Lamb v. McMillen

LUCAS A. LAMB, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT MCMILLEN Defendant.

Civil No. 16-3004

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

FILED: September 8, 2016

September 6, 2016

OPINION

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:

Before the Court is Defendant Robert McMillen's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Lucas A. Lamb's Complaint Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (d/e 6). Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Complaint does not state a claim for malicious prosecution under federal or state law or a claim for unlawful retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Defendant and the prosecutor both had probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had violated 720 ILCS 5/32-4(a), a statute prohibiting communication with a person thought to have been summoned as a juror with the intent to influence that person regarding any matter that may be brought before them in their capacity as a juror. This probable cause is based on Plaintiff's Facebook posts and Defendant's finding, noted in his police report, that Mark Boston was empaneled on a jury in a traffic case on January 13, 2014.

Further, because Plaintiff does not allege that he was detained after charges were filed, he does not state a claim for malicious prosecution under federal law, even if such a claim exists after the United States Supreme Court's resolution of Manuel v. City of Joliet, in which the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff was precluded from bringing a federal due process claim for malicious prosecution because Illinois law provides an adequate remedy for malicious prosecution. See 590 F. App'x 641, 642, (7th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 136 S. Ct. 890, 193 L. Ed. 2d 783 (2016). The Court relinquishes jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claim for intentional interference with electoral expectancy and dismisses the claim without prejudice so that Plaintiff may refile the claim in state court.

I. BACKGROUND¹

Plaintiff Lucas A. Lamb is a resident of Greene County, Illinois. At all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant Robert McMillen was Sheriff of Greene County, Illinois. Defendant, a Democrat, was elected Sheriff in November 2010 without opposition.

As both a citizen and a member of the Greene County Board, Plaintiff, a Republican, has been outspoken about his views regarding politics, including his views about the limited role that he believes that the Government should play in the lives of citizens and changes that Plaintiff would make to the Green County Sheriff's Office's policies. Plaintiff has openly criticized law enforcement for prosecuting crimes that Plaintiff believes to be victimless and for acting in a manner that Plaintiff believes to be duplicitous, unfair, unconstitutional, and cost-ineffective. Plaintiff has also expressed additional political views that are at odds with Defendant.

On or about December 8, 2013, Plaintiff declared that he would run against Defendant in the 2014 election for Sheriff ofGreene County. Plaintiff was the only opponent of Defendant in the election. On or before January 16, 2014, Defendant was aware that Plaintiff was running against Defendant for Sheriff in the 2014 election.

On January 13, 2014, Plaintiff, Mark Boston, Plaintiff's acquaintance and a candidate for the Greene County Board, and others, posted commentary on Boston's Facebook wall. The relevant comments between Plaintiff, Boston, and T. Koehne were as follows:

Boston (10:29 AM): Yeah, got selected for jury duty

Plaintiff (10:47 AM): Hell yes!

Plaintiff (10:47 AM): Nullify, nullify, nullify!

Plaintiff (11:50 AM): Fija.org

Boston (11:51 AM): got it

Plaintiff (11:53 AM): Hopefully it's a seat belt ticket. Sometimes I daydream about being on a jury that votes not guilty on a seat belt ticket. You have the right to judge the law and the action. Hang the jury, if necessary. Stand your ground and inform the jury of fija.org.

Boston (11:54 AM): nope speeding in a school zone

Plaintiff (11:55 AM): Great. Remember there must be a clear victim.

Plaintiff (2:46 PM): What's the verdict man, I'm dying here

T. Koehne (3:12 PM): Are jurors suppose [sic] to talk about cases?

On January 16, 2014, Defendant prepared and filed an incident report identifying Plaintiff as a suspect for violating 720 ILCS 5/32-4(a), an Illinois statute criminalizing unlawful communications with a juror. Defendant's incident report stated:

On Tuesday, January 14, 2014, at approx. 8:22 p.m., I (Greene County Sheriff Robert D. McMillen, #108) was contacted by Greene County Deputy Sheriff Cliff Elliot, and advised that he has information regarding some communications that Mark Boston had with Luke Lamb, pertaining to a Greene County jury trial, that was conducted on Monday, January 13, 2014. Deputy Elliot stated that Greenfield Chief of Police John Goode has viewed a Facebook conversation between Boston and Lamb. I advised Deputy Elliot to contact Chief Goode and have him copy it for me to review. It should be noted that Mark Boston served on [sic] as a Greene County juror on Monday, January 13th, concerning a traffic case, entitled State of Illinois v. Roberta Lockhart. The jury was picked on this case on Monday, January 13th, in the morning hours, and the jury trial took place shortly after 1:00 p.m. that same day.

On Thursday, January 16, 2014, at around 11:15 a.m., I met with Chief Goode at the Sheriff's Office. Chief Goode provided me with the Facebook printouts, detailing the conversation between Mark Boston and "Lou Clam" who is Luke Lamb's Facebook name. After reviewing the conversation they were having, it was apparent to me that Mr. Boston posted that he was going to serve as a juror on a case. Shortly after Mr. Boston posted the fact that he had [sic] picked as a juror, Mr. Lamb posted a comment to Mr. Boston to nullify the case, and if he had to, cause a hung jury.

According to 720 ILCS 5/32-4(a), "A person who, with intent to influence any person whom he believes has been summoned as a juror, regarding any matter which is or may be brought before the juror, communicates, directly, or indirectly, with such juror otherwise than as authorized by law." [sic]

Defendant had never investigated an unlawful communication with a juror case in his 20+ years as a police officer. Defendant stated that he reviewed the law in connection with unlawful communications as part of his investigation. However, Defendant did not attempt to interview Plaintiff, Mr. Boston, any other parties to the Facebook communications, or any jurors in the underlying traffic case before submitting his report to the State's Attorney's Office.

Greene County State's Attorney Caleb Briscoe recused himself from the investigation. On February 25, 2014, a special prosecutor with the Illinois Office of the State's Attorney Appellate Prosecutor, Ed Parkinson, signed an Information charging Plaintiff with unlawful communication with a juror, "presumably" based on Defendant's incident report. See Compl. (d/e 1) at ¶23. The charges were filed on March 5, 2014. At trial, Defendant stated that he "assumed" Plaintiff's comments were in regard to a particular case and Defendant admitted that such an assumption was contrary to his law enforcement training. See Compl. (d/e 1) at ¶40.

On October 23, 2016, Plaintiff was acquitted of the offense charged in the Information. The jury deliberated for less than two hours. Following the trial, Defendant acknowledged that he had a conflict of interest and that he did not prepare a normal police report or conduct a full investigation. Defendant claimed that he treated Plaintiff's case the way he would have treated a case against any other person; however, Defendant has acknowledged that he typically produces lengthy, thorough incident reports that are generally "3, 4, 5 pages long." See Compl. (d/e 1) at ¶33. Defendant further admitted that "there are some errors in [his] report."

Unlawful communication with a juror is a felony. If Plaintiff had been convicted, Plaintiff would have lost his right to vote, own firearms, and hold any political office in Illinois. From the time that charges were filed until the time Plaintiff was acquitted, Plaintiff was effectively barred from campaigning in the Sheriff's election. Plaintiff was prohibited from making any public comment about his political ideas or managing a campaign. On October 24, 2014, the day after Plaintiff's acquittal and eleven days before the election,Defendant stated, regarding the election, that he did not intend to have a debate with Plaintiff "at this late in the game." See Compl. (d/e 1) at ¶¶45, 48. Final voting in the Sheriff's election took place on November 4, 2014. Defendant defeated Plaintiff in the election 72% to 28%.

On January 1, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court, claiming that Defendant's initiation of criminal proceedings against Plaintiff by filing a "false" incident report constitutes: (1) malicious prosecution under both state and federal law; (2) unlawful First Amendment retaliation in response to both Plaintiff's declaration of his candidacy for Sheriff and Plaintiff's other political speech, including the speech Plaintiff posted on Facebook regarding juries; and (3) intentional interference with Plaintiff's candidacy for Sheriff, under 10 ILCS 5/29-17. On February 22, 2016, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim (d/e 6).

The Court now dismisses Plaintiff's claims for malicious prosecution under state law and for First Amendment retaliation because Defendant and the prosecutor both had probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had violated 720 ILCS 5/32-4(a). Further, theCourt dismissed Plaintiff's claim of malicious prosecution under federal law because, even if such a claim exists, Plaintiff does not allege that he was detained after charges were filed. See Manuel, 590 F. App'x at 643-44 (noting that "once detention by reason of arrest turns into detention by reason of arraignment . . . the Fourth...