Landolfi v. Town of N. Haven

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JOSEPHINE LANDOLFI, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF NORTH HAVEN, Defendant.

No. 3:22-cv-770 (VAB)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

August 23, 2024

RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

VICTOR A. BOLDEN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Josephine Landolfi (“Plaintiff”) has sued her former employer, the Town of North Haven (“Defendant” or the “Town”) for alleged violations of Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Ms. Landolfi brings two causes of action: interference in violation of the FMLA (Count One) and retaliation in violation of the FMLA (Count Two).

For the following reasons, the Town's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

As to Ms. Landolfi's FMLA interference claim, any such claim arising out of her 2018 FMLA leave will be dismissed; her FMLA interference clam arising out of her 2019 FMLA leave will remain.

As to Ms. Landolfi's FMLA retaliation claim, any such claim arising out of her 2018 FMLA leave will be dismissed; her FMLA retaliation clam arising out of her 2019 FMLA leave will remain.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Hired by the Town of North Haven in a part-time capacity for the accounts payable department in 1998, Local Rule 56(a)(2) Statement at 3, ECF No. 39-2 (May 24, 2024) (“Pl. SMF”); Def.'s Local Rule 56(a)(1) Statement ¶ 10, ECF No. 34-12 (Feb. 16, 2024) (“Def. SMF”), Ms. Landolfi began working full-time in the accounts payable department in 2000. Pl. SMF at 4;^[1]Def. SMF ¶¶ 12, 13. In February 2018, Ms. Landolfi began working as a human resources administrator. Pl. SMF at 7; Def. SMF ¶ 33.

On April 27, 2018, Ms. Landolfi fell while at work and injured her left ankle. Pl. SMF at 7; Def. SMF ¶ 38. Ms. Landolfi received workers' compensation benefits, returned to work after a week, and then fell again, this time injuring her right foot. Pl. SMF at 11; Def. SMF ¶ 38. Ms. Landolfi went on FMLA leave on or about June 4, 2018, through approximately the end of August in 2018 (the “first FMLA leave” or the “2018 FMLA leave”). Pl. SMF at 7; Def. SMF ¶ 43. While on her first FMLA leave, Ms. Landolfi continued to complete various work tasks. Pl. SMF at 9-11, 17-18; Def. SMF ¶¶ 44-56.

In May 2019, Ms. Landolfi slipped and fell injuring her right knee while at home Pl. SMF at 11; Def. SMF ¶ 57. On or about July 5, 2019, she commenced FMLA leave through approximately September 10, 2019, when she returned to work (the “second FMLA leave” or the “2019 FMLA leave”). Pl. SMF at 11; Def. SMF ¶ 58. While on her second FMLA leave, Ms. Landolfi again continued to complete various work tasks. Pl. SMF at 19.

In June 2020, during the pandemic prompted by the spread of the coronavirus (“COVID”), Ms. Landolfi's supervisor, Edward Swinkoski, eliminated Ms. Landolfi's human resources position, a decision approved by the First Selectman, Mike Freda. Pl. SMF at 13; Def. SMF ¶ 66.

B. Procedural History

On June 10, 2022, Ms. Landolfi filed her Complaint. See Compl., ECF No. 1.

On November 15, 2022, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss. See Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 17.

On October 19, 2023, Defendant filed an Amended Answer. See Am. Answer, ECF No. 28.

On February 16, 2024, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. See Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 34 (“Mot.”); Mem. of L. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 34-1 (“Mem.”).

On May 24, 2024, Ms. Landolfi filed and objection to Defendant's motion for summary judgment. See Pl.'s Obj. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 39; Pl.'s Mem. of L. in Supp. of Obj. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 39-1 (“Obj.”).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court will grant a motion for summary judgment if the record shows no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The non-moving party may defeat the motion by producing sufficient evidence to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 247-48 (emphasis in the original).

“[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id.; see Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[M]ateriality runs to whether the dispute matters, i.e., whether it concerns facts that can affect the outcome under the applicable substantive law.” (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248)).

“The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial-whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. When a motion for summary judgment is supported by documentary evidence and sworn affidavits and “demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,” the non-moving party must do more than vaguely assert the existence of some unspecified disputed material facts or “rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.” Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

The party opposing the motion for summary judgment “must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” Id. “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (citing Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 87 (1967); First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290 (1968)).

When deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court may review the entire record, including the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, and any other evidence on file to determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Pelletier v. Armstrong, No. 3:99-cv-1559 (HBF), 2007 WL 685181, at *7 (D. Conn. Mar. 2, 2007). In reviewing the record, a court must “construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and to draw all reasonable inferences in [his] favor.” Gary Friedrich Enters., L.L.C. v. Marvel Characters, Inc., 716 F.3d 302, 312 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). If there is any evidence in the record from which a reasonable factual inference could be drawn in favor of the non-moving party for the issue on which summary judgment is sought, then summary judgment is improper. See Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Old Dominion Freight Line Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2004).

III. DISCUSSION

The FMLA “entitle[s] employees to take reasonable leave for medical reasons, for the birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of child, spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition.” 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2). “The FMLA's central provision guarantees eligible employees 12 weeks of leave in a 1-year period following certain events: a disabling health problem; a family member's serious illness; or the arrival of a new son or daughter.” Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 86 (2002) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)); see also Woods v. START Treatment & Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2017) (“The Family and Medical Leave Act provides broad protections to employees who need to take time away from work to deal with serious health conditions of the employee or [her] family.”) (citation omitted). An eligible employee is one who has been employed with the same employer for at least twelve months and has accrued at least 1,250 hours of service with that employer. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(a).

The FMLA further entitles the employee who takes leave “to be restored to an equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1)(B). And it is “unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided” by the law. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). The law “creates a private right of action to seek both equitable relief and money damages against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction should that employer interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of FMLA rights.” Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 174 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

There are two types of FMLA claims: FMLA interference claims and FMLA retaliation claims. They “serve as ex ante and ex post” remedies for employees who seek to assert their rights under the FMLA. Woods, 864 F.3d at 166. Interference claims involve when an employer “has prevented or otherwise impeded the employee's ability to exercise rights under the FMLA.” Id. Retaliation claims are raised when an employee exercises her rights or opposes perceived FMLA violations and is then subjected to an adverse employment action. Id. (citing Potenza v. City of New York, 365 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir. 2004)).

Ms Landolfi has brought claims under the FMLA for both interference and retaliation, allegedly arriving out of FMLA leaves taken in 2018 and 2019. Defendant argues that (1) Ms. Landolfi's FMLA claims are time-barred; (2) she cannot establish a prima facie case...