Langley v. Langley

137 Conn.App. 588

49 A.3d 272

Mark C. LANGLEY

v.Oxana V. LANGLEY.

No. 32664.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 19, 2012.

Decided Aug. 21, 2012.

Daniel H. Miller, Waterbury, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Elisa J. Pensavalle, Hebron, for the appellee (defendant).

BEAR, ESPINOSA and SULLIVAN, Js.

ESPINOSA, J.

The plaintiff, Mark C. Langley, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in connection with the underlying dissolution action in which the trial court entered several financial orders.¹ The plaintiff claims that the trial court, in fashioning its financial orders, improperly (1) considered the entire length of the parties' relationship, rather than the length of the marriage at issue in the underlying dissolution action; (2) gave undue weight to the command of the English language held by the defendant, Oxana V. Langley, and to the amount of time she would need to obtain a greater command of the language; and (3) based the financial orders on the plaintiff's gross income. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts as found by the trial court are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The parties met in 2003 through an online social network. They developed an online relationship and regularly communicated with each other by means of the Internet. During that period, the plaintiff lived in Connecticut and the defendant lived in Moscow, Russia. The parties met in person when the plaintiff traveled to Russia later in 2003. In 2004, they agreed to marry. The plaintiff arranged for the defendant's relocation to the United States and lived with her in a rural part of Connecticut. The parties married for the first time in 2004.

On October 12, 2006, the plaintiff filed for divorce. When the defendant questioned the plaintiff about the dissolution summons and complaint, the plaintiff told her that she did not have to do anything. On March 1, 2007, the plaintiff went to court without the defendant and obtained a dissolution of marriage by default. Later that evening, the plaintiff informed the defendant that they were no longer married. On March 8, 2007, seven days later, the parties remarried.

The plaintiff filed a complaint for the dissolution of the parties' second marriage on February 9, 2009. In a memorandum of decision issued August 13, 2010, the court, Suarez, J., ordered the dissolution of the parties' second marriage. In connection with the underlying dissolution action, the court issued several financial orders, which the plaintiff now challenges on appeal. The plaintiff filed the present appeal on September 1, 2010. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

We first set forth the standard of review that governs all three of the plaintiff's claims. “We review financial awards in dissolution actions under an abuse of discretion standard.... In order to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we must find that the court either incorrectly applied the law or could not reasonably conclude as it did.... In making those determinations, we allow every reasonable presumption ... in favor of the correctness of [the trial court's] action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Loughlin v. Loughlin, 93 Conn.App. 618, 624, 889 A.2d 902, aff'd, 280 Conn. 632, 910 A.2d 963 (2006). “A fundamental principle in dissolution actions is that a trial court may exercise broad discretion in awarding alimony and dividing property as long as it considers all relevant statutory criteria.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wiegand v. Wiegand, 129 Conn.App. 526, 529, 21 A.3d 489 (2011). “[W]e do not review the evidence to determine whether a conclusion different from the one reached could have been reached.... Thus, [a] mere difference of opinion or judgment cannot justify our intervention. Nothing short of a conviction that the action of the trial court is one which discloses a clear abuse of discretion can warrant our interference.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Auerbach v. Auerbach, 113 Conn.App. 318, 330, 966 A.2d 292, cert. denied, 292 Conn. 902, 971 A.2d 40 (2009).

ILENGTH OF THE PARTIES' RELATIONSHIP

The plaintiff claims that the court, in fashioning its financial orders, improperly considered the entire length of the parties' relationship, rather than the length of the marriage at issue in the underlying dissolution action. The plaintiff argues that we must infer that the court improperly considered the parties' first marriage and prior period of cohabitation because the court mentioned these periods in its memorandum of decision. We disagree.

The following additional facts found by the court are relevant to this claim. In its memorandum of decision, the court stated: “The marriage between the parties was volatile since the beginning.... The plaintiff married a person he barely knew.... After considering all the statutory criteria set forth in [General Statutes §] 46b–62 as to attorney's fees; [General Statutes §] 46b–81 as to assignment of property and transfers of title; [General Statutes §] 46b–82, as to the award of alimony; together with applicable case law, [e]specially, Loughlin v. Loughlin, 280 Conn. 632 [910 A.2d 963] (2006), as to the length of the marriage criterion prescribed in §§ 46b–81 and 46b–82 with respect to prior marriages between the same parties; and the evidence presented here, the court hereby enters the following orders....” The court then issued the financial orders that the plaintiff now challenges in this appeal.

When issuing financial orders that involve the assignment of property and the award of alimony, a trial court must consider the relevant statutory criteria set forth in §§ 46b–81 (c)² and 46b–82 (a),³ respectively. Loughlin v. Loughlin, supra, 280 Conn. at 640, 910 A.2d 963.Section 46b–81 (c) provides in relevant part: “[T]he court ... shall consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate ... and needs of each of the parties....” ⁴ See also General Statutes § 46b–82 (a). “The court must consider all of these criteria.... It need not, however, make explicit reference to the statutory criteria that it considered in making its decision or make express finding[s] as to each statutory factor.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dombrowski v. Noyes–Dombrowski, 273 Conn. 127, 137, 869 A.2d 164 (2005).

“[T]he ‘length of the marriage’ criterion prescribed in §§ 46b–81 and 46b–82, as a matter of law, does not include prior marriages or cohabitation preceding the marriage....” Loughlin v. Loughlin, supra, 280 Conn. at 647, 910 A.2d 963. “[C]onsideration of a period of cohabitation that precedes a marriage as part of the statutory factor of ‘length of the marriage’ in a dissolution action is improper.” Id., at 644, 910 A.2d 963. Consideration of a prior marriage as part of the statutory “length of the marriage” factor also is improper. Id., at 650–51, 910 A.2d 963. Nevertheless, “a dissolution court properly may consider events that occur during a period of cohabitation as indirectly bearing on other statutory criteria [listed in §§ 46b–81 and 46b–82].” (Emphasis in original.) Id., at 644, 910 A.2d 963.

We conclude that the court in this case did not consider the parties' prior marriage or period of cohabitation as part of the length of the marriage criterion in §§ 46b–81 and 46b–82. The plaintiff's argument that we must infer that the court considered the parties' entire relationship because the court mentioned the parties' prior marriage and period of cohabitation incorrectly presumes that the mere mention of a fact in the court's decision indicates that the court considered it in the calculation of its financial orders. Our careful review of the court's memorandum of decision leads us to conclude that the court referred to the parties' previous marriage and period of cohabitation for purposes of providing factual and procedural background in its decision and that it did not base its financial orders on these historical facts. See State v. Carter, 122 Conn.App. 527, 533, 998 A.2d 1217 (2010) (“[a]bsent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court properly applied that law”), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 915, 13 A.3d 1104 (2011).

Affording the court every reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its actions in calculating its financial orders, we decline to infer, absent a clear indication to the contrary, that it improperly considered the parties' prior marriage or period of cohabitation. See id. Additionally, we note that the court explicitly took Loughlin v. Loughlin, supra, 280 Conn. at 632, 910 A.2d 963, into consideration. Therefore, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when considering the length of the marriage criterion in the calculation of its financial orders.

IIDEFENDANT'S COMMAND OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

Next, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in determining the duration of the defendant's alimony award. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that, in evaluating the defendant's employability to determine the appropriate duration of the award, the court gave undue weight to the defendant's limited grasp of the English language and the amount of time that she would need to obtain a greater command of the language.⁵ The plaintiff claims that the court gave undue weight to these considerations because the court failed to account for (1) the defendant's past refusal to take English lessons, despite the plaintiff's encouragement and (2) the defendant's existing ability to communicate with others in English. We are not persuaded.

The following additional facts found by the court are relevant to this claim. The defendant took English lessons in 2010, but had a limited command of the English language at the time of the trial court's decision. The defendant earned $70 per week cleaning houses. Sh...