Lamoureux v. Saul

COLT RUSSELL LAMOUREUX, Plaintiff v. ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant

Civil No. 1:20-CV-665

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

March 9, 2021

(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court has underscored for us the limited scope of our review when considering Social Security appeals, noting that:

The phrase "substantial evidence" is a "term of art" used throughout administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. —, —, 135 S. Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015). Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains "sufficien[t] evidence" to support the agency's factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis deleted). And whatever the meaning of "substantial" in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence, this Court has said, is "more than a mere scintilla." Ibid.; see, e.g., Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marks omitted). It means—and means only—"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S. Ct. 206. SeeDickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S. Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999) (comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly-erroneous standard).

Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).

In the instant case, Colt Lamoureux, a younger worker who was in his 20s at the time of the alleged onset of his disability, applied for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act on January 2, 2019, alleging that he had been disabled since February 26, 2013, due to back and hip injuries, obesity and mental impairments. (Tr. 15-17). After a consideration of the medical records and opinion evidence, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") who reviewed this case concluded that Lamoureux could perform a range of sedentary work with limitations and denied this disability application. (Tr. 12-28).

Mindful of the fact that substantial evidence "means only—'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,' " Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154, we find that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's findings in this case. Therefore, for the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the decision of the Commissioner denying this claim.

II. Statement of Facts and of the Case

Colt Lamoureux applied for disability income benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act on January 2, 2019, alleging that he had been disabled since February of 2013, due to back and hip injuries, obesity, and mental impairments. (Tr. 15-17). Lamoureux was born in November of 1985, and was thus in his late 20s at the time of the alleged onset of his disability, making him a younger worker underthe Commissioner's regulations. (Tr. 26). Lamoureux had previously served in the military, in the Army Airborne, and had suffered back and joint injuries as a result of a parachute jump while in the service. (Tr. 22). The date of the alleged onset of his disability for Social Security purposes coincided with his discharge from the military and it was reported that Lamoureux had not worked since his discharge. (Tr. 22).

The administrative record in this case confirmed that Lamoureux had experienced a significant service-related back injury, but also contained references to his ability to perform some sedentary work. Thus, a March 13, 2019, functional capacity evaluation of Lamoureux conducted by ErgoScience concluded that Lamoureux could perform some work in the sedentary range. (Tr. 386-395).¹ Likewise, treatment notes from the VA observed that Lamoureux could "perform sedentary activity if he can use the speaker phone to communicate and can perform limited time on computer and/or reading." (Tr. 587). For his part, Lamoureux has reported that, while his chronic back injuries and pain have severely reduced his level of activity, he is still able to do some farming, yard work and household tasks. (Tr. 39-44, 177-184, 470). Lamoureux also reported that he can drive, walk shortdistances, go out daily, shop, manage his finances, and occasionally hunt and fish, albeit with back discomfort. (Id.)

It is against this backdrop that a hearing was held on this disability application on October 4, 2019, where Lamoureux appeared and testified along with a Vocational Expert. (Tr. 32-68). In the course of the Vocational Expert's testimony, in response to hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ, the expert identified three sedentary jobs that Lamoureux could perform—table worker, bond semiconductor and security systems monitor. (Tr. 27, 62). The Vocational Expert further testified that there were approximately 36,000 positions available in the national economy in these three fields. (Id.)

Following this hearing, on November 15, 2019, the ALJ issued a decision denying this application for benefits, finding that Lamoureux remained capable of performing a limited range of sedentary jobs in the national economy. (Tr. 12-28). In that decision, the ALJ first concluded that Lamoureux had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity since the date of the alleged onset of his disability. (Tr. 17). At Step 2 of the sequential analysis that governs Social Security cases, the ALJ found that Lamoureux's back and hip injuries, and related emotional disorders were severe impairments. (Id.) At Step 3, the ALJ determined that none of these impairments met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. (Tr. 18-21).

Between Steps 3 and 4, the ALJ fashioned a residual functional capacity ("RFC"), which considered all of Lamoureux's limitations from his impairments and found that he could perform a range of sedentary work with some restrictions. (Tr. 21-26). In making this RFC determination, the ALJ considered all of the medical and opinion evidence in this case, as well as Lamoureux's self-reported activities of daily living. (Id.) While largely crediting Lamoureux's assertions that he was unable to lead the very active lifestyle he enjoyed prior to his service-related injury, the ALJ noted that his activities of daily living and conservative medical treatment suggested that Lamoureux retained the ability to perform some sedentary work. (Id.)

Having arrived at this RFC assessment, the ALJ found at Step 4 that Lamoureux could not return to his past work, but concluded at Step 5 that there were a number of sedentary jobs in the national economy that he could perform. (Tr. 26-28). In particular, consistent with the Vocational Expert's testimony, the ALJ found that there were three sedentary jobs that Lamoureux could perform—table worker, bond semiconductor, and security systems monitor. The ALJ further determined that there were approximately 36,000 positions available in the national economy in these three fields. (Id.) Based upon these findings, the ALJ held that there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy Lamoureux could perform, concluded that Lamoureux did not meet the stringent standard for disability set by the Social Security Act, and denied this disability claim. (Id.)

This appeal followed. (Doc. 1). On appeal, Lamoureux contends the ALJ erred in concluding that the 36,000 jobs identified by the Vocational Expert were a significant number of jobs in the national economy justifying denial of this disability claim. Lamoureux also argues in a summary fashion that he was denied due process and equal protection of the laws through the ALJ's determination that significant jobs existed in the national economy that he could perform. Finally, Lamoureux asserts in general terms that the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence.

This case is fully briefed and is, therefore, ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, under the deferential standard of review that applies here, we will affirm the decision of the Commissioner.

III. Discussion

A. Substantial Evidence Review - the Role of this Court

When reviewing the Commissioner's final decision denying a claimant's application for benefits, this Court's review is limited to the question of whether the findings of the final decision-maker are supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. §405(g); Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008); Ficca v. Astrue, 901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012). Substantial evidence "does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate tosupport a conclusion." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial evidence if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by the evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). But in an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be "something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ's decision] from being supported by substantial evidence." Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). "In determining if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole." Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F. Supp. 2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003).

The Supreme Court has underscored for us the limited scope of our review in this field, noting that:

The phrase "substantial evidence" is a "term of art" used throughout administrative law to describe how c

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