Lasko v. Lasko

245 Md.App. 70

226 A.3d 315

Andrew LASKO

v.Amanda LASKO

No. 2702, September Term, 2016

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

April 1, 2020

Submitted by: Pro Se, Bethesda, MD, for Appellant

Submitted by: Pro Se, Bethesda, MD, for Appellee

Panel:^* Woodward, Reed, Friedman, JJ.

Woodward, J. Appellant, Andrew Lasko ("Andrew"), filed a complaint for limited divorce, custody, child support, and other relief in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County after ten years of marriage to appellee, Amanda Lasko ("Amanda"). Amanda filed an answer to the complaint, as well as a counter-complaint for limited divorce, alimony, and custody. Andrew later filed a supplemental and amended complaint seeking an absolute divorce, custody, child support, and other relief. Amanda did not file an answer to the amended complaint. At trial, Andrew argued that Amanda was not entitled to a monetary award because she had never properly requested one. The trial court, however, determined that Amanda's answer sufficiently pleaded a request for a monetary award and then granted her a monetary award of $35,000.

On appeal to this Court, Andrew raises one issue for our review, which we have rephrased:¹ Whether the circuit court had the authority under the pleadings of the parties to grant a monetary award to Amanda.

For the reasons set forth herein, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

Andrew and Amanda were married on December 4, 2004. Three children were born of the marriage of the parties, all of whom are minors. The parties separated on February 21, 2015. On May 22, 2015, Andrew filed a Complaint for Limited Divorce, Custody, Child Support, and Other Appropriate Relief in the circuit court. Relevant to the instant appeal, Andrew's complaint stated in Paragraph 13 that "[d]uring their marriage, the parties acquired various items of tangible and intangible property, i.e., appliances, furniture, furnishings, automobiles, bank accounts, retirement accounts , etc., which are presently owned by one or both of the parties and used primarily for family purposes." (Emphasis added). In Paragraph 14, Andrew alleged that "none of the property described above was acquired prior to marriage, by inheritance or by gift from a third party and none of said property is subject to a valid agreement between the parties." For relief, Andrew requested in Paragraph 6 that the court "determine, at the time of the entry of its Judgment, which of the property owned by the parties is marital property and the value of the same." Additionally, in Paragraph 8, Andrew prayed that he be "granted all relief to which he may be entitled pursuant to the Family Law Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland."

On June 26, 2015, Amanda filed an answer to Andrew's complaint, along with a Counter-Complaint for Limited Divorce, Alimony and Child Custody. In her answer, Amanda admitted to the allegations contained in Paragraphs 13 and 14 of Andrew's complaint. Using almost identical language as that contained in Paragraphs 6 and 8 of Andrew's prayers for relief, Amanda requested that the trial court determine and value the parties' marital property and grant her "all relief to which she may be entitled pursuant to the Family Law Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland." In her counter-complaint, Amanda requested, in her prayers for relief, that she be awarded a limited divorce,² sole physical and legal custody of the parties' minor children, and a mental health evaluation of Andrew prior to granting him any visitation with the minor children, such evaluation being part of the court's consideration in deciding whether to grant visitation.³

On August 30, 2016, Andrew filed Plaintiff's Supplemental and Amended Complaint for Absolute Divorce, Custody, Child Support, and Other Appropriate Relief ("amended complaint"). The amended complaint contained the same allegations contained in Paragraphs 13 and 14 of the original complaint⁴ and the same prayers for relief contained in Paragraphs 6 and 8 of the original complaint.⁵ Amanda did not file an answer to Andrew's amended complaint.

At trial, Andrew argued that the circuit court lacked the authority to grant Amanda a monetary award because Amanda never properly pleaded an absolute divorce or a request for a monetary award. In an opinion filed on January 31, 2017, the trial court stated that, "[w]hile not well articulated, the Court finds [Amanda's answer] sufficient under Md. Rule 2-303" to authorize the court to grant her a monetary award. The court then granted Amanda a monetary award of $35,000, to be paid from Andrew's retirement account. Subsequently, Andrew filed this timely appeal. We will add additional facts as necessary to the disposition of the issue raised herein.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Maryland Rule 8-131(c) states:

When an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.

The rule also requires this Court to exercise our independent appraisal of the trial court's application of the law employing the least deferential standard of review. Walter v. Gunter , 367 Md. 386, 392, 788 A.2d 609 (2002) (stating that "where the order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, our Court must determine whether the lower court's conclusions are ‘legally correct’ under a de novo standard of review").

DISCUSSION

I.Affirmative Relief Requested in an Answer

Andrew contends that the trial court lacked authority to grant Amanda a monetary award because her counter-complaint "[pleaded] only for a limited divorce." Specifically, Andrew asserts that "[i]t is not until the trial court addresses an absolute divorce that it can make a marital property determination pursuant to Md. Code[ ] [Family Law] § 8-203." (Emphasis in original). According to Andrew, because the trial court cannot make a monetary award until such marital property determination has been made, which can occur only in a proceeding for annulment or absolute divorce, a "pleading for limited divorce cannot effectively seek a monetary award[.]"

Andrew argues that Amanda's answer was to his original complaint for a "Limited Divorce ," and because she never requested an absolute divorce, a monetary award "was not available" to her. (Italics added by Andrew). Amanda rejects Andrew's argument by stating that "[a] party requesting a monetary award is not required to file a complaint for absolute divorce; affirmative relief may be requested in an answer." Moreover, according to Amanda, her answer to Andrew's complaint for a limited divorce "was also her answer to his amended complaint for absolute divorce[.]" We agree with Amanda.

Andrew is correct when he states that "[a] pleading for limited divorce cannot effectively seek a monetary award or transfer of marital property under our statutory scheme as marital property only exists in the context of an absolute divorce or annulment." Md. Code (1984, 2019 Repl. Vol.), § 8-203(a)(1) of the Family Law Article ("F.L.") provides that "[i]n a proceeding for an annulment or an absolute divorce, if there is a dispute as to whether certain property is marital property, the court shall determine which property is marital property: (1) when the court grants an annulment or an absolute divorce[.]" (Emphasis added). Section 8-205 then states that a court may grant a monetary award or transfer of ownership of an interest in property, such as a retirement account, "after the court determines which property is marital property, and the value of the marital property." Therefore, it is clear that relief in the form of a monetary award or a transfer of property is not available in a proceeding for a limited divorce. In the instant case, because Amanda's counter-complaint sought only a limited divorce, she was not entitled to a monetary award under that pleading.

Amanda, however, filed an answer to Andrew's complaint. Over 100 years ago, the Court of Appeals held in Munich Re-Insurance Co. v. United Surety Co. , 113 Md. 200, 226, 77 A. 579 (1910), that a defendant in an equity suit may ask for relief against the plaintiff in an answer instead of a cross-bill.

In Rand v. Rand , 13 Md. App. 574, 284 A.2d 271 (1971), this Court applied the Munich principle to a divorce case.

In Rand , the wife requested, among other things, alimony and child support in her answer to the bill of complaint; she, however, did not file a cross-bill affirmatively seeking such relief. Id. at 576, 284 A.2d 271. Before the trial court, the husband claimed that the wife was not entitled to an award of alimony because she did not seek such relief by way of a cross-bill. Id. The trial court rejected the husband's argument and awarded the wife $75.00 per month alimony. Id. at 577, 284 A.2d 271. On appeal, this Court also rejected the husband's argument. Id. at 579–81, 284 A.2d 271. We stated that in Maryland the practice "was early adopted" "of allowing cross-relief to be sought by answer instead of by a cross-bill." Munich , 113 Md. at 220, 77 A. 579 (citing Young v. Twigg , 27 Md. 620 (1867) ). We elaborated:

We can conceive of no rhyme or reason why child support and alimony cannot be prayed in an Answer to a Bill of Complaint in a divorce case. This is particularly so where, as here, there is a non-culpatory type of divorce proceeding. We think that such a practice can be carried out with justice to all parties, and neither party would be in anywise prejudiced by the form of the pleadings.

Rand , 13 Md. App. at 580–81, 284 A.2d 271 ; see also Roth v. Roth , 49 Md. App. 433, 440, 433 A.2d 1162 (1981) (stating that "in any suit for divorce on nonculpatory grounds, dissolution of the marriage permits the court to consider the granting of alimony so long as that question is put in issue by...