Landen v. Sentry Ins. (Ex parte Chin)

1

Ex parte Victor Chin, M.D., and Sportsmed Orthopedic Specialists, P.C.

In re: Malik Landen Woodard v. Sentry Insurance et al.

No. 1210175

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 5, 2023

Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-21-902470

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

PARKER, Chief Justice.

Victor Chin, M.D., and Sportsmed Orthopedic Specialists, P.C. (collectively "the Sportsmed defendants"), are defendants in an action brought by their patient, Malik Landen Woodard. Woodard alleged that, against his wishes, Dr. Chin obtained records of Woodard's prior psychological treatment. The Sportsmed defendants seek mandamus relief from (1) the Jefferson Circuit Court's order denying their motion to change venue based on the Alabama Medical Liability Act, § 6-5-480 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, and the Alabama Medical Liability Act of 1987, § 65-540 et seq. (collectively "AMLA"), and (2) the court's order prohibiting them from using the psychological records (and certain related documents) in the case and requiring them to return or destroy those records and documents ("the protective order").^[1] As to the venue order, we deny the petition because the Sportsmed defendants do not argue that the complaint did not support an inference that Dr. Chin had no medical reason for obtaining the psychological records. As to the protective order, we deny the petition because the Sportsmed defendants do not demonstrate that the order is subject to mandamus review.

I. Facts

The following historical facts are summarized from the facts alleged in Woodard's operative complaint, which are taken as true at this procedural juncture. See Ex parte Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 712 So.2d 733, 734, 736 (Ala. 1998).

In March 2018, a one-ton battery cabinet that Woodard was installing while working fell on him, causing serious crush injuries. Woodard was airlifted to a hospital for emergency surgery. Several days later, he was transferred to a rehabilitation center. After his release and as part of his follow-up care, he attended therapy sessions with a psychologist.

In October 2019, Woodard saw Dr. Chin for pain management. Dr. Chin was a licensed physician with Sportsmed Orthopedic Specialists, P.C., at its center in Huntsville. At Woodard's first appointment, he signed a medical-records-release form generally authorizing other health-care providers to release their medical records to Dr. Chin. During the appointment, Dr. Chin asked Woodard for consent to obtain records of the psychologist's treatment. Woodard said that he did not want Dr. Chin to obtain them. Nevertheless, Dr. Chin later sought and obtained the psychological records from a medical-case manager who had been retained by Woodard's employer's workers' compensation insurer.

Based on Dr. Chin's obtaining the records, Woodard sued the Sportsmed defendants in the Jefferson Circuit Court. Woodard asserted claims of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, invasion of privacy, the tort of outrage, and civil conspiracy. The Sportsmed defendants moved to change venue to the Madison Circuit Court, pointing out that a section of AMLA, § 6-5-546, Ala. Code 1975, requires that "any action for injury or damages ... against a health care provider based on a breach of the standard of care ... be brought in the county wherein ... the alleged breach ... occurred." The court denied the motion.

Woodard moved for a protective order, asserting that the psychological records were confidential and privileged. He requested that the court prohibit the Sportsmed defendants from disclosing the psychological records in discovery or using them at trial or otherwise. He further asked the court to order the Sportsmed defendants to return or destroy all copies of the psychological records in their possession and any notes or documents summarizing them. The court granted the motion.

The Sportsmed defendants now seek mandamus relief from this Court.

II. Standard of Review

"A writ of mandamus will be issued only when (1) the petitioner has a clear legal right to it, (2) a respondent has refused to perform a duty, (3) there is no other adequate remedy, and (4) the petitioned court has jurisdiction." Ex parte Boone Newspapers, Inc., 337 So.3d 1187, 1189 (Ala. 2021).

III. Analysis

The Sportsmed defendants seek relief from two orders: the order denying their motion to change venue under AMLA and the protective order prohibiting them from using or disclosing the psychological records and certain related documents and requiring them to return or destroy them.

A. Venue

A trial court's refusal to change venue is reviewable by mandamus. Ex parte Sawyer, 892 So.2d 898, 901 (Ala. 2004). Ordinarily, we review the denial of a motion to change venue by assessing whether the trial court exceeded its discretion. Ex parte Flexible Prods. Co., 915 So.2d 34, 51 (Ala. 2005). Nevertheless, we review questions of law de novo. Ex parte Hughes, 51 So.3d 1016, 1018 (Ala. 2010).

The Sportsmed defendants argue that the circuit court erred in denying their motion to change venue because, they contend, Woodard's claims are governed by AMLA, which requires that medical-malpractice claims be adjudicated in the county in which the alleged breach occurred, § 6-5-546, Ala. Code 1975. Woodard concedes that, if AMLA applies, then the venue motion should have been granted. Thus, the dispositive question is whether AMLA applies to Woodard's claims for purposes of the venue motion.

AMLA applies to claims (1) against a health-care provider (2) for "medical injury" (3) based on a breach of the standard of care. See §§ 6-5540, -543(a), -544(a), -546, -548(a), (d), -549, -550, -551; Ex parte Vanderwall, 201 So.3d 525, 537 (Ala. 2015); Ex parte Addiction &Mental Health Servs., Inc., 948 So.2d 533, 535-36 (Ala. 2006); Jenelle Mims Marsh, Alabama Law of Damages § 36:45, at 948-49 (6th ed. 2012).

"Medical injury" is harm that occurs "because of the provision of medical services," Vanderwall, 201 So.3d at 537-38 (emphasis omitted). "Medical services," in turn, are conduct that the health-care provider has a "therapeutic or medical reason," id. at 538, for engaging in.

Before considering whether Dr. Chin had a therapeutic or medical reason for obtaining Woodard's psychological records, we must first consider the procedural standard or lens through which this factual question must be viewed. This Court has never squarely addressed the standard in the context of a motion to change venue. However, a motion challenging venue is analogous to a motion challenging personal jurisdiction. In both postures, generally the only "facts" before the trial court are the allegations of the complaint and the averments of any affidavits filed with or in response to the motion. See Wenger Tree Serv. v. Royal Truck &Equip., Inc., 853 So.2d 888, 894 (Ala. 2002) ("'In considering a Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction, a court must consider as true the allegations of the plaintiffs complaint not controverted by the defendant's affidavits.'" (citation omitted)); 14D Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3826 (4th ed. 2013) ("In ruling [on a motion challenging venue], the court will consider to be true any well-pleaded allegations of the complaint that bear on venue, unless contradicted by defendant's affidavit evidence." (footnote omitted)). In viewing those facts, the court "'"must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff."'" Wenger, 853 So.2d at 894 (citations omitted); see 5B Charles Alan Wright &Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1352 (3d ed. 2004) ("[In deciding a motion challenging venue,] the court must draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the plaintiff." (footnote omitted)).^[2]

Thus, the Sportsmed defendants had two primary options in challenging venue. They could argue that, based on the allegations in Woodard's complaint, no reasonable inference could be drawn that Dr. Chin had no medical reason for obtaining Woodard's psychological records. Or the Sportsmed defendants could seek to controvert such an inference with affidavit evidence that Dr. Chin had a medical reason. However, the Sportsmed defendants did neither. They did not submit any affidavits, but relied entirely on Woodard's allegations. See Thompson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., Civil Action No. 12-0576-WS-B, Dec. 13, 2012 (S.D. Ala. 2012) (not reported in Federal Supplement) ("Neither side presented affidavits or other evidence [regarding venue], so the Court's review is limited to the complaint."). And they did not argue that those allegations did not support an inference that Dr. Chin lacked a medical reason for obtaining the psychological records.^[3]

Instead, they argued that AMLA applied because the alleged harm occurred during the course of treatment and in the context of a doctorpatient relationship. That argument thus relied on this Court's previous "time and place" test for determining whether a claim is for "medical injury" for purposes of applicability of AMLA. Under that test, a claim was for "medical injury" if the alleged conduct occurred "as part of a physician's examination and/or treatment of a patient" and thus "during the delivery of professional services," Mock v. Allen, 783 So.2d 828, 833 (Ala. 2000). Put another way, "medical injury" was present if the conduct occurred "during the course of medical treatment" and the claim arose "as a direct result of a particular medical treatment," O'Rear v. B.H., 69 So.3d 106, 114 (Ala. 2011). For example, the test asked: "Did the alleged [conduct] occur within 'the doctor's office or hospital' and did it occur 'while [the defendant] was providing professional services'?" Vanderwall, 201 So.3d at 536.

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