Laura R. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

1

LAURA R., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

No. 5:21-CV-00320 (MAD)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

September 12, 2022

OLINSKY LAW GROUP HOWARD D. OLINSKY, ESQ. Attorneys for Plaintiff

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION LOUIS JOHN GEORGE, ESQ. Attorneys for Defendant

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

Mae A D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

On April 4, 2019, Plaintiff Laura R. filed an application for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"). See Dkt. No. 9, Administrative Transcript ("Tr.") at 192-95. Plaintiff's claim was denied on June 26, 2019, see id. at 121-28, and again upon reconsideration on November 4, 2019, see id. at 130-37. Plaintiff made a timely request for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), who issued an unfavorable decision on August 31, 2020. See id. at 13-25. Plaintiff made a request to review the decision, and on January 25, 2021, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request. See id. at 1-5.

On March 22, 2021, Plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the Commissioner's unfavorable decision. See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff has submitted a brief arguing that the ALJ's residual functional capacity ("RFC") determination was not supported by substantial evidence. See Dkt. No. 14. Defendant argues to the contrary. See Dkt. No. 17. For the reasons that follow, the Commissioner's decision denying Plaintiff benefits is affirmed.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was thirty-five years old at the time of her hearing and had completed a Bachelor's of Science. See Tr. at 37. Plaintiff had previously worked for thirty hours a week in the deli department of a BJ's Wholesale Club and as a data entry clerk at a company named Hazard and Siegel. See id. at 38-39. Plaintiff testified that she "kept needing to call in to work or show[ ] up late" to her position at Hazard and Siegel and was ultimately asked to resign from her position. Id. at 40. Plaintiff believes that she can no longer work because she is "at a point where [she is] not regularly awake enough to be able to get to work regularly" due to fatigue. Id. Plaintiff has a two-year-old child that she cares for with the help of her husband. See id. at 40-41. Plaintiff testified that she "regularly" lifts things in the twenty-pound range-primarily her child-and could walk "one to two miles depending on terrain." Id. at 42.

When questioned by her counsel, Plaintiff testified that her sleep and fatigue issues had grown worse "over the past 15 years," to the point where she has episodes that last "three to five days" and occur "about once a week" where she is "barely getting out of bed[,] can barely do anything," and suffers from "brain fog" and "migraines." Id. at 48-49. Plaintiff explained that the brain fog causes "[t]rouble thinking clearly or ... focusing or working through thoughts" and that her migraines are "very" painful. Id. at 49-50. Plaintiff also explained that she has symptoms of fibromyalgia that cause "a lot of pain" in her neck, shoulder, and hip areas. See id. at 52.

Plaintiff additionally suffers from back pain that causes shooting pain and numbness in her legs. See id. at 53. Plaintiff stated that she was okay sitting "[f]or the most part." Id. at 54. Plaintiff testified that she has "well-controlled" depression as well as attention deficit disorder that causes her concentration issues. Id. at 57. Plaintiff stated that she could shower but was generally too tired to do it, and that her husband "does all the work around the house," with her mother's help. Id. at 55.

In a decision dated August 31, 2020, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. See id. at 13-25. In her decision, the ALJ found the following: (1) Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of June 30, 2018; (2) Plaintiff's severe impairments included fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease, asthma, chronic fatigue syndrome, migraine headaches, and obesity; (3) Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments; (4) Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b); and (5) Plaintiff was capable of performing past relevant work as a data entry clerk as it did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by Plaintiff's RFC. See id. at 15-24.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A person is disabled when he is unable "to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). There is a five-step analysis for evaluating disability claims:

"In essence, if the Commissioner determines (1) that the claimant is not working, (2) that he has a 'severe impairment,' (3) that the impairment is not one [listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations] that conclusively requires a determination of disability, and (4) that the claimant is not capable of continuing in his prior type of work, the Commissioner must find him disabled if (5) there is not another type of work the claimant can do."

Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Draegert v. Barnhart, 311 F.3d 468, 472 (2d Cir. 2002)). "The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps, while the Social Security Administration bears the burden on the last step." Id. (citation omitted).

In reviewing a final decision by the Commissioner under Title 42, United States Code Section 405, the Court does not determine de novo whether a plaintiff is disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the Court must examine the Administrative Transcript to ascertain whether the correct legal standards were applied, and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000); Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998). "Substantial evidence" is evidence that amounts to "more than a mere scintilla," and it has been defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).

If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's finding must be sustained "even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff's position and despite that the court's independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner's]." Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F.Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Rutherfordv. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982)) (other citations omitted). In other words, this Court must afford the Commissioner's determination considerable deference and may not substitute "its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different result upon a de novo review." Valente v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).

B. The ALJ's Decision

At the first step of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 30, 2018, the alleged onset date. See Tr. at 15. At step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease, asthma, chronic fatigue syndrome, migraine headaches, and obesity. See id. at 15, 17. The ALJ found that Plaintiff's medically determinable mental impairments of depressive disorder and attention-deficit disorder, considered singly and in combination, were non-severe because they did not cause more than minimal limitations in Plaintiff's ability to perform basic mental work activities. See id. at 15. At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that functionally equals the severity of any impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See id. at 17-19.

At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC

to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except [Plaintiff] should not work at unprotected heights, climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, or work in close proximity to dangerous machinery or moving mechanical parts of equipment; [Plaintiff] should have no more than occasional concentrated exposure to respiratory irritants, such as dust, odors, fumes, gases, extreme hot and cold temperatures, and humidity; [Plaintiff] can tolerate no more than moderate levels of noise ...; should avoid work outdoors in bright sunshine and work with bright or flickering lights, such as one would experience welding or cutting metals.

Id. at 19. Initially, the ALJ examined the medical record and Plaintiff's testimony, and concluded that although Plaintiff's "medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, ... [her] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms [were] not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record." Id. at 20. The ALJ then considered a number of medical opinions. First, the ALJ considered the medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings of six state agency consultants^[1] and found those opinions to be persuasive. See id. at 22. Second, the ALJ considered the opinions of three consultative examiners^[2] and found that their medical opinions were either persuasive or partially persuasive. See id. at 23. Third, the ALJ considered the medical opinion of Avni Patel, M.D.,...