Lang v. Strange

JOANNA LANG, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Dick Lang, a marital community, and as guardian and parent of the minor children R.L. and C.L., Plaintiff, v. CHERYL STRANGE, individually and as Secretary of the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services DSHS, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:21-cv-05286-RJB

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Tacoma

August 10, 2021

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS CITY OF VANCOUVER, DUSTIN GOUDSCHAAL, AND JOHN PFISTER'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. 26)

ROBERT J. BRYAN, United States District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants City of Vancouver, Dustin Goudschaal, and John Pfister's (“City Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 26. The Court has considered the pleadings filed in support of and in opposition to the motions and the file herein. Though City Defendants filed the pending motions as two motions, a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment, the Court will construe them as only a motion for summary judgment based on the pleadings and the issues presented.

I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. FACTS

Relevant allegations from the first amended complaint (Dkt. 14) are as follows. Dick and Joanna Lang, “who are white and Jewish, ” adopted C.L. and R.L. in 2011 and 2013 respectively. Dkt. 14 at 10. The complaint states, “[f]or over 30 years, Dick and Joanna Lang opened their hearts and home to adopt minority special needs children because that was their calling.” Id. C.L., who was born in 2011, has Fragile X syndrome. Id. R.L., who was born in 2003, has an intellectual disability. Id.

On January 4, and February 1, 2017, the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services (“DSHS”) received allegations that the Langs abused R.L. Id. The allegations included claims that the Langs malnourished R.L. and that they kept him locked in his room. Dkt2. 28 at 12 and 34-10 at 3. According to Plaintiff, these allegations came from a mentally ill family member. Dkt. 14 at 10. Notes from the Dependency Petition state that these allegations were corroborated by “collateral” contacts. Dkt. 7-2 at 32-33.

On February 2, 2017, Kayena Gonzalez, a CPS investigator, and officers from the Vancouver Police Department came to the Lang home. The CPS investigator “handed Ms. Lang a note demanding that Ms. Lang take R.L. and C.L. to Legacy Salmon Creek ER for a full checkup.” Id. at 12. Though the complaint states, “Ms. Lang complied, ” the complaint and subsequent pleadings clarify that she did not take R.L. to Legacy Salmon Creek ER, but instead took him to see his regular pediatrician, Dr. Charles Fuchs. Id.; Dkt. 34 at 2-3. Dr. Fuchs assessed R.L. that same day and found that a change in his medication may have caused his weight loss, but that he appeared to be gaining weight and improving. Dkt. 34-7. A subsequent note from Dr. Fuchs says that at the time of that visit, he “did not have concerns about the safety or well-being of [R.L.] being able to leave the office with his mother[.]” Dkt. 34-7 at 7. The only factual allegation referencing a Vancouver Police Officer from this day is that an officer who accompanied the CPS investigators to the Langs' home, “refused to take the children into custody[.]” Dkt. 14 at 13.

On February 3, 2017, DSHS filed a dependency petition asking for a court order to take R.L. and C.L. into protective custody. Id. In response to the petition, Clark County Superior Court Commissioner Carin Schienberg issued a shelter care order. That evening, CPS investigators and four officers with the Vancouver Police Department (“VPD”) took R.L. and C.L. into protective custody. Id. at 14. According to Plaintiff, the VPD officers “demanded entry into the Langs' home, ” took photographs of the interior without the Langs' permission, then seized R.L. and C.L. Dkt. 34 at 3.

R.L. and C.L. were taken to Legacy Salmon Creek Medical Center for a child abuse specific evaluation by Dr. Tam Voung. Dkt. 15. Dr. Voung concluded that although R.L. was underweight and his urine analysis was positive for ketones, R.L. appeared to be stable and “safe to go home and follow up with a pediatrician” for “continued symptom management.” Dkt. 7-2 at 21-22. R.L. and C.L. were not returned to the Langs' home but were instead placed in separate foster homes. Dkt. 14 at 15-16.

On March 7, 2017, R.L. received another medical assessment, in which the doctor performing the evaluation noted that he had gained 24 pounds in the month since being removed from the Langs' care, and concluded that there were signs of negligent care and maltreatment. Id.

On March 8, 2017, Defendant Officer Jon Pfister assigned an investigation intake referral, based on the allegation that R.L. had been abused, to Defendant Detective Dustin Goudschaal. There is no evidence that Officer Pfister had any involvement in this matter after March 8, other than approving Detective Goudschaal's reports and attending one meeting. See Dkts. 26 and 34. Detective Goudschaal's involvement included (1) attending an interview of R.L. on March 16, 2017; (2) attempting to interview family members, all of whom declined; and (3) placing documents into evidence. Id.

On March 21, 2018, the State's Dependency Petition was denied, and, on April 4, 2018, R.L. and C.L. were returned to the Lang home. Dkt. 14 at 20. On June 30, 2019, Mr. Lang passed away.

B. PENDING MOTION

Joanna Lang brings her complaint in multiple capacities: in her individual capacity, as personal representative of the estate of Dick Lang, and as guardian and parent of the minor children R.L. and C.L. Dkt. 14. Her complaint alleges seven causes of action: (1) violation of federal and state due process pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) negligent investigation pursuant to RCW 26.44.050; (3) fraud; (4) defamation; (5) wrongful death; (6) discrimination under Title VI and RCW 49.60.030; and (7) violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.

Plaintiff does not allege either fraud or defamation against the City Defendants in the complaint, nor does she raise arguments on those claims in response to the pending motion for summary judgment.

In the pending motion, City Defendants move to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for summary judgment on all claims. City Defendants argue that Ms. Lang's claims brought in her personal capacity and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Dick Lang (collectively “Adult Plaintiffs”) are barred by the statute of limitations, and that Ms. Lang's claims brought in her capacity as guardian and parent of R.L. and C.L. should be dismissed because there is no genuine issue of material fact. Dkt. 26. Plaintiff opposes City Defendants' motion. Dkt. 34. For the following reasons, City Defendants' motion should be granted.

C. ORGANIZATION OF OPINION

This order will first discuss the summary judgment standard, then the claims brought by Adult Plaintiffs, and finally the claims brought by Ms. Lang on behalf of R.L. and C.L. The claims brought by R.L. and C.L. must be analyzed separately because claims by minor children carry a different statute of limitations. Wash. Rev. Code 4.16.190(1). However, the grounds for dismissal of the claims brought by Ms. Lang in her capacity as parent and guardian of R.L. and C.L. serve as alternative grounds requiring dismissal of the claims brought by Adult Plaintiffs.

II. DISCUSSION

A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim in the case on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1985). There is no genuine issue of fact for trial where the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (nonmoving party must present specific, significant probative evidence, not simply “some metaphysical doubt.”). Conversely, a genuine dispute over a material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute, requiring a judge or jury to resolve the differing versions of the truth. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 253 (1986); T.W. Elec. Service Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

The determination of the existence of a material fact is often a close question. The court must consider the substantive evidentiary burden that the nonmoving party must meet at trial -e.g., a preponderance of the evidence in most civil cases. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254; T.W. Elect. Serv. Inc., 809 F.2d at 630. The court must resolve any factual issues of controversy in favor of the nonmoving party only when the facts specifically attested by that party contradict facts specifically attested by the moving party. The nonmoving party may not merely state that it will discredit the moving party's evidence at trial, in the hopes that evidence can be developed at trial to support the claim. T.W. Elect. Serv. Inc., 809 F.2d at 630 (relying on Anderson, supra). Conclusory, non-specific statements in affidavits are not sufficient, and “missing facts” will not be “presumed.” Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 888-89 (1990).

B. ADULT PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS UNDER § 1983 DISCRIMINATION, NEGLIGENT...