Laird v. Olver

LANCE LAIRD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LAUREN OLVER, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:16-cv-14376

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

January 25, 2019

HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS [42, 51] AND DISMISSING THE CASE

On March 29, 2018, Plaintiff¹ filed an amended complaint. ECF 32. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Patricia Worth ("Worth"), as Guardian ad litem for his children, and all other Defendants, as employees of the Michigan Department of Human Services ("DHS"), violated his constitutional rights while acting under the color of state law. See generally, id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his First Amendment right to family association and unity, his Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights, and his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at 257-60. On April 26, 2018, Defendants Sarah Britten, Debra Faust, Angela Jenkins, Amanda Ostrander, Charles Rose, Jennifer Sczykutowicz, and Mollie Wagner ("DHS Defendants")² filed a motion to dismissbased on qualified immunity. ECF 42. On May 18, 2018, Defendant Rashaad Jones filed a motion to dismiss because the amended complaint does not identify him as personally involved in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. ECF 51. On December 12, 2018, the Court dismissed Defendant Patricia Worth from the case. ECF 66.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Lance Laird is the biological father of the minor plaintiffs he represents in the case. His claims arise out of a prior Michigan state-court proceeding regarding his—and the children's mother's—parental rights. In Laird's state court litigation, the Michigan Supreme Court considered Michigan's "one-parent doctrine," under which, after a court has established jurisdiction over a child by adjudicating the rights of one parent, "the court [can] then enter dispositional orders affecting the parental rights of both parents." In re Sanders, 495 Mich. 394, 407 (2014) (emphasis in original). The Michigan Supreme Court held that "dispositional hearings are constitutionally inadequate; due process requires that every parent receive an adjudication hearing before the state can interfere with his or her parental rights." Id. at 415. The Michigan Supreme Court therefore found that the prior adjudication of the children's mother's rights did not provide a valid basis for Laird's parental rights to be modified after only a dispositional hearing. Id. at 421-23. Laird now seeks monetary damages against the DHS employees involved in his custody battle.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When analyzing a motion to dismiss under Civil Rule 12(b)(6), the Court views the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, presumes the truth of allwell-pleaded factual assertions, and draws every reasonable inference in favor of the non-moving party. Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). To survive a motion to dismiss, "the complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Nat'l Hockey League Players Ass'n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d 462, 468 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). It must allege facts "sufficient 'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,' and to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007)).

Section 1983 subjects those acting under the color of state law to liability for violating the constitutional or statutory rights of citizens. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "But government officials performing discretionary functions generally are granted a qualified immunity[.]" Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). Qualified immunity shields government officials "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Qualified immunity not only shields officials from liability but immunizes them from suit altogether. See Porter v. City of Dyersburg, No. 07-2638 B/P, 2008 WL 2222693, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 2, 2008) (quoting Skousen v. Brighton High Sch., 305 F.3d 520, 526 (6th Cir. 2002)). "After a defendant has raised the defense of qualified immunity by a motion to dismiss . . . the burden of pleading factswhich, if true, 'describe a violation of a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable public official, under an objective standard, would have known' rests on plaintiff." Gregory v. Hunt, 872 F. Supp. 476, 479 (W.D. Tenn. 1991) (quoting Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297, 299 (6th Cir. 1986)).

DISCUSSION

I. Defendant Rashaad Jones

Jones asserts that Plaintiff's allegations do not identify him as personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations. ECF 51, PgID 486. Although Plaintiff alleges that "[a]ll named defendants in this action were involved in the taking, causing to be took [sic] (from LL), investigation and other personal involvement regarding LL's plaintiff minor children," his factual allegations regarding Defendant Jones are scarce. ECF 32, PgID 255. And when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court "need not accept a 'bare assertion of legal conclusions.'" Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Columbia Nat. Res., Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995)).

Plaintiff asserts Jones: "was, at all times relevant to this action, a caseworker employed by DHS;" placed C.L. with Plaintiff on September 19, 2011; inspected the home that same date and found no concerns; placed P.S. and C.L. with Plaintiff's mother, Shirley Behling, on November 2, 2011; and inspected the home that day and again found no concerns. ECF 32, PgID 249-50. The complaint alleges neither that Jones took Plaintiff's children from him nor that Jones modified Plaintiff's parentalrights. Plaintiff therefore failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to Jones and the Court will grant Jones's motion to dismiss.

II. DHS Defendants

DHS Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's claims. ECF 42. DHS caseworkers and supervisors enjoy qualified immunity for removing children from homes and making placement determinations. See Ratte v. Corigan, 989 F. Supp. 2d 550, 563-64 (E.D. Mich. 2013); Brent v. Wayne Cty. Dep't of Human Servs., 901 F.3d 656, 685 (6th Cir. 2018). Plaintiff must therefore allege facts demonstrating that DHS Defendants infringed a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of their actions. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243-44 (2009).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants infringed four of his constitutional rights—his First Amendment right to family association and unity, his Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights, and his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. The Court will address each claim in turn.

A. First Amendment Claim

Plaintiff first alleges that Defendants infringed his and his children's First Amendment rights of family association and unity. ECF 32, PgID 257-58. He alleges that the First Amendment protects "a parent's right and a child's liberty interest in familial integrity." Id. at 257. Familial integrity claims, however, do not implicate the First Amendment. See Ballard v. Johnson, No. 15-11039, 2017 WL 1151166, at *8(E.D. Mich. Mar. 28, 2017) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)). Plaintiff therefore failed to allege that the DHS Defendants violated his clearly established constitutional rights. DHS Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from the First Amendment claim.

B. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim

Plaintiff next alleges that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because he was not afforded constitutionally-sufficient procedure before his children were removed from his custody. ECF 32, PgID 258-59. Although the Michigan Supreme Court has already held that Plaintiff's due process rights were infringed³ when his children were removed from his custody, see In re Sanders 495 Mich. at 421-23, qualified immunity shields DHS Defendants from this claim. DHS Defendants are immune unless Plaintiff pleaded facts sufficient to allege a violation of a constitutional right that was clearly established at the time the DHS Defendants acted. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609. "The dispositive question is 'whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.'" Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (emphasis in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)). Whether the right is clearly established must be determined "in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Id. (per curiam) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004)).

Here, the general proposition that "[t]he integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" was clearly established at the time of the DHS Defendants' actions. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651. The more specific right—whether proceeding in accordance with Michigan's established "one-parent doctrine" was unconstitutional—was not clearly established at the time of DHS Defendants' actions. Indeed, it was Plaintiff's case that established that the doctrine was unconstitutional. See In re Sanders, 495 Mich. at 421-23. Until that decision, the one-parent doctrine was an established doctrine grounded in a Michigan statutory scheme that had existed "for more than 70 years." See id. at 423 (Markman, J., dissenting). The unconstitutionality of...