Lair v. Mangan

476 F.Supp.3d 1091

Doug LAIR, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Jeff MANGAN¹ , et al., Defendants.

CV 12-12-H-CCL

United States District Court, D. Montana, Helena Division.

Signed August 3, 2020

Courtney Turner Milbank, Pro Hac Vice, Jeffrey P. Gallant, Pro Hac Vice, James Bopp, Jr., Pro Hac Vice, The Bopp Law Firm, P.C., Terre Haute, IN, Anita Y. Milanovich, Milanovich Law, PLLC, Butte, MT, for Plaintiffs.

Dale M. Schowengerdt, Crowley Fleck PLLP, Matthew T. Cochenour, Patrick M. Risken, Office of the Montana Attorney General, Helena, MT, for Defendants.

ORDER

Charles C. Lovell, Senior United States District Judge

Before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion for relief from the Court's Order and Amended judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). The Court heard argument on July 30, 2020. James Bopp, Jr., of the BOPP LAW FIRM , PC argued for Plaintiffs and was accompanied by local counsel, Anita Y. Milanovich of MILANOVICH LAW , PLLC. Matthew T. Cochenour, Acting Solicitor General for the State of Montana argued for Defendants and was accompanied by Assistant Attorney General Patrick M. Risken. Having reviewed the parties' briefs and received argument, the Court is prepared to rule.

LEGAL STANDARD

This Court can only reopen a final judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) when the request is supported by "extraordinary circumstances." Riley v. Filson , 933 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2019). A "change in the controlling law can – but does not always – provide a sufficient basis for granting relief under Rule 60(b)(6)." Henson v. Fidelity Nat'l Financial, Inc. , 943 F.3d 434, 444 (9th Cir. 2019).

In their briefing, both parties addressed the factors set out by the Ninth Circuit for deciding a Rule 60(b)(6) motion in a habeas case. Phelps v. Alameida , 569 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2009). Ten years after deciding Phelps , the Ninth Circuit concluded "that many of the Phelps factors are relevant to the Rule 60(b)(6) analysis" in non-habeas cases. Henson , 943 F.3d at 440.

In Henson , the Ninth Circuit once again emphasized, as it did in Phelps , that "courts must consider all of the relevant circumstances surrounding the specific motion before the court in order to ensure that justice be done in light of all the facts." Id. , citing Phelps at 1133. Although the Court has considered those factors in deciding the pending motion, it heeds the Ninth Circuit advice that the factors set forth in Phelps are not "intended to be a rigid or exhaustive list" and has balanced the competing policies of the finality of judgments and the need to do justice in light of all the facts. Id. at 446, quoting Phelps at 1133, 1135.

DISCUSSION

Although Plaintiffs claim to be seeking relief from this Court's May 17, 2016, order (Doc. 278) and the Amended Judgment subsequently issued by the Clerk (Doc. 280), they are actually asking the Court to set aside the Ninth Circuit's reversal of this Court's May 17, 2016, order and decision to reverse and remand the case in 2015 in response to this Court's October 10, 2012, opinion and order, (Doc. 168) which relied on the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Randall.

Plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court's November 25, 2019 per curiam opinion in Thompson v. Hebdon constitutes a change in controlling law that provides a sufficient basis for granting relief under Rule 60(b)(6). In Thompson , the Supreme Court answered in the affirmative the question whether the plurality opinion in Randall should be considered in deciding cases involving campaign finance restrictions. Thompson v. Hebdon, ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S. Ct. 348, 351 and n. *, 205 L.Ed.2d 245 (2019).

Defendants appear to concede that Plaintiffs' argument might have merit, but for the fact that the Ninth Circuit already applied Randall to Montana's limits in both its 2015 decision reversing and remanding the Court's 2012 opinion and order and its 2017 decision reversing the Court's 2016 opinion and order. Resolving this issue requires the Court to compare the events in this case to the events that led to the Supreme Court's decision in Thompson.

Procedural History – Lair v. Mangan²

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the Billings Division for the District of Montana on September 6, 2011, alleging that a number of Montana state statutes were facially unconstitutional as they violated the First Amendment. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on September 7, 2011, seeking to enjoin enforcement of these statutes. However, before any action was taken on the motion, Defendants moved to change venue and the case was transferred to the undersigned.

On February 16, 2012, the Court held a hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction and enjoined enforcement of Montana's vote-reporting requirement and political-civil libel statute, Montana Code Annotated §§ 13–35–225(3)(a), 13–37–131. The Court denied the motion as to the remaining statutes.

The Court issued its first scheduling order on March 9, 2012. The parties agreed that all of the issues regarding the contribution limits in Montana Code Annotated § 13–37–216(1), (3), and (5) would be resolved through a bench trial and that all other matters would be adjudicated by summary judgment.

The parties then cross-moved for summary judgment, and the Court held a hearing on May 12, 2012. The Court granted both motions in part and denied them in part. The Court permanently enjoined Montana's vote-reporting requirement, political-civil libel statute, and ban on corporate contributions to political committees used by those committees for independent expenditures. See Mont. Code Ann. §§ 13–35–225(3)(a), 13–37–131, 13–35–227. However, the Court concluded that Montana's ban on direct and indirect corporate contributions to candidates and political parties was constitutional. Id. at § 13–35–227. The parties cross-appealed that order but then voluntarily dismissed the appeals on July 23, 2012.

The Court held a bench trial from September 12, 2012, to September 14, 2012, in order to resolve Plaintiffs’ claims related to Montana's campaign contribution limits in Montana Code Annotated § 13–37–216(1), (3), and (5). On October 3, 2012, less than three weeks after the close of evidence, the Court issued an order declaring the contribution limits unconstitutional and permanently enjoining their enforcement. (Doc. 157). The order indicated that complete findings of fact and conclusions of law would follow, but that the Court wished to make its ultimate ruling known as far in advance of the pending November election as possible. That same day, Defendants filed a motion to stay the Court's ruling pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court did not rule on the motion immediately, instead giving Plaintiffs five days to respond. The Court ultimately denied Defendants’ motion to stay.

On October 4, 2012, Defendants filed a notice of appeal of the Court's October 3rd order and judgment. On October 10, 2012, the Ninth Circuit motions panel assigned to the case temporarily stayed the Court's order and judgment pending appeal, citing the fact that the Court had yet to issue its findings of fact and conclusions of law. That same afternoon, this Court issued its findings and conclusions, relying primarily on the United States Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Randall v. Sorrell , 548 U.S. 230, 126 S.Ct. 2479, 165 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006), to find that Montana's campaign contribution limits do not pass constitutional muster. (Doc. 168).

On October 16, 2012, the Ninth Circuit motions panel issued its full opinion granting Defendants’ motion to stay for the duration of the appeal. In essence, the motions panel concluded that Defendants were likely to succeed on appeal because the Ninth Circuit's decision in Montana Right to Life Association v. Eddleman , 343 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter, Eddleman ], likely remained good law despite Randall. See Lair v. Bullock , 697 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter, Lair I ].

On May 26, 2015, the Ninth Circuit merits panel assigned to the case issued its opinion, which was subsequently amended and re-issued on September 1, 2015. See Lair v. Bullock , 798 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2015) [hereinafter, Lair II ]. The Lair II court reversed and remanded, directing this Court to apply the following test from Eddleman to the case at bar: "state campaign contribution limits will be upheld if (1) there is adequate evidence that the limitation furthers a sufficiently important state interest, and (2) if the limits are ‘closely drawn’—i.e., if they (a) focus narrowly on the state's interest, (b) leave the contributor free to affiliate with a candidate, and (c) allow the candidate to amass sufficient resources to wage an effective campaign." 798 F.3d at 748. The Lair II court expressly held that Randall did not overrule the Eddleman closely-drawn analysis "because there simply was no binding ... decision on that point." Id. at 747. However, the Lair II court also held that the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission , 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010), abrogated Eddleman to the extent the latter relied upon an impermissible notion of what constitutes an "important state interest" vis-à-vis contribution limits. Id.

The Lair II court provided explicit instructions to this Court as to the standard to apply on remand. First, having interpreted the Court's October 10, 2012 findings and conclusions as silent on the issue of whether Defendants established an important state interest underlying the statutes at issue, the Lair II court directed the Court "either (1) to decide whether Montana has carried its burden in showing the contribution limits further a valid ‘important state interest’ or, if the [Court] again assumes the state has carried its burden, (2) to identify expressly what interest the [Court] assumes exists." Id. at 748. The Ninth Circuit also directed the Court to apply the three-part closely-drawn test from Eddleman , should it find that the contribution limits...