Lancaster v. Michael Stapleton Assocs.

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GARRETT LANCASTER, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL STAPLETON ASSOCIATES, LTD d/b/a MSA SECURITY, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 5:23-cv-00063

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Harrisonburg Division

May 3, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ELIZABETH K. DILLON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Garrett Lancaster sued his former employer, Michael Stapleton Associates, LTD (MSA), contending that it terminated his employment in response for his whistleblower activity in reporting alleged abuses by MSA at its Canine Validation Center (CVC) in Winchester, Virginia.^[1] His complaint asserts a single count of discrimination in violation of 41 U.S.C § 4712, based on alleged retaliation against him.^[2]

MSA has not yet filed an answer. Pending before the court is MSA's motion to strike portions of the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). In its motion, MSA contends that Lancaster's claim is based, in part, on allegations that he did not administratively exhaust prior to his bringing suit. It thus asks the court to strike those allegations and any claims based on them and require Lancaster to file an amended complaint with the “offending matter” removed. (Mem. Supp. Mot. to Strike 2, Dkt. No. 9-1.) The motion is fully briefed, and no party has requested a hearing. For the reasons set forth herein, MSA's motion will be denied in part and granted in part.

I. BACKGROUND

MSA is a security company that provides intelligence, training, and investigative services in the public and private sector. At all times relevant to Lancaster's claims, MSA had a contract with the State Department (DOS) under a program called Worldwide Protective Services (WPS). Pursuant to that contract, MSA trained and cared for canines that, at the CVC, were trained to detect explosive devices and materials and tested-also referred to as validated-on those skills. The CVC became operational in 2016, and it included a fully licensed veterinary hospital staffed with veterinarians, veterinary technicians, and support staff to provide care to the canines. Lancaster was hired in 2010 and worked for MSA at other locations; he began working in December 2015 at the CVC as a Validation and Training Specialist (VTS). He served in that role until June 7, 2019, when he was terminated. (Compl. ¶¶ 9-10, 12, 17-18, 21.)

MSA stated that it was terminating Lancaster because he (along with two other test validators) had deviated from CVC standards by manipulating a test after it was validated. This decision was purportedly based on two separate reviews of video evidence of testing, in which Lancaster and two other testers were found to have improperly manipulated a test.^[3] (Id. ¶¶ 5765 (discussing termination).)

Two days after his termination, on June 9, 2019, Lancaster submitted a hotline complaint with the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of State (OIG), in which he alleged that he was terminated in retaliation for his participation in a prior OIG investigation. (June 2019 Hotline Report). (Compl. ¶ 5; MSA Mot. to Strike, Ex. A, Dkt. No. 9-2.) Specifically, he stated that he spoke with “several investigators” at OIG and with “investigators for the House Oversight Committee for National Security.” (2019 Hotline Rep. 1-2.)

The prior investigation Lancaster referenced was triggered by a complaint filed by a CVC veterinarian and colleague of Lancaster's, Dr. Iovino. Dr. Iovino filed her OIG complaint in July 2017, and Lancaster participated in interviews with OIG as part of the investigation OIG conducted into Dr. Iovino's allegations. (Compl. ¶¶ 40-41, 44-46.)

After submission of his June 2019 Hotline Report, the OIG investigated his report and interviewed Lancaster twice during its investigation. The first interview occurred in October 2019 and the second in February 2020. (MSA Mot. to Strike, Exs. B, C, Dkt. Nos. 9-3, 9-4.)

The OIG concluded that MSA had improperly retaliated against Lancaster. (Compl. ¶ 6.) That decision was later reversed by the Division Director of the Office of the Procurement Executive of DOS (Division Director), representing a final decision on the matter. (Id. ¶ 7.)

In its motion to strike, MSA emphasizes that the June 2019 Hotline Report and the notes from the two interviews of Lancaster reference the Iovino investigation, but they do not indicate with any specificity what Lancaster said during the course of the OIG's Iovino investigation, the names of the persons with whom he spoke, or even the topics of discussion, except to note in general terms that he had “cooperated with the OIG” and spoke to investigators about “different aspects” of Dr. Iovino's complaint. (Mem. Support Mot. to Strike 4, Dkt. No. 9-1.) MSA also acknowledges that the notes from the February 2020 interview refer to specific persons from OIG with whom he spoke about “the health and wellness of the dogs.” (Mot. to Strike, Ex. C, at 5.)

Because of the purported lack of detail in these documents, MSA argues that many of the allegations in Lancaster's complaint were not included in his 2019 Hotline Report and that he did not exhaust them. As to those issues, then, it contends that his complaint is not properly before the court. (Mem. Supp. Mot. to Strike 6.) In particular, MSA's motion to strike asks that paragraphs 1, 26, 40-47, and 69 be stricken and that plaintiff be directed to submit an amended complaint without the “offending allegations and focusing solely on the narrow issues he brought to OIG.” (Id. at 1.) The court discusses the content of those paragraphs in context below.

Separately, MSA also asserts that paragraph 46 of the complaint also should be struck on an independent ground.^[4] In that paragraph, Lancaster alleges that “upon information and belief,” he “was interviewed about” particular topics. MSA correctly notes that the topics of an interview in which he participated should be within Lancaster's personal knowledge. (Mem. Support Mot. to Strike 11-12.) Relying on authority noting that pleading “upon information and belief” is inappropriate when the plaintiff should have personal knowledge of the stated allegations (id. at 11), MSA asks that the entire paragraph be struck.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike Standard^[5]

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(f) permits the court to strike from a pleading any matter that is redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). “Immaterial matter is that which has no essential or important relationship to the claim for relief,” and “impertinent matter consists of statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question.” 5C Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1382 (3d ed., April 2022 update). The function of a 12(f) motion to strike is “to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Gregory v. Belfor USA Grp., Inc., No. 2:12cv11, 2012 WL 2309054, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 15, 2012) (quoting Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010)).

Although Rule 12(f) motions are generally viewed with disfavor, Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347 (4th Cir. 2001), they are proper where “the challenged allegations have no possible relation or logical connection to the subject matter of the controversy and may cause some form of significant prejudice to one or more of the parties to the action.” Bailey v. Fairfax Cnty., No. 1:10-cv-1031, 2010 WL 5300874, at *4 (E.D. Va. Dec. 21, 2010) (quoting Wright & Miller, supra). The moving party bears the burden to show that the challenged material is prejudicial. Iovino v. Michael Stapleton Associates, Ltd., 600 F.Supp.3d 610, 618 (W.D. Va. 2022) (citing Hardy v. Lewis Gale Med. Ctr., 377 F.Supp.3d 592, 605 (W.D. Va. 2019)). “[T]he decision of whether to strike all or part of a pleading rests within the sound discretion” of the district court.” Id. (citation omitted).

B. Administrative Exhaustion Requirement

As noted, Lancaster's claim is brought under 41 U.S.C. § 4712, which states that reprisal is prohibited if an employee discloses to certain persons identified in § 4712(a)(2) “information that the employee reasonably believes is evidence of gross mismanagement of a Federal contract or grant, a gross waste of Federal funds, an abuse of authority relating to a Federal contract or grant, a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, or a violation of law, rule, or regulation related to a Federal contract . . . or grant.”^[6] 41 U.S.C. § 4712(a)(1).

As the parties agree, Lancaster was required to administratively exhaust his remedies prior to bringing suit in federal court. The exhaustion framework was recently set forth by another judge of this court in another case against MSA:

A complainant who has made . . . a disclosure [under § 4712], and believes she has been retaliated against, may submit a complaint to the relevant executive agency's Inspector General. Id. § 4712(b)(1). This complaint must be made within three years of the retaliation. Id. § 4712(b)(4).

Iovino v. Michael Stapleton Assocs., 600 F.Supp.3d 610, 618 (W.D. Va. 2022).

The Inspector General is tasked with investigating the complaint and submitting a report with findings to the complainant, the contractor, and the agency head. 41 U.S.C. § 4712(b)(1). The agency head then has 30 days to determine whether the contractor improperly retaliated against the complainant. Id. § 4712(c)(1). If, as here, the agency head determines there was no retaliation, he must issue an order denying relief. Id. Thereafter, a complainant may sue the contractor “in the appropriate district court of the United States, which shall have...