Larkins-Ruby v. Austin Cnty.

JENNIFER ANN LARKINS-RUBY, Appellant v. AUSTIN COUNTY, SEALY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, AND AUSTIN COUNTY EMERGENCY SERVICES DISTRICT #1, Appellees

No. 01-21-00496-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, First District

December 29, 2022

On Appeal from the 155th District Court Austin County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2020V-0165

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Countiss, and Farris.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

April L. Farris Justice

Appellant Jennifer Ann Larkins-Ruby, proceeding pro se, appeals the trial court's judgment in this ad valorem tax delinquency suit in favor of appellees Austin County, Sealy Independent School District, and Austin County Emergency Services District #1 (collectively, the "taxing units"). We construe Larkins-Ruby's appeal to argue that (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction over the case; (2) the taxing units lacked authority to assess ad valorem taxes against her real property; and (3) the taxing units failed to establish a prima facie case. We affirm.

Background

On December 16, 2020, the taxing units sued Larkins-Ruby to recover delinquent ad valorem taxes, penalties, and interest on real property located in Austin County for tax years 2018 and 2019.^[1] The taxing units also sought to recover "all additional taxes which become delinquent on such property prior to judgment, as well as any additional penalties and interest which accrue prior to or after judgment, to the date of sale." At trial, the taxing units also requested delinquent taxes, penalties, and interest for tax year 2020.

The trial court held a bench trial on August 17, 2021. The taxing units entered into evidence a certified tax statement showing that, as of August 31, 2021, Larkins- Ruby owed delinquent taxes in the amounts of $2,855.79 to Austin County; $6,694.45 to Sealy Independent School District; and $155.69 to Austin County Emergency Services District #1. Larkins-Ruby defended against her tax liability by arguing that the taxing units had not established standing to sue; they lacked authority to tax her property because she submitted a certificate withdrawing her property from the tax rolls; her "land is not commercial"; her property was "redeemed . . . back to private status" through a trust; and the taxing units have never rebutted these arguments. She did not introduce any evidence, but the trial court took judicial notice of her previous filings in the case.

The trial court entered judgment in favor of the taxing units ordering that they are entitled to recover delinquent taxes penalties, and interest for tax years 2018 through 2020 as well as costs. The judgment also ordered foreclosure and a sale of the subject property to satisfy the judgment. This appeal followed.

Jurisdiction

On appeal, Larkins-Ruby first contends generally that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the lawsuit.

Section 33.41(a) of the Property Tax Code states,

At any time after its tax on property becomes delinquent, a taxing unit may file suit to foreclose the lien securing payment of the tax, to enforce personal liability for the tax, or both. The suit must be in a court of competent jurisdiction for the county in which the tax was imposed.

TEX. TAX CODE § 33.41(A); see id. § 1.04(12) (defining "taxing unit" to include counties, school districts, "a special district or authority," or "any other political unit of this state" authorized to impose ad valorem taxes on property). The Texas Constitution provides that a district court's jurisdiction "consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body." Tex. Const. art. V, § 8. Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Tex. Dep't of Parks &Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004); Town &Country Suites, L.C. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 461 S.W.3d 208, 211 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).

The taxing units filed the underlying ad valorem tax suit in the 155th District Court in Austin County, Texas. See TEX. TAX CODE § 33.41(A). THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS LOCATED IN AUSTIN COUNTY. See id. Accordingly, the trial court had jurisdiction over the taxing units' delinquency lawsuit against Larkins-Ruby.

Larkins-Ruby also argues that the taxing units did not prove they had standing.^[2] Standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction and a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining a lawsuit. Garcia v. City of Willis, 593 S.W.3d 201, 206 (Tex. 2019); Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case and is never presumed. Tex. Ass n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 44344 (Tex. 1993). The plaintiff has the burden to allege facts affirmatively demonstrating that the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. To establish standing, a plaintiff must allege (1) an "injury in fact" that (2) is fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged action and (3) is likely redressable by a favorable decision. Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154-55 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).

In addition to constitutional standing, standing may be predicated upon statutory authority. Nephrology Leaders &Assocs. v. Am. Renal Assocs. LLC, 573 S.W.3d 912, 915-17 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.); Everett v. TK-Taito, L.L.C., 178 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). When the Legislature has conferred standing by statute, "the proper analysis is to determine whether the claimant falls within the category of claimants upon whom the Legislature conferred standing." Nephrology Leaders, 573 S.W.3d at 916; see Everett, 178 S.W.3d at 851; In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]). Statutory standing, however, does not supplant constitutional standing, and a plaintiff must have constitutional standing even if standing has been conferred by statute. Nephrology Leaders, 573 S.W.3d at 917; see also Fin. Comm'n of Tex. v. Norwood, 418 S.W.3d 566, 582 n.83 (Tex. 2013) ("[C]ourts' constitutional jurisdiction cannot be enlarged by statute.").

As stated above, section 33.41(a) of the Property Tax Code authorizes a "taxing unit," at any time after its tax on property becomes delinquent, to sue a property owner "to foreclose the lien securing payment of the tax, to enforce personal liability for the tax, or both." TEX. TAX CODE § 33.41(a). The taxing units alleged in their petition that they were each political subdivisions of the state "legally constituted and authorized to impose and/or collect ad valorem taxes[.]" See id. § 1.04(12) (defining "taxing units"). They further alleged that the ad valorem taxes on the subject property had become delinquent for tax years 2018 and 2019, and they added delinquent taxes for tax year 2020 at trial. The taxing units therefore alleged that they fall within the category of claimants upon whom the Legislature conferred standing in section 33.41(a). See id. § 33.41(a); Nephrology Leaders, 573 S.W.3d at 916.

We conclude that the taxing units had statutory standing to maintain the tax delinquency lawsuit against Larkins-Ruby.

The taxing units also alleged facts in their petition establishing constitutional standing. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226 (stating that plaintiff must plead facts affirmatively demonstrating trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction). Their petition alleged that Larkins-Ruby owned the property on the first day of January for each tax year in which the taxing units sought to recover delinquent taxes. See TEX. TAX CODE § 32.07(a) (stating that “property taxes are the personal obligation of the person who owns or acquires the property on January 1 of the year for which the tax is imposed”). The taxing units alleged that property taxes were “delinquent and owing, along with penalties and interest authorized by law,” for each of the tax years alleged.

These allegations establish that the taxing units were injured by Larkins-Ruby's failure to pay legally imposed ad valorem taxes on the subject property. See Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 154-55 (stating elements of constitutional standing). These allegations also establish that the taxing units' injury likely would be redressable by an award of damages or, alternatively, foreclosure of tax liens on the property and an order to sell the property in a tax foreclosure sale. See id. Larkins-Ruby does not offer any argument or analysis or point to any evidence showing that the taxing units did not have standing to maintain their lawsuit beyond arguing they did not offer proof of their standing. We therefore conclude that the taxing units had standing to maintain suit against Larkins-Ruby. We overrule Larkins-Ruby's jurisdictional issues.

Authority of Taxing Units to Levy Taxes

Larkins-Ruby also challenges the taxing units' authority to tax the subject property. She argues that Texas granted a land patent to John P. Borden, an apparent predecessor-in-title, which divested the government of jurisdiction over the subject property, including the right to levy taxes against it. She further argues that she does not conduct business on her property, and therefore it is not subject to taxation. These arguments lack merit.

The Texas Constitution provides, "All real property and tangible personal property in this State, unless exempt as required or permitted by this Constitution, whether owned by natural persons or corporations, other than municipal, shall be taxed in proportion...