Laird v. State

1

Chase Daniel Laird, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee

No. 03-21-00631-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Third District, Austin

December 22, 2023

FROM THE 207TH DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY NO. CR2016-302, THE HONORABLE DIB WALDRIP, JUDGE PRESIDING

Before Justices Baker, Kelly, and Smith

OPINION

Edward Smith, Justice

Appellant Chase Daniel Laird was convicted by a jury of trafficking a child and sexual assault of a child and sentenced to sixty years' and twenty years' confinement, respectively. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 20A.02(a)(7), 22.011(a)(2). The trial court ordered that the sentences run concurrently. On appeal, Laird contends that the anti-trafficking statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague and that his right to a speedy trial was violated. We will affirm the trial court's judgments of conviction.

BACKGROUND^[1]

In January 2016, Laird, then 24 years old, met Suzie Marie^[2] on a dating app, and the two soon began messaging on Facebook. Although Marie was 14 years old at the time, her friend-who created Marie's profile-gave her age as 19. At Laird's request, Marie sent him 15 photographs some of which depicted her naked breasts and genitalia.

Laird messaged Marie again in mid-February, pressuring her to meet him for sex and threatening to "post[ the photographs] somewhere" if she refused. Despite her repeated insistence that she was in fact 14, he told her to "stop playing the age card" and accused her of claiming that she was "19[,] then 16, then 15 and now 14." He messaged that if she were to have sex with him, he would allow her to delete the photographs from his phone.

On February 18th, he went to a bowling alley in New Braunfels where she was competing in a youth league. He led her to his SUV, drove her a short distance to a residential area, and had sex with her in the back of the vehicle. On returning to the bowling alley, she called her mother and told her that she had "met up with and had sex with a grown man."^[3]

Marie was examined by a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE), and swabs were taken from her vagina; DNA from semen on the swabs was later determined to be consistent with Laird's DNA profile. On March 17th, he emailed her from his Texas State account, apologizing for the quality of the sex and asking if they could have sex again.

He was indicted with trafficking a child (count I), sexual assault of a child (count II), and sexual performance by a child (count III). Following a trial-at which he testified and admitted to having had sex with Marie, who he knew was a minor-he was convicted by a jury on all three counts. The jury sentenced him to sixty years' confinement for count I, twenty years' confinement for count II, and twenty years' confinement for count III. Because of double-jeopardy concerns, the trial court vacated the conviction for count III and dismissed the charge. The court also ordered that the remaining sentences run concurrently. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Constitutional Challenges to Section 20A.02(a)(7)

In his first two issues, Laird contends that the anti-trafficking statute under which he was convicted, Section 20A.02(a)(7) of the Texas Penal Code, is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. See Tex. Penal Code § 20A.02(a)(7). Specifically, he asserts that the statute encroaches on "young people's" First Amendment rights to intimate association and marriage, that it fails to provide adequate notice of what conduct it proscribes, and that it vests prosecutors "with impermissible power and no guiding standards."

Preservation of error is a systemic requirement on appeal. Ford v State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Haley v. State, 173 S.W.3d 510, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). If an issue has not been preserved for appeal, we should not address the merits of that issue. Id. To preserve a complaint for appellate review, there must ordinarily be a timely, specific objection and a ruling by the trial court. Tex.R.App.P. 33.1(a). "To be timely, a complaint must be made as soon as the grounds for complaint [are] apparent or should be apparent." Wilson v. State, 7 S.W.3d 136, 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). To be sufficiently specific, an objection need not employ "hypertechnical or formalistic . . . words or phrases," Golliday v. State, 560 S.W.3d 664, 670 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); "magic words," Ford, 305 S.W.3d at 533; or a citation to a particular statute, Laws v. State, 640 S.W.3d 227, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (quoting Ford, 305 S.W.3d at 533). Rather, the objecting party must "let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks he is entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the judge is in the proper position to do something about it." Pena v. State, 285 S.W.3d 459, 464 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). "This gives the trial judge and the opposing party an opportunity to correct the error." Pena, 285 S.W.3d at 464 (citing Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)).

An appellant may claim that a statute is unconstitutional "on its face" or "as applied." A claim that a statute is facially unconstitutional is a claim "that the statute, by its terms, always operates unconstitutionally." Gillenwaters v. State, 205 S.W.3d 534, 536 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citing Texas Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 461 n.5 (Tex. 1997)); see McGruder v. State, 483 S.W.3d 880, 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (noting that facial challenge "is an attack on the statute itself"). In contrast, an as-applied challenge claims "that the statute, although generally constitutional, operates unconstitutionally as to the claimant because of his particular circumstances." Gillenwaters, 205 S.W.3d at 537 n.3 (citing Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d at 461 n.5).

Although we understand Laird to contend that Section 20A.02(a)(7) is unconstitutional on its face, the nature of his constitutional challenges is irrelevant for purposes of our analysis. The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that both facial and as-applied challenges must be raised before the trial court, or they are waived.^[4] See Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (concluding that "a defendant may not raise for the first time on appeal a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute"); Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that as-applied constitutional challenges were not preserved for appellate review because no specific, timely objections were made at trial); see also Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Flores v. State, 245 S.W.3d 432, 437 n.14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Coggin v. State, 123 S.W.3d 82, 89 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, pet. ref'd).

As the State observes, Laird did not raise any challenge to the constitutionality of Section 20A.02(a)(7) in the trial court and did not specifically object that the statute was vague or overbroad; thus, he has failed to preserve either of his issues for our review. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 (a); Karenev, 281 S.W.3d at 434; Curry, 910 S.W.2d at 496; Robisheaux v. State, 483 S.W.3d 205, 214-15 (Tex. App.-Austin 2016, pet. ref'd) (rejecting facial challenge to constitutionality of statute and concluding that it did not violate prohibition against ex post facto laws); see also Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 676 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) ("Appellant also challenged the constitutionality of this statutory framework, both facially and as applied to him. Because those grounds were not preserved for appellate review because Appellant did not raise any such challenges at the trial court level, the court of appeals overruled those grounds."). We overrule his first and second issues.

II. Speedy-Trial Right Violation

In his third issue, Laird contends that his right to a speedy trial was violated under the balancing framework articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).

The Supreme Court in Barker listed four factors that a court should consider in addressing a speedy trial claim: (1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the defendant because of the length of delay. Id.; see Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Sample v. State, 653 S.W.3d 287, 291 (Tex. App.-Austin 2022, pet. ref'd). The State bears the burden of justifying the length of the delay, while the defendant has the burden of proving his assertion of the right to a speedy trial and of showing prejudice. State v. Davis, 549 S.W.3d 688, 697 (Tex. App.-Austin 2017, no pet.) (citing Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)). The defendant's burden of proof on the third and fourth factors "'varies inversely' with the State's degree of culpability for the delay." Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280. Thus, the greater the State's bad faith or official negligence and the longer its actions delay a trial, the less a defendant must show actual prejudice or prove diligence in asserting his right to a speedy trial. Id. at 280-81. None of the factors is a necessary or sufficient condition of finding a speedy-trial-right deprivation. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. They are instead "related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant." Id. Because the factors have no "talismanic qualities," courts must "still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process." Id.

We have previously discussed the two-phase standard for reviewing a trial court's ruling on a speedy-trial claim:

[W]e review factual components for an abuse of discretion and legal components de novo. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 282. Review of the four

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