Landau v. Lamas

BRIAN LANDAU, Plaintiff, v. MARIROSA LAMAS, et al., Defendants.

3:15-CV-1327

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

August 1, 2019

(JUDGE MARIANI)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Brian Landau, an inmate in Pennsylvania state prison, originally filed this action in July 2015 against twenty-one current and former Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC") employees and officials.¹ Landau asserts thirteen federal constitutional and state tort claims arising out of alleged incidents of sexual harassment and assault committed against Landau by Defendant Rebecca Zong, a former DOC corrections officer.²(Doc. 88). Collectively, Defendants have filed three separate motions for summary judgment against Plaintiff, with each motion raising various arguments against the numerous claims in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.³ (Doc. 170, Doc. 174, Doc. 178). The third motion for summary judgment, filed by DOC Defendants, urges the Court to grant summary judgment to DOC Defendants with respect to all of Plaintiff's claims against DOC Defendants (Counts II, III, V, VI, VII, IX, XIV, XV, and XVI) on various grounds, including applicable statute of limitations, sovereign immunity, and the merits. (Doc. 178, Doc. 179). In his Report and Recommendation (R&R) addressing the third motion for summary judgment, Magistrate Judge Carlson recommends granting in part and denying in part the third motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 204). DOC Defendants have raised Objections to the R&R (Doc. 211, Doc. 212). Landau did not respond to DOC Defendants' Objections, but instead raised his own set of Objections to the R&R (Doc. 219) to which DOCDefendants have responded (Doc. 220) and Landau has replied (Doc. 221). Upon de novo review of the R&R, the Court will sustain in part and overrule in part DOC Defendants' Objections, overrule Landau's Objections, and adopt in part and not adopt in part the R&R for the reasons set forth below.

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND

It serves little purpose to engage in an extended recounting of the undisputed facts of this case, as the parties dispute much of the events that transpired in 2013 and 2014 that underly Landau's lawsuit. Rather, it suffices for the Court to summarize the relevant material facts and allegations, noting where the parties disagree. Additionally, as Landau has named a great number of individuals as defendants under a variety of legal theories and their liability is connected to their roles as DOC officials and employees, it is helpful to classify them according to their involvement with Landau and his claims.

Landau is an inmate incarcerated in the Pennsylvania DOC. (Doc. 180 ¶ 1). Landau was incarcerated at SCI-Rockview when the events underlying this lawsuit began in August 2013, and he was later transferred to SCI-Benner. (Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 8). Zong was a corrections officer or corrections officer trainee with the DOC and worked at SCI-Rockview between August 2013 and June 2014. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 8, Doc. 88 ¶ 17). Landau alleges that Zong sexually harassed, abused, and raped him. (Doc. 180 ¶ 8, Doc. 88 ¶¶ 30-78). These allegations include: Zong made unwelcome sexual advances on Landau (Doc. 88 ¶¶ 30-39, Doc. 187-2 at 52:7-15, 56:5-57:11, 66:3-13, 77:18-78:19); Zong coerced Landau into performing"demeaning sexual acts by threatening Landau with a report of sexual misconduct if Landau refused to follow Zong's instructions," including touching Landau and forcing him to masturbate in front of her (Doc. 88 ¶¶ 46-66, Doc. 187-2 at 52:7-53:25, 77:18-78:19); and most seriously, forcing Landau to engage in sexual activity, including intercourse, in the chapel at SCI-Rockview on two occasions in April and May 2014 (Doc. 88 ¶¶ 69-78, Doc. 187-2 at 130:8-136:17, 142:12-144:13). Zong claimed at her deposition and in other parts of the factual record that Landau coerced her into engaging in sexual activity. (Doc. 187-1 at 72:5-9, Doc. 192-5 at 6-7, Doc. 192-6 at 2). DOC Defendants claim that Landau and Zong engaged in a consensual sexual relationship. (Doc. 175 at 10-12, Doc. 176 ¶¶ 17-58). Landau alleges that certain DOC Defendants knew of Zong's abuse but did nothing. (Doc. 88 ¶¶ 79-89, Doc. 194 ¶¶ 38, 40, 43, 46). DOC Defendants dispute this. (Doc. 180 ¶¶ 38, 40, 43, 46).

Landau states that with the assistance of his friend, inmate Mike Brown, he anonymously reported Zong to DOC Defendant Tice in June 2014 by providing a copy of a letter Zong wrote him. (Doc. 187-2 at 148:1-150:10). Zong was investigated by DOC and fired and was later prosecuted by the Commonwealth. (Doc. 180 ¶¶ 27, 33, Doc. 194 ¶¶ 27, 33). Landau was transferred to SCI-Benner and contends that he was mistreated, harassed, and punished instead of being treated as a victim of sexual assault. (Doc. 88 ¶¶ 95-98, 104-06, 114-18, 169, 184, 186, 232-44). He also argues that DOC Defendants treated him differently than other inmates who have been the victims of sexual assaultcommitted by male prison guards. (Id. ¶¶ 166, 170, 173). He further argues that DOC Defendants did not conduct proper training under the federal Prison Rape Elimination Act ("PREA"), 34 U.S.C. § 30301, et seq. (formerly cited as 42 U.S.C. § 15601, et seq.) (Doc. 88 ¶¶ 194-231); failed to take other proper measures to prevent sexual abuse (id. ¶¶ 160-65, 167-68); and failed to supervise and discipline Zong (id. ¶¶ 133-38, 176-77, 189-90). He also claims that certain DOC Defendants callously engaged in a betting pool or lottery regarding sexual relations between Landau and Zong rather than taking the alleged sexual abuse seriously, as required by prison regulations and the law. (Id. ¶¶ 145, 149-55). DOC Defendants deny these allegations.

DOC Defendants can be broadly categorized into four groups, based on their roles at DOC and their alleged involvement in the events at issue. The first group is DOC corrections officers at SCI-Rockview: Defendants Rogers, Bumbarger, Foster, Nicholas, Cienfuegos, Miller, Harpster, and Snyder. The second group is DOC security officers at SCI-Rockview: Defendants Tice, Hoover, and Vance. The third group is DOC management officials at SCI-Rockview and SCI-Benner: Lamas, Glunt, and Ferguson. The final group is DOC training, hiring, and compliance officials: Defendants Garman, Salamon, Evans, Dooley, Gallo, and Young.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A District Court may "designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact andrecommendations for the disposition" of certain matters pending before the Court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). If a party timely and properly files a written objection to a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, the District Court "shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." Id. at § 636(b)(1)(C); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); M.D. Pa. Local Rule 72.3; Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). "If a party does not object timely to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the party may lose its right to de novo review by the district court." EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 99-100 (3d Cir. 2017). However, "because a district court must take some action for a report and recommendation to become a final order and because the authority and the responsibility to make an informed, final determination remains with the judge, even absent objections to the report and recommendation, a district court should afford some level of review to dispositive legal issues raised by the report." Id. at 100 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims that do not present a "genuine dispute as to any material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "As to materiality, . . . [o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). Once such a showing has been made, the non-moving party must offer specific facts contradicting those averred by the movant to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 111 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1990). Therefore, the non-moving party may not oppose summary judgment simply on the basis of the pleadings, or on conclusory statements that a factual issue exists. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . or showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B). In evaluating whether summary judgment should be granted, "[t]he court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). "Inferences should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true." Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 912, 113 S. Ct. 1262, 122 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1993).

However, "facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a 'genuine' dispute as to those facts." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007). If a party has carried its burden under the summary judgment rule,

its opponent

...