCA Reply, Dkt. No. 45.)

iii. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

On February 15, 2024, Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Dkt. Nos. 31-33.) On February 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition. (Dkt. No. 39.) On March 7, 2024, Defendant filed a reply. (Dkt. No. 43.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Remand

“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper, and that the court resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state court.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations and citations omitted). Federal courts must “reject federal jurisdiction if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Grancare, LLC v. Thrower by & through Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2018) (quotations and citations omitted).

The “well-pleaded complaint rule” provides “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is present on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). “A corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the ‘complete preemption' doctrine, which applies in cases in which ‘the preemptive force of a statute is so extraordinary that it converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.'” In re NOS Commc'ns, MDL No. 1357, 495 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393).

B. Motion to Compel Arbitration

Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract.” 9 U.S.C. §2. “Once the Court has determined that an arbitration agreement relates to a transaction involving interstate commerce, thereby falling under the FAA, the court's only role is to determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists and whether the scope of the dispute falls within that agreement.” Ramirez v. Cintas Corp., No. C 04-00281 JSW, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43531, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2005) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4; Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000)).

C. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be brought at any time “[a]fter the pleadings are closed,” but “earlier enough not to delay trial.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The standard applied to decide a Rule 12(c) motion is the same as the standard used in a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011). “[J]udgment on the pleadings is appropriate when, even if all allegations in the complaint are true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Westlands Water Dist. v. Firebaugh Canal, 10 F.3d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1993). In deciding the motion, a court may consider “(1) exhibits to the non-moving party's pleading, (2) documents that are referred to in the non-moving party's pleading, or (3) facts that are included in materials that can be judicially noticed.” See Yang v. Dar Al-Handash Consultants, 250 Fed.Appx. 771, 772 (9th Cir. 2007). The court need not automatically accept as true unreasonable inferences, unwarranted deductions of fact, or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations. See W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court will address each of the pending motions below.

A. Motion to Remand

First, Plaintiff moves to remand this case to state court on the grounds that Defendant's removal was untimely, and, alternatively, that the claims are not preempted by the § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), such that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. (Pl.'s Remand Mot. at 1, 8.) The Court will address both arguments below.

i. Removal was timely.

Plaintiff argues that the case was not timely removed from state court, because, on January 20, 2021, Defendant produced numerous documents from Plaintiff's personnel file that indicated his union affiliation, including his application for union membership, employee change, notice indicating a union wage increase, payroll deduction authorization, and a wage statement showing that union dues were paid. (Pl.'s Remand Mot. at 9; Decl. of Un Kei Wu, “Wu Decl.,” Dkt. No. 18-1 ¶¶ 3, 5-8, Exs. A-D.)

In opposition, Defendant contends that the January 2021 document production is irrelevant, and that it timely removed the lawsuit because neither of the two 30-day periods for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446 apply. (Def.'s Remand Opp'n at 2-3, 6.) The fact that the FAC was not clearly removable on its face is undisputed. (See Pl.'s Remand Mot. at 9.)

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) provides two 30-day periods for removal. The first is when the pleading is removable on its face. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). The second is, when “the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3); see also Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussion of two...