Lambrix v. Jones

227 So.3d 550

Cary Michael LAMBRIX, Petitioner,

v.Julie L. JONES, etc., Respondent.

No. SC17-1608.

Supreme Court of Florida.

[September 26, 2017]

Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, William M. Hennis III, Litigation Director, and Bryan E. Martinez, Staff Attorney, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel–Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Petitioner

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Scott A. Browne, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and C. Suzanne Bechard, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Respondent

PER CURIAM.

Cary Michael Lambrix, a/k/a Michael Ray Lambrix, a prisoner under a sentence of death for the 1983 murders of two victims—Aleisha Bryant and Clarence Moore, Jr., a/k/a Lawrence Lamberson—whose execution is scheduled for October 5, 2017, petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. See Lambrix v. State, 494 So.2d 1143, 1145 (Fla. 1986). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(9), Fla. Const. For the reasons fully explained below, we deny Lambrix's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

BACKGROUND

On direct appeal, this Court explained the facts underlying Lambrix's crimes:

On the evening of February 5, 1983, Lambrix and Frances Smith, his roommate, went to a tavern where they met Clarence Moore, a/k/a Lawrence Lamberson, and Aleisha Bryant. Late that evening, they all ventured to Lambrix'[s] trailer to eat spaghetti. Shortly after their arrival, Lambrix and Moore went outside. Lambrix returned about twenty minutes later and requested Bryant to go outside with him. About forty-five minutes later Lambrix returned alone. Smith testified that Lambrix was carrying a tire tool and had blood on his person and clothing. Lambrix told Smith that he killed both Bryant and Moore. He mentioned that he choked and stomped on Bryant and hit Moore over the head. Smith and Lambrix proceeded to eat spaghetti, wash up and bury the two bodies behind the trailer. After burying the bodies, Lambrix and Smith went back to the trailer to wash up. They then took Moore's Cadillac and disposed of the tire tool and Lambrix'[s] bloody shirt in a nearby stream.

Lambrix, 494 So.2d at 1145. Lambrix's sentences of death became final in 1986 and have been litigated continuously since that time.¹

As this Court has stated, Lambrix's "death case ... has been in the judicial system for a substantial period of time." Lambrix v. State, 39 So.3d 260, 262 (Fla. 2010). This Court has explained that "the lengthy procedural history [in Lambrix's case] is in part due to the continued attempts by Lambrix to file pleadings both with the postconviction court and with this Court that do not establish any viable claim pertaining to his guilt or the validity of the death penalty imposed." Lambrix v. State, 124 So.3d 890, 893 (Fla. 2013) ; see Lambrix v. State, 217 So.3d 977, 988 (Fla.), petition for cert. filed, No. 17–5539 (U.S. Aug. 9, 2017). Indeed, despite this Court determining in 2013 that Lambrix had "exhausted all permissible legal remedies in his case," Lambrix has continued to raise repetitive state and federal claims. Lambrix, 124 So.3d at 900.

After the Governor scheduled Lambrix's execution for February 11, 2016, Lambrix had yet another opportunity to challenge his convictions and sentences. See generally Lambrix, 217 So.3d 977. This Court stayed Lambrix's execution to address the application of Hurst v. Florida, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 616, 193 L.Ed.2d 504 (2016), to his case. Lambrix, 217 So.3d at 980. After considering Lambrix's various arguments, this Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Lambrix's successive motion for postconviction relief, denied Lambrix's separate petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and lifted the stay on Lambrix's execution. Id. at 989–90.

ANALYSIS

In his pending petition, filed on August 31, 2017, the day before his current execution was rescheduled, Lambrix raises the following claims: (1) based on the constitutional prohibition against the execution of an innocent person and fundamental principles of due process, he is entitled to a cumulative review of all the evidence which will establish a truly persuasive showing of his actual and legal innocence; (2) this Court must fully address the denial of Lambrix's right to testify; and (3) Lambrix was unconstitutionally denied access to materials that may contain DNA evidence. The State argues that Lambrix's claims lack merit and are improper as duplicative of formerly litigated claims.

I. Cumulative Review of Evidence Supporting Actual and Legal Innocence

In his first claim, Lambrix contends that "Florida law provides an avenue for state court review of [his] claims of actual and legal innocence." Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Lambrix v. Jones, No. SC17–1608, at 10. Specifically, Lambrix argues that neither the jury in his case, nor any state or federal court, has ever conducted a cumulative review of "all the readily available evidence" that would "establish that Lambrix is actually or legally innocent of each of the two murders." Pet. at 15–16.

Lambrix claims that Moore killed Bryant, and he, in turn, killed Moore in self-defense. This belated theory of self-defense emerged three years after the actual trial (1984) at his first clemency proceeding (1987), when clemency counsel provided a "live transcribed statement" which he claimed "included a description of Lambrix's account." Pet. at 29. Lambrix later testified to this theory at an evidentiary hearing on his successive postconviction motion, as we explained in our 2010 opinion:

According to Lambrix, he told Smith the following account: after he invited both victims outside, Bryant and Moore began to fight, so Lambrix attempted to leave. On his way back, he heard a scream, grabbed a tire iron, and ran back. He saw Moore straddling Bryant and tried to push him off. Moore attempted to "come at [him]," so he continued to swing the tire iron at Moore until he realized that Moore "was down." He denied that he ever admitted to killing either victim on purpose.

Lambrix, 39 So.3d at 271.

There is no evidence, other than Lambrix's self-serving belated assertions of self-defense, that supports his theory. In fact, in his initial postconviction motion, his appeal from the circuit court's denial of his initial postconviction motion, and his initial petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Lambrix's arguments focused on "his consumption of alcohol" the night of the crimes and the defense of voluntary intoxication. Lambrix v. State, 534 So.2d 1151, 1151 (Fla. 1988) ; see Lambrix v. Dugger, 529 So.2d 1110 (Fla. 1988). This Court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, concluding that the "evidence was not sufficient to show intoxication." Lambrix, 529 So.2d at 1112.

As part of his claim of actual innocence, Lambrix alleges that certain evidence entitles him to an evidentiary hearing at which he would prove his innocence: (1) inconsistencies in and lack of credibility for witness Frances Smith's testimony, (2) witness Deborah Hanzel's recantation, and (3) his consistent claim of self-defense. Lambrix also argues that the denial of his right to testify and denial of access to DNA evidence contribute to his innocence claim. We address these arguments in Claims II and III, respectively, below. After reviewing this Court's prior opinions regarding Lambrix's assertions, we address the specifics of Lambrix's freestanding claim of innocence.

A. Frances Smith's Testimony

As to Smith, Lambrix argues that newly discovered evidence discredits her testimony, which was the lynchpin of the State's case at trial. On direct appeal, this Court denied Lambrix's claim that the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination of Smith. Lambrix, 494 So.2d at 1146–47. Lambrix also raised this claim in the federal district court, which denied the claim. See Lambrix v. Dugger, No. 88–12107–Civ–Zloch (S.D. Fla. May 12, 1992). On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial. Lambrix v. Singletary, 72 F.3d 1500, 1503 & n.3 (11th Cir. 1996), aff'd, 520 U.S. 518, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997).

In his third postconviction motion, Lambrix argued that the State withheld exculpatory or impeachment evidence involving a sexual relationship between Smith and a state attorney investigator. Lambrix, 39 So.3d at 266. Reviewing the trial court's finding that no sexual relationship occurred, this Court determined that even if a sexual relationship existed, Lambrix could not show prejudice. Id. at 269. The Eleventh Circuit also denied this claim and others related to Smith's testimony in denying Lambrix's application for leave to file a second or successive federal habeas petition alleging the existence of new claims. In re Lambrix, 624 F.3d 1355, 1358, 1368 (11th Cir. 2010).

In his fourth postconviction motion, Lambrix argued that new evidence showed that two hairs found on the murder weapon matched Smith's DNA. Lambrix, 124 So.3d at 894–95. This Court affirmed the postconviction court's denial of Lambrix's motion, holding that Lambrix failed to explain how Smith's hair would exonerate him or even cast doubt on Smith's testimony. Id. at 895–96.²

B. Deborah Hanzel's Recantation

As to witness Deborah Hanzel, Lambrix argues that she is the only witness at trial who corroborated Smith's testimony of Lambrix's confession to killing the victims. He also contends that her subsequent recantation supports his claim of actual innocence. In 2010, this Court reviewed Lambrix's claim that "the postconviction court erred in failing to find that witness Deborah Hanzel recanted and that Smith and a state agent coerced her to lie." Lambrix, 39 So.3d at 270. This Court explained that "Hanzel was one of the witnesses who testified at both the initial trial and the second trial as to certain incriminating statements that Lambrix allegedly made." Id. Later, during successive postconviction proceedings, Hanzel made statements—both written and oral—that contradicted her...