Langton v. Town of Chester Library Bd.

MARY LANGTON, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF CHESTER LIBRARY BOARD, Defendant.

No. 14-cv-9474 (NSR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

June 1, 2020

OPINION & ORDER

NELSON S. ROMÁN, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Mary Langton ("Plaintiff") brings this action, pro se, against Defendant Town of Chester Library Board ("Defendant" or the "Library Board") for alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.¹ (ECF No. 1.) By Order of Reference, dated April 21, 2016, this action was referred to the Honorable Magistrate Judge Lisa M. Smith ("Judge Smith") for all pre-trial matters.² (ECF No. 42.) Presently before the Court are Plaintiff's objections to (1) Judge Smith's September 25, 2017 Order (ECF No. 104) denying Plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint (the "2017 Order"); and (2) Judge Smith's July 3, 2019 Order denying Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (the "2019 Order").

For the following reasons, the Court AFFIRMS Judge Smith's 2017 Order and 2019 Order.

BACKGROUND

The Court assumes familiarity with the underlying facts of this case, as set forth in this Court's 2016 Order, see Langton v. Town of Chester, 168 F. Supp. 3d 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), andJudge Smith's 2017 Order. For context, the Court briefly recounts the procedural history underlying Plaintiff's objections.

Plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended complaint on July 26, 2017. (ECF No. 89.) In her proposed first amended complaint (the "FAC"), Plaintiff sought to add claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) ("Section 1985(2)"), alleging that several individuals conspired to alter the contents of the report written by Devora Lindeman (the "Lindeman Report"), which had been used as the basis for removing Plaintiff from her position on the Library Board. (Id. ¶ 51.) Specifically, the FAC avers that (1) the version of the Lindeman Report proffered by Defendant in both this case and the parallel action filed in the New York State Supreme Court, Orange County (the "State Action") is "fraudulent, false, and defamatory," and (2) the authentic Lindeman Report clears Plaintiff of wrongdoing. (Id. ¶¶ 38-39.)

On September 26, 2017, Judge Smith denied Plaintiff's motion to amend. In so ordering, Judge Smith concluded that Plaintiff did not establish good cause for her failure to timely file a motion to amend under Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 104 at 9-11.) Judge Smith determined, alternatively, that granting leave to amend would be futile because the FAC failed to raise a cognizable claim under Section 1985(2). (Id. at 14-16.) Plaintiff filed her objection to the order on October 11, 2017 (the "First Objection"). (ECF No. 105.)

On June 26, 2019, while the First Objection was pending before this Court, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (the "SAC"). (ECF No. 171-1.) Plaintiff's allegations were again premised on a conspiracy regarding the purportedly fraudulent Lindeman Report, but, in addition to claims under 1985(2), Plaintiff now asserted violations of various provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code, a claim for legal malpractice, and a violation ofthe Fourteenth Amendment.³ (ECF No. 171-1 ¶¶ 325-33.) In addition to new claims, Plaintiff also sought to add many new defendants, including, inter alia, her former counsel in this matter, her former counsel in the State Action, Defendant's counsel, and previously dismissed defendants Town of Chester and Teresa Mallon. (Id.)

On July 3, 2019, by text only order, Judge Smith denied Plaintiff's motion to file the SAC. (See July 3, 2019 Dkt. Entry.) Although primarily premised on Plaintiff's failure to comply with Judge Smith's Individual Rule 2A,⁴ the order also noted that the reasons for the previous denial of Plaintiff's motion continued to apply. (Id.) The order further outlined several additional bases warranting denial:

Any effort to further amend, especially to add new defendants (the proposed amended complaint adds 20 defendants, some of whom had previously been dismissed from the case), is far too late. Among other things, Plaintiff has asserted causes of action based on violations of Title 18 of the United States Code, for which there is no private right of action[;] claims of this type would have to be pursued by the United States Government, not a private citizen[.] Plaintiff has not identified when each cause of action is alleged to have accrued, but there is no question that some of the causes of action against some of the defendants would be time-barred.

(Id.)

On July 10, 2019, Plaintiff filed an objection to the order (the "Second Objection"). (ECF No. 173.) This Opinion and Order followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), a district court may refer certain non-dispositive pretrial matters pending before the court to a magistrate judge for determination. A motion to amend acomplaint is considered a non-dispositive motion. Fielding v. Tollaksen, 510 F.3d 175, 178 (2d Cir. 2007); accord Thompson v. United States, No. 16-CV-3468 (AJN), 2017 WL 2666115, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2017) ("'Motions . . . to amend are generally considered nondispositive motions, for which the Court's standard of review of the magistrate judge's decision is highly deferential.'"). Upon a magistrate judge's issuance of "a written order stating the decision" on a non-dispositive motion, a "party may serve and file objections to the order." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). When a party submits objections to the magistrate judge's order, the district court must then review the objections and "modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law." Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

A decision is clearly erroneous where "although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Gualandi v. Adams, 385 F.3d 236, 240 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). A magistrate judge's ruling is contrary to law if it "fail[s] to apply or misapplies relevant statues, case law, or rules of procedure." Thai Lao Lignite (Thailand) Co., Ltd. v. Gov't of Lao People's Democratic Republic, 924 F. Supp. 2d 508, 511-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal citation omitted). "A showing that 'reasonable minds may differ on the wisdom of granting the [moving party's] motion' is not sufficient to overturn a magistrate judge's decision." Edmonds v. Seavey, No. 08 Civ. 5646(HB), 2009 WL 2150971, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2009) (quoting Cagle v. Cooper Cos., Inc., No. 91 Civ. 7828(HB), 1996 WL 514864, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2016)).

This standard affords magistrate judges "broad discretion in resolving non-dispositive disputes and reversal is appropriate only if their discretion is abused." Ritchie Risk-Linked Strategies Trading (Ireland), Ltd. v. Coventry First LLC, 282 F.R.D. 76, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, "[t]he party seeking to overturn a magistrate judge'sdecision [] carries a heavy burden." Samad Bros., Inc. v. Bokara Rug Co., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 5843(JFK), 2010 WL 5095356, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2010) (internal citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

In her First Objection, Plaintiff maintains that Judge Smith's 2017 Order was clearly erroneous because, inter alia, Plaintiff offered enough justification for her delay in seeking leave to amend her complaint and pled her proposed Section 1985(2) claims with sufficient particularity and factual bases to survive dismissal. (ECF No. 105.) In her Second Objection, Plaintiff merely asserts that the order was "clearly erroneous and contrary to law" and an abuse of Judge Smith's discretion. (ECF No. 173.) The Court will consider the two objections in turn.

I. Plaintiff's First Objection

The First Objection contends that Judge Smith erred in concluding that Plaintiff did not establish good cause for the delay in filing her motion to amend. (ECF No. 105 at 3.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that good cause was established because her new claim was learned through deposition testimony that took place on April 20, 2017, and she had made good-faith efforts to amend the complaint in the past but her then-attorney declined to do so. (Id. at 3-5). Ultimately, resolution of the First Objection turns on whether Judge Smith's decision was clearly erroneous under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend "should freely [be] give[n] when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). If, however, the Court enters a Rule 16 scheduling order that further restricts amendments, then "the lenient standard under Rule 15(a) . . . must be balanced against the [stricter] requirement under Rule 16(b)[.]" Holmes v. Grubman, 568 F.3d 329, 334-35 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). To that end, Rule 16(b) provides that "[a] schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Under this good cause inquiry, "the primary consideration iswhether the moving party can demonstrate diligence." Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 244 (2d Cir. 2007). "A party has not acted diligently where the proposed amendment to the pleading is based on information 'that the party knew, or should have known,' in advance of the deadline sought to be extended." Rubik's Brand Ltd. v. Flambeau, Inc., No. 17 Civ. 6559 (PGG) (KHP), 2020 WL 2215250, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2020) (internal citations and quotations omitted). "[A] district court does not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the pleadings after the deadline set in the scheduling order" if good cause has not been established. Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 340 (2d Cir. 2000).

Here, Judge Smith's conclusion that Plaintiff failed to establish good cause under Rule 16 was a proper exercise of her...