Laker v. Caras

538 P.3d 926

Christopher LAKER, Appellant,

v.Christopher CARAS, Director of the Driver License Division, Department of Public Safety, Appellee.

No. 20220557-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed October 19, 2023

Jason A. Schatz, Salt Lake City, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes, Salt Lake City, and Andrew Dymek, Attorneys for Appellee

Judge Ryan M. Harris authored this Opinion, in which Judges Michele M. Christiansen Forster and Ryan D. Tenney concurred.

Opinion

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 Christopher Laker was arrested on suspicion of drunk driving. Later, after an administrative hearing, the Driver License Division determined that Laker had refused the arresting officer's request that he submit to a chemical test to determine his blood alcohol level, and therefore revoked his driver license for a period of 18 months. The district court reached that same conclusion after a trial de novo. Laker now appeals, challenging the court's finding that he refused a chemical test. We conclude, however, that the court's finding was supported by substantial evidence, and therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 One night in November 2021, a Salt Lake City police officer (Officer) was called to the scene of an automobile accident.¹ Laker was identified as the driver of the vehicle. Upon his arrival at the scene, Officer noted the odor of alcohol coming from Laker and observed that Laker had slurred speech and bloodshot eyes and was unsteady on his feet. Laker admitted to Officer that he had been drinking. After Laker exhibited what Officer believed to be an inordinate number of clues during field sobriety testing, Officer arrested Laker and transported him via patrol car to the police station.

¶3 After arriving at the station, but while Laker was still inside the patrol car, Officer asked Laker to submit to a chemical test to determine his blood alcohol level. Officer made this request using a prepared form, and he read the request "verbatim off the form." Specifically, Officer informed Laker that he was under arrest on suspicion of drunk driving, and Officer asked Laker to "submit to a chemical test to determine the alcohol and/or drug content of [his] body"; Officer also warned Laker that a positive test result could "result in denial, suspension, revocation, or disqualification of [his] driving privilege." Laker refused Officer's initial request.

¶4 Following protocol, Officer then began to read Laker a second warning, again using a prepared form that law enforcement personnel use in situations in which an arrestee initially refuses a request to submit to a chemical test; this warning is known as the "refusal admonition." Before reading the admonition, Officer informed Laker that once the admonition had been read, it would be Laker's decision "to submit or not submit to the chemical test," and he would ask Laker for his "response, if any," but he thereafter would not "continue" to ask Laker what his position was. Officer then read Laker the following admonition, again doing so "verbatim" from the form:

If you refuse the test or fail to follow my instructions, I must warn you that your driving privilege may be revoked for 18 months if age 21 or older, or for 2 years, or until age 21 if you are under the age of 21; or 36 months, or until age 21 if it is a second or subsequent license withdrawal for an alcohol or drug related driving offense, with no provision for limited driving. You may be subject to criminal prosecution. In addition, you will be prohibited from driving with any measurable or detectable amount of alcohol in your body for a period of five or ten years, depending on your prior driving history, and you will be prohibited from driving a vehicle without an ignition interlock device installed for a period of three years. I will make the test results available to you, if you take the test.

¶5 After receiving the refusal admonition, Laker did not immediately agree to submit to a test. Instead, he responded by expressing confusion and concern about the test, and by requesting to call his mother.² In response, Officer commented to Laker, while still in the patrol car outside the station, that the decision about whether "to submit or not to submit" was "completely up to him," but that this decision needed to be made "within a reasonable amount of time." Officer then explained that he was going to "take [Laker's] seatbelt off" and take him into the station and "lock [him] into" an "Intox room," events that would give Laker a few minutes to consider his decision.

¶6 Once inside the Intox room, Officer "secured [Laker] to the bench" and then stood "in front of" Laker "for probably two minutes, waiting for" Laker to offer a "yes or a no" to the test request. Laker offered no response. At that point, Officer informed Laker he was "going to be in the other room" but would still be able to see and hear Laker, so if Laker "need[ed] anything or if [he] ha[d] any further questions" to let Officer know. Without making any further statements to Laker, Officer marked Laker as a "refusal" and began drafting a search warrant for a blood draw. While Officer was away, Laker was "on his phone."

¶7 By the time Officer returned, he had obtained a warrant to have Laker's blood drawn for testing and informed Laker that they just needed to wait for the phlebotomist who would be performing the blood draw. Altogether, the intake process lasted between two and two and a half hours, during which time Laker never once stated that he would agree to submit to a chemical test.

¶8 Some weeks later, Laker was notified that the Driver License Division (the Division) intended to revoke his license for 18 months because "a peace officer had reasonable grounds to believe that [Laker] refused to submit to a chemical test after being requested and warned by a peace officer." Following an administrative hearing, the Division determined that Laker "did not submit to the [chemical] test" and therefore revoked Laker's driving privileges for 18 months.

¶9 Laker then sought judicial review of the Division's determination. The district court held a trial de novo to consider the matter; at that trial, Officer was the only witness to testify. At the end of the trial, the court took the matter under advisement.

¶10 Later that day, the court issued a written ruling denying Laker's petition for relief. The court found that Laker had indeed refused to submit to a chemical test upon request, noting that "the law require[s] an immediate request to have the test," which immediate consent Laker had not given, and stating that it could "not find" that Officer's "waiting for several minutes before finding a refusal occurred was unreasonable." Accordingly, the court declined to disturb the Division's 18-month revocation of Laker's driver license.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11 Laker now appeals, and challenges the court's finding that Laker "refused" to submit to a chemical test. "Our review of a trial de novo on a driver license suspension is deferential to the [district] court's view of the evidence unless the [district] court has misapplied principles of law or its findings are clearly against the weight of the evidence." Decker v. Rolfe , 2008 UT App 70, ¶ 9, 180 P.3d 778 (quotation simplified). In particular, "[t]he determination that [an arrestee's] failure to respond to the officer or to take the test amounts to a refusal is a factual finding which we will not disturb when supported by substantial evidence." Lee v. Schwendiman , 722 P.2d 766, 767 (Utah 1986) (per curiam).

ANALYSIS

¶12 Under governing Utah law, "every person who chooses to drive a vehicle on Utah's roadways is deemed to have given implied consent, for driver license purposes, to a chemical test of their ‘breath, blood, urine, or oral fluids’ for the purpose of determining their impairment level." Gukeisen v. Department of Public Safety , 2020 UT App 32, ¶ 8, 461 P.3d 1146 (quotation simplified) (quoting Utah Code § 41-6a-520(1)(a) ); see also Beck v. Cox , 597 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah 1979) (observing that Utah statutory law "provides that a driver is deemed to have given his consent" to a chemical "test as a condition to using the highways" (quotation simplified)). The implied consent statute requires any officer who, after an arrest, asks a motorist to submit to a chemical test to "warn [the motorist] that refusal to submit to the test ... may result in ... revocation of the [motorist's] license to operate a motor vehicle." Utah Code § 41-6a-520(2)(a).

¶13 Our law is clear that, once this warning has been given, a driver must "immediately request" that the officer administer the test. See id. § 41-6a-520(2)(b)(i) ; see also Lee v. Schwendiman , 722 P.2d 766, 767 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) ("[A] driver must affirmatively agree to submit to a test immediately following clear warning of the consequences of refusal." (emphasis added)). A driver who, after receiving the warning, does not immediately consent to a chemical test will be deemed to have "refused" the test. See Lee , 722 P.2d at 767 (stating that "refusal is presumed" in the absence of immediate consent); Conrad v. Schwendiman , 680 P.2d 736, 738 (Utah 1984) (stating that "refusal is conclusively presumed" absent immediate consent).

¶14 Moreover, the immediate consent must be clear and unequivocal. Indeed, "a motorist can ‘refuse’ a chemical test in any number of ways, and ... may be considered to have refused the test even without actually saying ‘no’ or ‘I refuse.’ " Gukeisen , 2020 UT App 32, ¶ 9, 461 P.3d 1146. A motorist cannot dodge a request for a chemical test "by temporizing, equivocating, or simply remaining silent," or even by asking for an attorney. Id. ¶¶ 8–9 (quotation simplified); see also Holman v. Cox , 598 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1979) (stating that the "whole statutory scheme" of the implied consent law "could be subverted by one who equivocates or remains silent, and later protests that it was his unexpressed intent to take the test"). Our law requires...