Lasalle v. Comm'r of Corr.

321 A.3d 499

227 Conn.App. 520

Marcelino LASALLE, Jr.

v.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

(AC 46325)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 16, 2024

Officially Released August 20, 2024

Cheryl A. Juniewic, New Haven, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

Meryl R. Gersz, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Paul J. Narducci, state’s attorney, and Elizabeth Moseley, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

Bright, C. J., and Cradle and Seeley, Js.

CRADLE, J.

₅₂₁The petitioner, Marcelino LaSalle, Jr., appeals from the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as untimely pursuant to General Statutes § 52-470 (d) and (e).¹ On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas ₅₂₂court abused its discretion in denying his peti- tion for certification to appeal following its determination that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate good cause to overcome the statutory presumption of unreasonable delay for the filing of his untimely habeas petition. We disagree and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal.

The following procedural history is relevant to the petitioner’s claim on appeal. Following a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted of one count of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a). State v. LaSalle, 95 Conn. App. 263, 265, 897 A.2d 101, cert. denied, 279 Conn. 908, 901 A.2d 1227 (2006). On July 19, 2004, the trial court sentenced him to fifty-three years of incarceration. This court affirmed his conviction; id. at 279, 897 A.2d 101; and our Supreme Court denied his petition for certification to appeal. State v. LaSalle, 279 Conn. 908, 901 A.2d 1227 (2006). The petitioner, then a self-represented party, commenced his first habeas action on August 15, 2006, which was denied on April 29, 2011, after a trial during which he was represented by counsel. This court dismissed the petitioner’s appeal from that decision; LaSalle v. Commissioner of Correction, 139 Conn. App. 910, 56 A.3d 763 (2012), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 916, 62 A.3d 527 (2013); and our Supreme Court, on March 13, 2013, denied his petition for certification to appeal from this court. LaSalle v. Commissioner of Correction, 308 Conn. 916, 62 A.3d 527 (2013).

In November, 2013, the petitioner commenced a federal habeas action as a selfrepresented party, and the ₅₂₃United States District Court for the District of Connecticut denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a memorandum of decision dated July 8, 2014.² LaSalle v. Murphy, United States District Court, Docket No. 3:13CV01703 (JBA), 2014 WL 3177766 (D. Conn. July 8, 2014).

The petitioner commenced the present habeas action as a self-represented party on October 10, 2019, and filed an amended petition on May 7, 2021. On March 23, 2022, the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, sought an order to show cause pursuant to § 52-470 (d) and (e), asserting that the petitioner’s present habeas petition was filed more than two years after the judgment became final in the petitioner’s previous habeas action. The habeas court, Oliver, J., issued an order to show cause for the delay in filing the petition and, on December 16, 2022, the court, Newson, J., held a hearing.

At the hearing, the petitioner, who was then represented by counsel, presented only his own testimony. He testified that he had been diagnosed with dyslexia and attention deficit disorder (ADD) and that, when he was first incarcerated, he could read only at "a first grade, second grade maybe, level" and he could not write. He testified, as to his dyslexia, that "a lot of times, I’ll read, I’ll try to read, and things will be backwards for me like numbers. A 69, I might see it as 96. And as far as sounds … something that might be an ‘a’ I think is an ‘o’ and stuff like that." As to his ADD, he testified that, "unless it’s something that I really like—₅₂₄for instance, I like muscle cars. If I’m reading a magazine about muscle cars, I can focus in pretty good because I enjoy them so much. But if it’s something that I don’t like or don’t understand, while I’m trying to understand, I got three other things in my head, you know, fighting for like attention."

He also testified that the law is "nothing I can comprehend. … I can’t make heads or tails of it." He testified that, in filing both his state habeas petitions and his federal habeas petition, he "had somebody fill it out" for him. He referred to that person as a "legal beagle" and testified that "legal beagles" are other inmates who charge for their services and do not have law degrees, and he agreed that inmates are "at the mercy of their timeline."

The habeas court dismissed the petitioner’s petition in a memorandum of decision dated January 17, 2023. The court reasoned that "the present action was commenced about three years and ten months beyond the statutory period.³ … Notwithstanding [the petitioner’s testimony], [he], although admitting he had help, was able to file his first habeas action as a self-represented person and also made glancing mention of pursuing some sort of federal action that was heard in New York. He also admits that he received information and assistance from jailhouse lawyers with preparing legal paperwork for his prior legal actions, but offered no reason why such assistance was unavailable to guide him after his prior habeas became final in December, 2013.⁴ Finally, despite his claimed … lack of education and knowledge of the legal system, the petitioner ₅₂₅was able to manage his way self-represented through a federal habeas corpus trial challenging his conviction. …

"[T]he petitioner offers no truly credible evidence of any external factors outside the control of the petitioner resulting in the present petition being filed nearly four years beyond the allowable two year period. The court finds that there has been no good cause for the delay. … [T]he petition for writ of habeas corpus is dismissed." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; footnotes added; internal quotation marks omitted.) The petitioner then filed a petition for certification to appeal from the habeas court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the habeas court denied. This appeal followed.

[1–3] "Faced with a habeas court’s denial of a petition for certification to appeal, a petitioner can obtain appellate review of the [denial] of [his] petition for habeas corpus only by satisfying the two-pronged test enunciated by our Supreme Court in Simms v. Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 640 A.2d 601 (1994), and adopted in Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 612, 646 A.2d 126 (1994). First, [the petitioner] must demonstrate that the denial of [his] petition for certification constituted an abuse of discretion…. Second, if the petitioner can show an abuse of discretion, [he] must then prove that the decision of the habeas court should be reversed on the merits. … To prove that the denial of [his] petition for certification to appeal constituted an abuse of discretion, the petitioner must demonstrate that the [resolution of the underlying claim involves issues that] are debata- ble among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. … In determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner’s request for certification, we necessarily must ₅₂₆consider the merits of the petitioner’s underlying claims to determine whether the habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner’s appeal was frivolous. In other words, we review the petitioner’s substantive claims for the purpose of ascertaining whether those claims satisfy one or more of the three criteria … adopted by [our Supreme Court] for determining the propriety of the habeas court’s denial of the petition for certification. …

[4, 5] "[A] habeas court’s determination regarding good cause under § 52-470 (e) is reviewed on appeal only for abuse of discretion. Thus, [w]e will make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling[s] …. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court … reasonably [could have] conclude[d] as it did." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Canales v. Commissioner of Correction, 216 Conn. App. 827, 832–33, 286 A.3d 936 (2022), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 905, 302 A.3d 295 (2023).

[6–8] Here, it is undisputed that the petitioner untimely filed the present habeas petition. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court abused its discretion by denying his petition for certification to appeal in that it had improperly determined that he did not establish good cause for his delay in filing the present habeas petition. Specifically, the petitioner argues that he demonstrated good cause by testifying that he had been diagnosed with dyslexia and ADD and had resultantly experienced reading and writing difficulties. His alleged diagnoses, he contends, "caused the perfect storm, resulting in his inability to advocate for himself, because he lacked the reading skills, focus and organizational skills necessary to comprehend the legal system and advocate for himself …." He further argues that these "mental and intellectual limitations" led him "to … rely on the advice of so-called ‘legal beagles’ or ₅₂₇‘jailhouse lawyers’ … who did not graduate from law school …. " The petitioner asserts, in conclusion, that "[t]he mere fact that [he] admittedly suffers from dyslexia and [ADD] proves that both medical conditions … establish good cause pursuant to the criteria as defined in … § 52-470, in that external forces outside of the control of the petitioner caused the delay in the filing of his pro se petition …. "⁵ We disagree.

[9, 10] "[T]o rebut successfully the presumption of unreasonable delay in § 52-470, a petitioner generally will...