Lajeunesse v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea

160 F.Supp.2d 324

David LAJEUNESSE, Plaintiff, v. The GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC TEA COMPANY, INC., Waldbaum's Foodmart, Inc. and Donald Knoll Defendants.

CIV.A. No. 399CV01630AWT.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

August 31, 2001.

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Otto P. Witt, James S. Brewer, West Hartford, CT, for plaintiff.

Felix J. Springer, Daniel Adam Schwartz, Meredith G. Diette, Day, Berry & Howard, Hartford, CT, for defendants.

RULING ON THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THOMPSON, District Judge.

The plaintiff, David Lajeunesse, has alleged that the defendants wrongfully terminated his employment. The defendants have moved for summary judgment as to all claims. For the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary judgment is being granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company ("A & P") owns and operates grocery stores throughout the United States and Canada. Defendant Waldbaum's is a subsidiary of A & P, and operates a number of grocery stores in and around the New England area, including in Connecticut. Defendant Knoll was the store manager of the Rocky Hill, Connecticut store, where the plaintiff was working at the time his employment was terminated.

On October 31, 1988, Waldbaum's hired the plaintiff to work as the night crew chief at its Manchester, Connecticut store. The plaintiff was transferred from store to store as business needs arose. Around 1990, he was promoted to the position of Assistant Grocery Manager at the Newington, Connecticut store. In February 1997, Waldbaum's transferred the plaintiff to its Rocky Hill, Connecticut store to supervise the night shift there.

In January 1998, the plaintiff's direct supervisor and defendant Knoll prepared a review of the plaintiff's job performance, as an Assistant Grocery Manager, for 1997. Annual performance reviews are conducted by ranking employees in ten different categories on a scale of one to five. Overall performance is determined by averaging those ten scores. An overall average score of 3.6 or above is considered to exceed expectations. A score between 2.6 and 3.59 is considered to meet expectations. A score of 2.59 or below is considered to not meet expectations. The plaintiff received an overall score of 2.73. He reviewed and signed the performance review in March 1998.

On May 9, 1998, the plaintiff injured his right shoulder while turning a crank on the recycle bin at work. He was admitted to Manchester Memorial Hospital, where the treating physician, Dr. Klaus, diagnosed the plaintiff as having suffered a "rotator cuff injury" to his right shoulder. In releasing the plaintiff from the hospital, she stated that he was able to return to work immediately on a "modified" basis, with the limitations that he not use his right arm and hand and that he not be required to lift any object heavier than 15 pounds with his left hand. The doctor gave him a note to this effect. She also recommended that he take a couple of days off from work, and gave him a separate note to that effect. Prior to this injury, there were no physical limitations on the plaintiff's ability to perform his job.

On May 10, 1998, the plaintiff returned to work and gave Knoll the doctor's notes. He notified Knoll that because of his injury he needed to take a couple of days off from work and that he intended to file a worker's compensation claim. Knoll indicated that as a manager, the plaintiff could not afford to take several days off from work and that if he did so, he would be fired. Knoll determined that the plaintiff should return to work with the restriction recommended by the doctor. The plaintiff returned to work the following day.

On May 27, 2001, the plaintiff saw his regular orthopedic doctor, Dr. Messinger, for a check-up. Dr. Messinger diagnosed the plaintiff as suffering from a right shoulder sprain, rotator cuff tendinitis and a possible tear. He recommended some treatments and concluded that the plaintiff was able to return to work full duty if he exercised caution in lifting.

From late 1997 through 1998, for financial reasons, Waldbaum's began to close certain of its stores and to reduce its workforce. In 1997 and early 1998, Waldbaum's closed over ten stores and reduced its workforce accordingly. Then, in mid-1998, it closed an additional three stores, which necessitated, inter alia, a reduction in the managerial ranks, including the position of Assistant Grocery Manager. On each occasion, Waldbaums' procedure for reducing its workforce was based on a comparison of the performances of all employees at all stores in the same job classification.

In connection with the reduction in the workforce pursuant to which the plaintiff's employment was terminated, Waldbaums' Director of Personnel, Sheila McCloskey, analyzed the position of Assistant Grocery Manger. She did so by comparing the overall performance scores from the performance reviews for 1997 of the individuals in position of Assistant Grocery Manager; this encompassed 35 stores.¹ No other documents were relied upon to make the decision as to which employees to terminate. McCloskey also discussed the performance of the employees holding this position with Waldbaum's Vice President of Operations, Chuck McCutchen, and District Manager, Ray Elumba. The plaintiff had received a score of 2.73 and ranked last in overall performance among all of the night managers, and, in fact, among all of the Assistant Grocery Managers.

Based on the 1998 performance scores and their personal knowledge of the employees' performance, both McCloskey and Elumba recommended to McCutchen that three Assistant Grocery Managers, including the plaintiff, be terminated. In July 1998, Waldbaum's terminated the plaintiff's employment at a meeting between the plaintiff, McCutchen, McCloskey and Elumba. Defendant Knoll, who reported to Elumba, was not involved in the decision to terminate the plaintiff's employment and was not aware of the termination until it had occurred. On or about July 31, 1998, the plaintiff filed a worker's compensation claim related to his shoulder injury.

Subsequently, the plaintiff worked as the deli manager of Santilli's Market. He states that he was able to perform that job with "just a little, not much" restriction from his shoulder injury. Pl.'s Dep. (Defs.' Statement of Undisputed Facts (doc. # 55), Exh. 3) at 99. Since September 21, 1998, the plaintiff has worked as the dairy manager at Shaw's Supermarket. In this position, his tasks include stocking shelves and lifting objects which weigh five to ten pounds. His right shoulder bothers him, but he is able to perform all of his job-related tasks on a daily basis.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment may not be granted unless the court determines that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried and that the facts as to which there is no such issue warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir.1994). Rule 56(c) "mandates the entry of summary judgment... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

When ruling a motion for summary judgment, the court must respect the province of the jury. The court, therefore, may not try issues of fact. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Donahue v. Windsor Locks Bd. of Fire Comm'rs, 834 F.2d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1987); Heyman v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1319-20 (2d Cir. 1975). It is well-established that "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of the judge." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Thus, the trial court's task is "carefully limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined... to issue-finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution." Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224.

Summary judgment is inappropriate only if the issue to be resolved is both genuine and related to a material fact. Therefore, the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. An issue is "genuine... if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal quotation marks omitted). A material fact is one that would "affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. As the Court observed in Anderson: "[T]he materiality determination rests on the substantive law, [and] it is the substantive law's identification of which facts are critical and which facts are irrelevant that governs." Id. Thus, only those facts that must be decided in order to resolve a claim or defense will prevent summary judgment from being granted. When confronted with an asserted factual dispute, the court must examine the elements of the claims and defenses at issue on the motion to determine whether a resolution of that dispute could affect the disposition of any of those claims or defenses. Immaterial or minor facts will not prevent summary judgment. See Howard v. Gleason Corp., 901 F.2d 1154, 1159 (2d Cir.1990).

When reviewing the evidence on a motion for summary judgment, the court must "assess the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant and... draw all reasonable inferences in its favor." Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting Del. & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 902...