Langlade Cnty. v. D.J.W. (In re D.J.W.)

391 Wis.2d 231

942 N.W.2d 277

2020 WI 41

In the MATTER OF the mental COMMITMENT OF D.J.W.:

Langlade County, Petitioner-Respondent, v. D.J.W., Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.

No. 2018AP145-FT

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oral Argument: November 25, 2019

Opinion Filed: April 24, 2020

For the respondent-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs filed by Jeremy A. Newman, assistant state public defender. There was an oral argument by Jeremy A. Newman .

For the petitioner-respondent, there was a brief filed by Robin James Stowe, corporation counsel. There was an oral argument by Robin James Stowe .

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in which ZIEGLER, KELLY, DALLET, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. ROGGENSACK, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.

¶1 The petitioner, D.J.W., seeks review of an unpublished, authored decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's order extending his involuntary commitment.¹ The court also continued his involuntary medication and treatment on an inpatient basis. D.J.W. contends that Langlade County (the County) did not present sufficient evidence of his dangerousness to sustain an extension of his involuntary commitment.

¶2 At the recommitment hearing, the County's expert witness testified that D.J.W. had lost a job, relied on his parents for housing, and received disability benefits due to schizophrenia and delusions. D.J.W. takes issue with the County's reliance on this information in demonstrating that he is "dangerous" to himself pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. In response, the County asserts that taken as a whole the testimony is sufficient to determine that D.J.W. would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn under § 51.20(1)(am).

¶3 We determine that going forward circuit courts in recommitment proceedings are to make specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based. Further, we conclude that the evidence introduced at the recommitment hearing was insufficient to support a conclusion that D.J.W. is "dangerous" pursuant to either §§ 51.20(1)(a) 2.c. or 2.d. and 51.20(1)(am).

¶4 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.

I

¶5 On January 30, 2017, the circuit court for Langlade County² entered an order committing D.J.W. to the custody and care of the County for a period of six months. The circuit court determined D.J.W. to be mentally ill, dangerous, and a proper subject for treatment. Further, the circuit court ordered involuntary medication and treatment.³

¶6 As the expiration of D.J.W.'s initial commitment approached, the County petitioned the circuit court to extend D.J.W.'s commitment for one year. The circuit court appointed Dr. John T. Coates to examine D.J.W.

¶7 At the recommitment hearing, the County called a single witness, Dr. Coates.⁴ D.J.W. testified on his own behalf and did not call any other witnesses.

¶8 Dr. Coates testified that he had diagnosed D.J.W. with schizophrenia. He further observed that D.J.W. had "a history of auditory and visual hallucinations" and that "[h]is thought process is illogical and again some grandiose illusions."

¶9 According to Dr. Coates's testimony, D.J.W. "did admit that he has had kind of the same hallucinations for about three years. He told me that about four months ago he saw the devil and that two months ago he was hearing voices." The doctor described D.J.W.'s illness as "treatable with psychotropic medications."

¶10 On direct examination, the attorney for the County asked Dr. Coates, "Do you have an opinion as to whether or not [D.J.W.], as a result of his current condition, is a risk of danger to himself or to others?" Dr. Coates responded:

Well, the main danger is risk to himself if he should go off treatment. He's apt to have exacerbation of his illness. He's apt to experience, you know, hallucinations to a greater degree. Become delusional. In the past, he has had some problems with aggressive behavior and property damage. But I think the greater risk is just his inability to properly care for himself and to properly socialize if he goes untreated.

¶11 As examples of D.J.W.'s inability to properly care for himself in the event treatment were withdrawn, Dr. Coates testified:

[H]e's living with his parents now. He quit his job because he, you know, was delusional. He has obtained disability. That disability points to the fact that he's not able to independently care for himself at this point. And he would be homeless I think if he wasn't able to live with his parents.... His judgment is currently still impaired. He feels that he can manage his illness in the presence of hallucinations.... [H]e feels that you know, hallucinations really aren't a problem for him.... He feels the medication is actually the problem, not his illness.

¶12 Dr. Coates further testified that D.J.W. was not necessarily homicidal or suicidal: "I don't know if he's highly suicidal or highly homicidal. I can say that people when they're acutely psychotic are unpredictable and their actions are unpredictable." The "major danger," as Dr. Coates saw it, was as follows:

[I]f he goes off his medications, he will be delusional. He will be hallucinating.

He will not be able to interact appropriately with others. Like I said, at the beginning of the year he quit a job because he thought he was the Messiah. So the major danger is to himself. I don't think he's necessarily a violent man that's going to go out and harm others.

¶13 In summation, Dr. Coates recommended that D.J.W. stay on his medication. He concluded that D.J.W. is "incapable of refusing medication or incompetent to refuse medication based on his inability to apply the understanding of the advantages and disadvantages and the alternatives in treating his illness."

¶14 On cross examination, Dr. Coates again emphasized that D.J.W. "harmed himself by quitting his job because he thought he was the Messiah." When asked by D.J.W.'s counsel how that is "dangerous to himself or somebody else[,]" Dr. Coates responded that "[h]e lost employment. He can't take care of himself. He can't provide for his basic needs because he can't maintain employment because he's the Messiah." Dr. Coates also reiterated on cross examination that D.J.W. had moved in with his parents and "would be homeless if it wasn't for others." However, Dr. Coates was unaware of any point at which D.J.W. had actually been homeless.

¶15 Testifying again on cross examination that D.J.W. does well while under treatment, Dr. Coates stated:

[W]hen he goes off treatment we've seen the results of that he can't care for himself, he can't maintain a job. He needs to rely on his parents for housing. He has received disability so he's been found disabled. You know, you can't have it both. You can't be disabled and say I'm fine to do whatever I want to do.

¶16 As he did on direct examination, Dr. Coates again emphasized on cross examination his view that D.J.W. was dangerous to himself but not necessarily to others:

Again, you know like I say, he quit a job in January because he was the Messiah. That is danger to himself. He, you know, lost employment because of his illness. Again, he's unable to independently care for himself. He proved that by obtaining disability. Danger in my opinion is not suicidal and homicidal ideations. Although those are possibilities.

¶17 D.J.W. also took the stand and testified. He acknowledged that he hears voices, sees things that other people cannot, and believes that he is the Messiah with a mission of "invent[ing] a way out of" global warming. Further, D.J.W. confirmed that he received help from his family, stated that he had a job on a farm, and had applied for and obtained disability benefits. He additionally expressed a dislike for his medication.

¶18 At the close of the recommitment hearing, the circuit court rendered a decision and recommitted D.J.W. for a period of one year. It determined first that D.J.W. suffers from a mental illness. Second, it concluded that his mental illness is treatable, as evidenced by the testimony that his hallucinations and delusions decreased while he had been subject to treatment.

¶19 The circuit court concluded next that D.J.W. would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn. On this point, it found that "given the degree of those hallucinations and delusions ultimately that course would put his judgment and perception in such a place that he would be a significant danger to himself." Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that the County met its burden under Wis. Stat. § 51.20 to recommit D.J.W.

¶20 Further, the circuit court determined that D.J.W. was "substantially incapable of applying and understanding the advantages, disadvantages and alternatives to his mental illness to the point where he can't make an informed choice as to whether to accept or refuse medication or treatment." As a result, the circuit court ordered that he be involuntarily medicated.

¶21 D.J.W. appealed, arguing that the County presented insufficient evidence of his dangerousness under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2. and (1)(am). The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that "the circuit court's finding of D.J.W.'s dangerousness under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(am) was not clearly erroneous." Langlade Cty. v. D.J.W. (D.J.W. II ), No. 2018AP145-FT, unpublished slip op., ¶10 (Wis. Ct. App. May 1, 2018).

¶22 Specifically, the court of appeals observed the circuit court's findings that (1) D.J.W. experienced significant symptoms due to his schizophrenia ; (2) if treatment were withdrawn, D.J.W.'s hallucinations and delusions would "take their course" and make him a significant danger to himself; and (3) D.J.W. was incapable of understanding the advantages and disadvantages of treatment. Id. In the court of appeals' view, "[t]hese...