Landry v. Leesville Rehab. Hosp. LLC

YOLANDA LANDRY v. LEESVILLE REHABILITATION HOSPITAL LLC

CASE NO. 2:19-CV-00465

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

June 24, 2021

JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE KAY

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [doc. 28] filed by defendant Leesville Rehabilitation Hospital ("LRH") in response to the employment discrimination suit filed by Yolanda Landry. Landry opposes the motion. Doc. 34.

I.BACKGROUND

This suit arises from Landry's employment as a rehabilitation nurse technician at LRH, an inpatient rehabilitation facility in Leesville, Louisiana. In November 2017 Landry, who is an African-American woman, complained to her supervisor that she had been the victim of inappropriate sexual contact by a patient. A few minutes later, the patient buzzed her to his room and called her a "sexy, beautiful black woman." Days later, after hearing that the patient was spreading rumors that she and others were sleeping on the job, Landry confronted him and allegedly caused him to startle and aggravate his back injury. The patient's wife complained to his physician, to the LRH director of nursing, and to the LRH hospital administrator. After an investigation, Landry was terminated from her employment at the hospital.

Landry filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, raising allegations of race- and sex-based discrimination and retaliation. Doc. 1, att. 2. The EEOC issued a dismissal and notice of suit rights, and Landry timely filed suit in this court on April 12, 2019. Doc. 1, att. 3. Here she raises claims of sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation against LRH under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. LRH now moves for summary judgment, asserting that Landry cannot establish a prima facie case for any of her claims. Doc. 28.

II.SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56(a), "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The moving party is initially responsible for identifying portions of pleadings and discovery that show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). He may meet his burden by pointing out "the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case." Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 404 (5th Cir. 2003). The non-moving party is then required to go beyond the pleadings and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To this end he must submit "significant probative evidence" in support of his claim. State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). "If the evidence is merely colorable, or isnot significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted).

A court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The court is also required to view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Clift v. Clift, 210 F.3d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 2000). Under this standard, a genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable trier of fact could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008).

III.LAW & APPLICATION

A plaintiff may prove intentional retaliation or discrimination under Title VII using either direct or circumstantial evidence. When circumstantial evidence is involved, the court uses the framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) to analyze the claim. Under that framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing, in the case of a discrimination claim, that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she was discharged or otherwise suffered adverse employment action; and (4) she was treated less favorably than members outside of her protected class or was replaced by a member outside of that class. Bryan v. McKinsey & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 358, 363 (5th Cir. 2004). If the plaintiff makes this showing, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory motive for its action. McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2007). At the final stage, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to show that the employer's explanation is not true and is instead a pretext for the real discriminatory and/or retaliatory purpose. Id.

A. Sexual Harassment Claim

Sexual harassment is a form of illegal employment discrimination. Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2012). Sexual harassment under Title VII generally falls into two categories: (1) a "quid pro quo" claim and (2) allegations that a supervisor's sexual harassment created a "hostile work environment." See, e.g., Casiano v. AT&T Corp., 213 F.3d 278, 283-84 (5th Cir. 2000). To establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim, as alleged here, the plaintiff must show that (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her race, gender, etc.; (4) the harassment was severe enough to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the discrimination but failed to take prompt remedial action. Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002). Here Landry alleges that she suffered sexual harassment through the treatment she received from patient John Doe, which her employer failed to remedy.¹ LRH does not dispute the first three elements of her claim but maintains that she cannot meet her burden as to the severity of the harassment or the employer's knowledge.

On the severity element, an employer violates Title VII "[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). Because Title VII is "only meant to bar conduct that is so severe [or] pervasive that it destroys a protected class member's opportunity to succeed in the workplace," courts have set a high standard for determining what constitutes a hostile work environment. Lewis v. M7 Prods., LLC, 427 F.Supp.3d 705, 720 (M.D. La. 2019) (internal quotation omitted). The conduct must be both subjectively and objectively offensive, meaning that the victim perceived the environment as hostile or abusive and that a reasonable person would do likewise. E.E.O.C. v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 399 (5th Cir. 2007). Courts examine such a claim based on the totality of the circumstances, looking to the frequency and severity of the conduct, whether it was physically threatening or humiliating, and whether it "unreasonably [interfered] with an employee's work performance." Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 347 (5th Cir. 2007). "No single factor is determinative." WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d at 399.

Landry's claim arises from her treatment by a single patient over a brief period. "[I]solated incidents, if egregious, can alter the terms and conditions of employment." Harvill v. Westward Comms., LLC, 433 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). Landry complains of three interactions with John Doe, all of which occurred in November 2017: (1) when he put his hand on her buttocks as she was helping him to his bed, (2) shortly thereafter, when he buzzed her to his room and told her she was "a sexy, beautifulblack woman," and (3) a few days later, when she confronted him over his allegations that staff members were sleeping on the job, to which he allegedly responded, "Get the [redacted] out of here."

Only the first two interactions appear to qualify as sexual harassment, and they are not sufficiently egregious to give rise to a claim under Title VII. She complains, in essence, of one instance of inappropriate physical contact of brief duration and one instance of insulting/suggestive words. Yet she has made no allegation that these interactions did have any impact on her employment, until she took it upon herself to confront him. While the conduct was undoubtedly subjectively and objectively offensive, it was of such limited duration and insufficiently egregious to rise to the level of actionable sexual harassment under Title VII. Accordingly, the claim must be dismissed and the court need not consider defendant's arguments on the final element of the prima facie case at this stage.

B. Racial Discrimination Claim

Landry maintains that she was fired because of her race and that she was treated less favorably than white employees who were the subject of complaints. LRH asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment on this claim because Landry was not qualified for the position in light of her treatment of patient John Doe and because her white comparators were not sufficiently similar.

On a racial discrimination claim under Title VII, an employee who offers a fellow employee as a comparator must demonstrate that the employment actions at issue were taken under "nearly identical circumstances." Lee v. Kansas City So. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259-60 (5th Cir. 2009). In the case of an employee terminated for an alleged violation,he must show that the conduct drawing the adverse employment decision was "nearly identical" to that of the proffered comparator who allegedly drew a dissimilar decision. Id. at 260. The similarity may turn on the comparable seriousness of the offenses, rather than how they are coded, and the court takes the perspective of the employer at the time of the adverse...