Laurent v. Diltz

JAYME LAURENT, as Administrator ofthe Estate of Robert Linkous, Plaintiff, v. TROY DILTZ, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:17-cv-343

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

November 1, 2018

District Judge Walter H. Rice

Magistrate Judge Sharon L. Ovington

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION¹

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jayme Laurent, as administrator of the estate of his father, Robert Linkous, brings this action against Troy Diltz; Scott Short; Matthew Blair; Brian Carr; City of Huber Heights, Ohio (collectively, Huber Heights Defendants); Montgomery County, Ohio and the Montgomery County Board of Commissioners; Sheriff Phil Plummer (collectively, County Defendants); and five John Does, alleging, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that Defendants deprived Mr. Linkous of his Fourth and Fourteen Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, to receive due process under the law, and to receive medical care. Further, Plaintiff alleges under Ohio law that Defendants caused the wrongful death of Mr. Linkous and intentionally or recklessly inflicted serious emotional distress on him.

Plaintiff does not name as parties or assert claims against Montgomery County Jail's medical provider, NaphCare, Inc., or any NaphCare employees. County Defendants (aka Third-Party Plaintiffs), however, filed a Third-Party Complaint (Doc. #14) alleging that NaphCare, Inc. (aka Third-Party Defendant), by refusing to defend and indemnify County Defendants, breached their contract. Additionally, County Defendants seek declaratory judgment requiring NaphCare to defend and indemnify them in this action.

This case is presently before the Court upon Third-Party Defendant NaphCare's Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Complaint (Doc. #17), Third-Party Plaintiffs' Response (Doc. #21), NaphCare's Reply (Doc. #23), and the record as a whole.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's Complaint provides the background for Third-Party Plaintiff's Complaint. In early October 2015, Robert Linkous, a 49-year-old plumber and electrician, quit using heroin "cold-turkey" and stopped drinking alcohol. (Doc. #1, PageID #5). During his withdrawal, his wife noticed that he "began to show signs of mental confusion and heart failure. His behavior was off, he was confused, his legs were swollen, and his skin was beet red. Both his heart rate and blood pressure were elevated." Id. at 6. At Mrs. Linkous's request, Plaintiff's sister called for an ambulance, reporting "she didn't know if he was overdosing or on drugs and alcohol." Id. She indicated that Mr. Linkous was not violent and did not have any weapons. Id. Huber Heights Police Officers—Defendants Troy Diltz, Scott Short, Matthew Blair, and Brian Carr—arrived at the house before the ambulance. Id. They removed Mr. Linkous fromthe house and ordered Mrs. Linkous to remain inside. Id. When an officer returned to the house, Mrs. Linkous explained that Mr. Linkous was withdrawing and had health problems. Id.

The officers, after finding two warrants for Mr. Linkous from Clark County, informed Mrs. Linkous that they intended to take him to jail. Id. at 7. They did not allow the rescue personnel to treat him. Id. And, over Mrs. Linkous's objections, the officers instructed the ambulance to leave. Id.

When Officer Diltz booked Mr. Linkous into the Montgomery County Jail, he did not mention that Mr. Linkous had been withdrawing from alcohol and heroin or that he had a heart condition, high blood pressure, and mental confusion. Id. at 7-8. However, concerned for her husband's health, Mrs. Linkous called the jail "at least ten times, during all shifts, that evening and throughout the next day." Id. at 8. She explained his situation and medical conditions. Her mother and his sister also called. Id.

Meanwhile, in jail, Mr. Linkous's medical condition continued to deteriorate and was exacerbated when another inmate "severely beat" him. Id. "Mr. Linkous was left bruised and bleeding from his nose and mouth. A jail medic gave him an ice pack but did not assess his medical condition, take his vitals, or provide treatment." Id. Indeed, the jail employees "hid from Mrs. Linkous the beating, which was an additional stressor to his heart." Id.

Sometime thereafter, deputies from Clark County picked Mr. Linkous up from the Montgomery County Jail and took him to the hospital. Id. at 9. According to Plaintiff, "it was obvious to them that he needed immediate medical care: he was bruised andbattered and short of breath." Id. "Despite being treated at the hospital, Mr. Linkous died of heart failure a few hours after his admission." Id.

According to County Defendants, "[a]t the time of the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims, NaphCare contracted with the [Montgomery County Board of Commissioners (Board)] to provide medical care to inmates within the Montgomery County Jail." (Doc. #14, PageID #66). Article Fifteen of their contract requires "NaphCare to defend and indemnify the Board and agents and employees of the Board against all claims arising out of or resulting from any act or omissions of NaphCare or of any agents or employees of NaphCare." Id. County Defendants "demanded that NaphCare defend and indemnify [them] in this action, under the provisions of the Contract, but NaphCare has failed and refused to meet its contractual obligations." Id. at 68. They contend that NaphCare's refusal constitutes a breach of contract and request declaratory judgment stating that NaphCare is required to defend and indemnify them against any judgment for Plaintiff in this action. Id.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, "A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and ... a demand for the relief sought ...." This standard "does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.' A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted); see also Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) ("a complaint must contain (1) 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible,' (2) more than 'a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements,' and (3) allegations that suggest a 'right to relief above a speculative level.'") (quoting in part Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); Adkisson v. Jacobs Eng'g Grp., Inc., 790 F.3d 641, 647 (6th Cir. 2015) ("when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the district court must 'construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all factual allegations as true.'") (quoting Laborers' Local 265 Pension Fund v. iShares Trust, 769 F.3d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 2014)).

"When a court is presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it may consider the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant's motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained therein." Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001)); see also Greensberg v. Life Ins. Co.,177 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) ("Under certain circumstances, however, a document that is not formally incorporated by reference or attached to a complaint may still be considered part of the pleadings.").

Federal Civil Procedure Rule 14 governs third-party practice: "A defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a summons and complaint on a nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it." "Third-party pleading is appropriate only where the third-party defendant's liability to the third-party plaintiff is dependent on the outcome of the main claim; one that merely arises out of the same set of facts does not allow a third-party defendant to be impleaded." American Zurich Ins. Co. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 512 F.3d 800, 805 (6th Cir. 2008). In other words, a defendant must be trying to transfer the liability asserted against him by the original plaintiff to the third-party defendant. Id.

IV. DISCUSSION

Third-Party Defendant NaphCare provided four reasons why County Defendants' Third-Party Complaint should be dismissed. (Doc. #17). First, Plaintiff does not allege any claims against NaphCare or its employees, and County Defendants cannot be vicariously liable under § 1983 for any act or omission of NaphCare. Second, contribution and indemnity are not available under § 1983. Third, the Third-Party Complaint fails to state a plausible cause of action against NaphCare. Fourth, the Third-Party Complaint will needlessly complicate the present suit and prejudice Plaintiff.

County Defendants do not dispute some of these issues. (Doc. #21). The parties agree that County Defendants cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a vicarious liabilitybasis. (Doc. #17, PageID #416), (Doc. #21, PageID #431); see Savoie v. Martin, 673 F.3d 488, 494 (6th Cir. 2012) ("respondeat superior is not a valid theory of liability for private contractors...