Laufer v. Acheson Hotels, LLC

DEBORAH LAUFER, Plaintiff, v. ACHESON HOTELS, LLC, Defendant.

Docket no. 2:20-cv-00344-GZS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE

May 18, 2021

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Before the Court is Defendant Acheson Hotels, LLC's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 9) and the related Request for Judicial Notice (ECF No. 10). Via these filings, Defendant asks the Court to find that Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue her claim under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189. For reasons explained herein, the Court GRANTS both Motions.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendant's Motion invokes Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which requires dismissal of claims over which this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. A federal court is obligated to ensure the existence of subject matter jurisdiction before considering the merits of any complaint. See, e.g., United States v. University of Mass., Worcester, 812 F.3d 35, 44 (1st Cir. 2016). Plaintiffs generally bear the burden of demonstrating subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1209-10 (1st Cir. 1996). Faced with a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, the Court applies the same "plausibility standard applicable under Rule 12(b)(6)" to the operative complaint. Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d 724, 730 (1st Cir. 2016). However, the Court may also consider additional materials submitted by either side that allow it to resolve the jurisdictional challenge. See Valentin v. Hospital Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 363-64 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting that "plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations . . . [may be] augmented by an explanatory affidavit or other repository of uncontested facts").

In accordance with Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may only decide cases that "embody a genuine, live dispute between adverse parties." Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493, 498 (2020) (explaining that this requirement "prevent[s] the federal courts from issuing advisory opinions"). The doctrine of standing implements this requirement by imposing three key requirements on a plaintiff: "(1) . . . an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). "The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing these elements and must plead sufficient factual matter to plausibly demonstrate standing to bring the action." Perez-Kudzma v. United States, 940 F.3d 142, 145 (1st Cir. 2019) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 796 (2021) ("The doctrine of standing generally assesses whether [a plaintiff's personal] interest exists at the outset.")

As to injury in fact, the "first and foremost of standing's three elements," the Supreme Court has explained that "Congress cannot erase [the injury-in-fact requirement] by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. at 1547-48 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, even when a plaintiff bases her case on the violation of a federal statute, "[t]o establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered 'an invasion of a legally protected interest' that is 'concrete and particularized' and 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'" Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560); see also Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A., 140 S. Ct. 1615, 1620 (2020) ("ThisCourt has rejected the argument that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Deborah Laufer is a resident of Florida. She "is unable to engage in the major life activity of walking more than a few steps" and uses a wheelchair, cane or other support to ambulate. (Am. Compl. (ECF No. 13), PageID # 120.)¹ She also has "limited use of her hands," which impacts her ability to grasp objects. (Id.) Laufer is "also vision impaired." (Id.) Outside her home, she "primarily rel[ies] on a wheelchair" and uses an accessible vehicle with a ramp. Laufer is a self-proclaimed "advocate" for "similarly situated disabled persons." (Id., PageID #s 120-21.) Her advocacy focuses on working as "a 'tester' for the purpose of asserting her civil rights and monitoring, ensuring, and determining whether places of public accommodation and their websites are in compliance with the ADA." (Id. at 121.) More specifically and as it relates to this case, Laufer tests online reservation systems ("ORS") of hotels and lodging establishments to ensure that these systems comply with ADA regulations regarding making reservations for accessible guest rooms. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(1).

Defendant Acheson Hotels, LLC ("Acheson") owns and operates the Coast Village Inn and Cottages ("Coast Village Inn"), located in Wells, Maine. By operating this lodging establishment, Acheson is subject to the various regulations that seek to ensure places of public accommodation are accessible to disabled persons. Prior to September 24, 2020, Laufer visited the ORS for the Coast Village Inn multiple times "for the purpose of reviewing and assessing the accessiblefeatures at the Property and ascertain[ing] whether they meet the requirements of 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e) and her accessibility needs." (Am. Compl., PageID #s 124 & 127.) Since 2019, Laufer has been planning a trip to Maine. (Laufer Decl. (ECF No. 17), PageID # 171.) Specifically, Laufer has planned to drive from Florida to Maine and then to Colorado with her grandchild "meandering all throughout the states in which she passes [with] stop[s] at tourist attractions, points of interest, educational and historic sites." (Am. Compl., PageID # 123.) While in Maine, Laufer has planned to "meet with her sister and look for a bed and breakfast to possibly buy and run." (Id.) While Laufer "initially planned to travel during the Summer of 2020, [she] now awaits the passing of the Covid crisis and, once it subsides, she will take her trip." (Id., PageID # 124.)

Prior to September 24, 2020, when Laufer visited www.thecoastvillageinn.com, the ORS "failed to identify accessible rooms, failed to provide an option for booking an accessible room, and did not provide sufficient information as to whether the rooms or features at the hotel are accessible."² (Id.) Laufer asserts that the failure to include this accessibility information deprives her of "the ability to make a meaningful choice." (Laufer Decl., PageID # 171.) She further asserts that the conditions she encountered when visiting the ORS from her home caused her to suffer "humiliation and frustration at being treated like a second class citizen, being denied equal access and benefits to . . . accommodations and services."³ (Id., PageID # 172.)

In other similar cases filed in this District⁴ and federal courts in various other states, Laufer claims to have documented similar problems with the ORS of other lodging establishments. In total, she has filed over 650 similar cases involving non-compliant ORS. (See Def. Ex. 1 (ECF No. 10-1).) Laufer "maintains a system to ensure that she revisits the online reservation system of every hotel she sues." (Am. Compl., PageID # 127.)

In this case, Laufer ultimately seeks a declaratory judgment, an injunction requiring Defendant to bring its ORS into compliance with 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(1), as well as attorney's fees and costs.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant's Motion urges the Court to dismiss this action due to Plaintiff's lack of standing; more specifically, due to Plaintiff's lack of any plausible injury that is concrete and imminent. (See Def. Mot. (ECF No. 9), PageID # 33.) At the outset, it is important to note that Laufer is only alleging a violation of the ADA's "Reservations Rule"⁵ found in 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(1). She does not allege that Defendant's establishment has physical barriers that violate applicable ADA building standards, nor does she allege that the ORS itself is inaccessible. Thus, her claimed injury is an informational injury, which Plaintiff insists is sufficient to satisfy theinjury-in-fact requirement. (See Pl. Response (ECF No. 16), PageID #s 145-51.) On the record presented, the Court disagrees.

The Supreme Court has recognized informational injuries as a basis for standing previously. First, in Havens Realty Corp v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), the Supreme Court held that a tester had standing to sue under the Fair Housing Act when he was denied "truthful information concerning the availability of housing." Id. at 373. Then, in Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989), the Court found that an advocacy group suing for information under the Federal Advisory Committee Act could establish standing by showing "that they sought and were denied" information subject to disclosure under this statute. Id. at 449. Almost a decade later, in Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998), the Supreme Court found that voters had standing under the Federal Election Campaign Act to obtain information subject to disclosure under that Act. See id. at 21. In considering these Supreme Court precedents, the First Circuit has explained that all "relied on Congress's power to identify 'previously inadequate' intangible injuries and protect them with 'procedural right[s]' whose infraction 'constitute[s] injury in fact' without proof of 'any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.'" Amrhein v. eClinical Works, LLC, 954 F.3d 328, 333 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549). However, in the same decision, the First Circuit acknowledged, "[t]here are limits; even Congress...