Lamont ex rel. Equalization v. Capacity

P. STEPHEN LAMONT, individually AND ON BEHALF OFTHE COMMITTEE FOR ELECTION EQUALITY, and his minor son, P.S.L II,¹ Plaintiff, v. KRISTEN K. WILSON in her individual and official capacity,TERRENCE E. McCARTNEY in his individual and official capacity,KIRSTEN A, BUCCI² in her individual and official capacity,LAURA U. BRETT in her individual and official capacity,JOSEPH A. SACK in his individual and official capacity,JULIE P. KILLIAN in her individual and official capacity,FRANK J. CULCROSS³ in his individual and official capacity,SCOTT D. PICKUP in his official and individual capacity,JIM BUONAIUTO in his individual and official capacity,ANGELA RUNCO in her individual and official capacity,CITY OF RYE, JOHN DOES, and JANE DOES, Defendants.

14-cv-5052 (NSR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

August 20, 2015

OPINION & ORDER

NELSON S. ROMÁN, United States District Judge

Plaintiff P. Stephen Lamont ("Plaintiff") brings this action pro se on behalf of himself, the Committee for Election Equality,⁴ and his minor son⁵ alleging violations of 42 U.S.C.§ 1983, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") resulting from the denial of his membership application to the Rye Golf Club. Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are gleaned from the Amended Complaint ("AC") unless otherwise noted and are accepted as true for purposes of this motion.

Plaintiff is a ten-year resident of Rye, New York, and a former member of the Rye Golf Club (the "RGC"), where he held various categories of membership between 2005 and 2012. (AC ¶ 7.) The RGC is owned by the City of Rye. (AC ¶ 29.)

On May 3, 2013, Plaintiff submitted an application for a "Pool for Two" membership at the RGC. (AC ¶ 22.) Plaintiff's application was purportedly denied on or about May 15, 2013. (Id.) Although not entirely clear from the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff appears to imply that the denial of his application was based on Defendants deciding that he should have applied for a "Family Pool" membership rather than a "Pool for Two" membership, which was limited to a "primary member and spouse or significant other." (Id. ¶¶ 22-23, ¶ 22 n.1). In December 2013, Plaintiff received a telephone call from Defendant Kristen Wilson claiming that there were unpaid dues on his RGC account in the amount of $1,450. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff alleges that Wilson actually knew there were no unpaid dues on his account at the time she placed the telephone call. (Id.) Plaintiff then "consistently" requested evidence of the unpaid dues and ofan executed "Family Pool" membership application, but never received such evidence. (Id. ¶ 23.)

On June 30, 2014, Plaintiff sent the RGC an application for a "Family Pool" membership for the 2014-2015 season. (Id. ¶ 24.) The next day, Plaintiff sent the RGC a cashier's check drawn from the corporate account of iviewit Holdings, Inc., of which Plaintiff is the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. (Id.) On July 3, 2014, Plaintiff received an email from Defendant Jim Buonaiuto advising him that there was an outstanding balance on Plaintiff's account from the previous year and that Plaintiff should discuss a resolution of the balance with Wilson. (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff alleges that Wilson and the other defendants conspired to deny his application. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27.)

After receiving Buonaiuto's email, Plaintiff emailed Defendant Frank Culross and demanded activation of his membership by July 6, 2014 at 10 a.m. (Id. ¶ 28.) Culross did not activate Plaintiff's membership and Plaintiff commenced the instant action. (Id.)

STANDARD ON A MOTION TO DISMISS

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must supply "factual allegations sufficient 'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.'" ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, the complaint must allege "'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, 592 F.3d 314, 321 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In applying this standard, acourt should accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations, but should not credit "mere conclusory statements" or "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action." Id.

"Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers, even following Twombly and Iqbal." Thomas v. Westchester, No. 12 Cv. 6718 (CS), 2013 WL 3357171 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013) (internal citations omitted). The court should read pro se complaints "'to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.'" Kevilly v. New York, 410 F. App'x 371, 374 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (quoting Brownell v. Krom, 446 F.3d 305, 310 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) ("even after Twombly, though, we remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally."). "However, even pro se plaintiffs . . . cannot withstand a motion to dismiss unless their pleadings contain factual allegations sufficient to raise 'a right to relief above the speculative level.'" Jackson v. N.Y.S. Dep't of Labor, 709 F. Supp. 2d 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Dismissal is justified, therefore, where "the complaint lacks an allegation regarding an element necessary to obtain relief," and therefore, the "duty to liberally construe a plaintiff's complaint [is not] the equivalent of a duty to re-write it." Geldzahler v. New York Medical College, 663 F. Supp. 2d 379, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), when "matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court," a motion to dismiss "must be treated as one for summary judgment," and "[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). The rule does not require, however, that the court convert a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment in every instance. Rather, the rule:

gives district courts two options when matters outside the pleadings are presented in response to a 12(b)(6) motion: the court may exclude the additional material and decidethe motion on the complaint alone or it may convert the motion to one for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and afford all parties the opportunity to present supporting material.

Fonte v. Bd. of Managers of Cont'l Towers Condo., 848 F.2d 24, 25 (2d Cir. 1988); see Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2000). Thus, conversion is not required if the court explicitly disregards the outside materials submitted by the parties. See Cleveland v. Caplaw Enterprises, 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2006) (matters outside pleadings presented to court were "excluded" within meaning of Rule 12(d) by district court's explicit refusal to consider outside materials); Amaker v. Weiner, 179 F.3d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Attachment of an affidavit or exhibit to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, however, does not without more establish that conversion is required."); Islip U-Slip LLC v. Gander Mountain Co., 2 F. Supp. 3d 296, 302 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) ("[C]onversion is not required if the court disregards the extrinsic material.").

Plaintiff attaches a number of exhibits to his memorandum in opposition to the instant motion, the majority of which have nothing to do with Plaintiff's claims concerning his application for membership in the RGC. Plaintiff cites to these exhibits in an attempt to allege purportedly unlawful acts carried out by some of the defendants to this action, as well as other members of the Rye government and community. Plaintiff may not, however, "amend [his] complaint by asserting new facts or theories for the first time in opposition to [a] motion to dismiss." K.D. ex rel Duncan v. White Plains Sch. Dist., 921 F. Supp. 2d 197, 209 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (collecting cases); see also Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 1998); Deylii v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., No. 12 Cv. 06669 (NSR), 2014 WL 2757470, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2014) ("It is well-settled that a party may not amend its complaint through statements in motion papers."); Fadem v. Ford Motor Co., 352 F. Supp. 2d 501, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("It is long-standing precedent in this circuit that parties cannot amend their pleadings through issues raised solely in their briefs.") The Court therefore excludes these additionalmaterials and will decide the motion to dismiss solely on the basis of the allegations contained in the Amended Complaint.

DISCUSSION

I. Section 1983 Claims

Construing the Amended Complaint liberally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, giving rise to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court addresses each of Plaintiff's allegations in turn.

A. Equal Protection

Plaintiff's first theory of liability under § 1983 is premised on the Defendants' alleged violation of Plaintiff's right to be provided equal protection under the law. (Pl.'s Opp. ¶¶ 45-48.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants blocked his membership "in flagrant violation of the Fourteenth Amendment[,]" (AC ¶ 40), and compares this action to the "school district cases," including seminal Supreme Court decisions Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) and Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cnty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). (AC ¶ 41; Pl.'s Opp. ¶¶ 45-46.) Plaintiff argues that "nearly all legislation classifies on the basis of some criteria, bestowing...