Lawhead v. Law Offices of Joseph Martin Carasso

482 F.Supp.3d 867

Donaldson V. LAWHEAD, Tammara D. Lawhead, and Brandon V. Lawhead, Plaintiffs,

v.The LAW OFFICES OF JOSEPH MARTIN CARASSO and Joseph Martin Carasso, Defendants.

Civil No. 20-520 (JRT/DTS)

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

Signed August 31, 2020

Marshall H Tanick, MEYER NJUS TANICK P.A., 330 Second Avenue South #350, Minneapolis, MN 55401; Brandon V. Lawhead, LAWHEAD LAW OFFICE, 506 West Oakland Avenue, Austin, MN 55912, for plaintiffs.

Mark A. Bloomquist and Travis Jorge Allen, MEAGHER & GEER, PLLP, 33 South Sixth Street, Suite 4400, Minneapolis, MN 55402, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

JOHN R. TUNHEIM, Chief Judge

Plaintiffs Donaldson V. Lawhead, Tammara D. Lawhead, and Brandon V. Lawhead (collectively, the "Lawheads") filed this legal malpractice and breach-of-contract action against their former attorney, Defendant Joseph Martin Carasso and his law office, for allegedly providing negligent legal advice regarding the administration of a family member's estate in New York. Carasso filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), arguing that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him. The Lawheads opposed the motion and, in the alternative, requested jurisdictional discovery. Because neither Carasso nor his law firm have sufficient minimum contacts with Minnesota, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Further, because the Lawheads fail to dispute any facts central to the Court's reasoning, the Court will deny the Lawheads’ request for jurisdictional discovery.

BACKGROUND

I. THE PARTIES

The Lawheads are residents of Minnesota and were appointed Administrators to the Estate of Michael Blair Lawhead ("Blair Lawhead"), the late son of Donaldson and Tammara, and brother of Brandon. (Compl. at 1, ¶ 3, Feb. 14, 2020, Docket No. 1.) Donaldson and Brandon Lawhead attended William Mitchell College of Law in St. Paul, Minnesota, and run a father-son law practice, Lawhead Law Office, in Austin, MN.

Carasso is a resident of New York and his solo law practice—the Law Offices of Joseph Martin Carasso—has one office located in New York. (Compl. ¶ 4; Decl. of Joseph Martin Carasso ("1^st Carasso Decl.") ¶ 2, Mar. 10, 2020, Docket No. 8.) Carasso also attended William Mitchell College of Law, but has never maintained an office or a license to practice law in Minnesota, nor has he ever advertised or solicited business in the state. (1^st Carasso Decl. ¶¶ 2, 5–6.)

II. THE PARTIES’ RELATIONSHIP

The parties’ relationship began in 2003, after Blair Lawhead reached out to his father and brother seeking a referral to a New York lawyer for a friend's personal injury case. After seeing that Carasso attended William Mitchell College of Law and was a practicing attorney in New York, Brandon Lawhead reached out to Carasso to see if he would take the case. (Aff. of Brandon V. Lawhead ("Lawhead Aff.") ¶ 3, May 4, 2020, Docket No. 22.) Over the course of their 15-year relationship, the Lawheads referred two cases to Carasso in New York, the last of which ended in 2010. (2^nd Decl. of Joseph Martin Carasso ¶ 2, May 18, 2020, Docket No. 32.) Carasso also represented Blair Lawhead on four New York real estate matters, the last of which ended in 2009. (Id. ¶ 3.) Prior to 2018, Carasso states that he had not had any contact with the Lawheads since 2010. (Id. ¶ 2.)

On March 14, 2018, Blair Lawhead passed away intestate after suffering a heart attack while working at his salon located in a studio space in his Cooperative (Co-Op) apartment building in New York. (Compl. ¶ 5.) Within hours after learning of Blair's death, Brandon Lawhead contacted Carasso from Minnesota and, within a few days, formally retained Carasso to handle Blair's Estate. (Id. ¶¶ 8–9; Lawhead Aff. ¶ 9, Ex. 1 at 2–4, May 4, 2020, Docket No. 21-1.) The Lawheads were concerned about protecting the Estate from Blair's partner, Thomas Hoskins, with whom Blair lived but was estranged and attempting to evict.¹ (Lawhead Aff. ¶ 8(C).) The Estate primarily consisted of Blair's apartment at the Co-Op, his salon at the Co-Op, a home in Hudson, New York, and various other valuables, including approximately $45,000 in cash, a violin, and art collection, all of which were located in New York. (Compl. ¶¶ 5–6, 8–9; Lawhead Aff. ¶ 6.)

On the March 14 phone call and in one meeting with Carasso in New York, Carasso allegedly advised Brandon Lawhead that, prior to being appointed Administrator, Brandon (1) had an equal right to be in Blair's New York Apartment; (2) could change the locks on Blair's home in Hudson, New York, to keep Hoskins out; (3) could deposit Blair's cash into a bank account and use it to pay funeral expenses; and (4) could take the violin to Minnesota for Blair's funeral. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Brandon relied on Carasso's advice and took actions consistent with it. (Id. ) As a result, Hoskins brought claims for trespass, unlawful ouster, and conversion against the Lawheads in New York federal court. (Id. ) The Lawheads allege that Carasso continued to perform negligently by failing to convey a settlement offer to Hoskins, falsely representing to the Lawheads that he was an expert in Estate Litigation and the Surrogates Court in New York, and engaging in unauthorized discovery against the Co-Op. (Id. ¶¶ 11–17.)

In October 2018, the Lawheads fired Carasso and refused to pay him his remaining fees and expenses. (1^st Carasso Decl. ¶ 12.) Litigation surrounding that dispute is ongoing in New York Surrogates Court. (Id. ¶ 14.)

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 14, 2020, the Lawheads filed this action alleging four Counts: (I) legal malpractice; (II) breach of fiduciary duty; (III) negligent/intentional representation; and (IV) breach-of-contract. (Compl. ¶¶ 20–46.)

On March 10, 2020, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) arguing that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. (Mot. to Dismiss, Mar. 10, 2020, Docket No. 5.) The Lawheads opposed the Motion and also requested jurisdictional discovery in the alternative. (Mem. Opp. at 30–31, May 4, 2020, Docket No. 20.)

On July 7, 2020, the Lawheads filed a motion to amend their complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. (Mot. to Am., July 7, 2020, Docket No. 35.) Because the Lawheads were not entitled to amend as a matter of course, and because they failed to comply with several local rules, the Magistrate Judge denied the motion without prejudice. (Order, July 8, 2020, Docket No. 39.)

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) provides that a party may move to dismiss claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. "To defeat a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the nonmoving party need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction." Epps v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp. , 327 F.3d 642, 647 (8th Cir. 2003). "As long as there is ‘some evidence upon which a prima facie showing of jurisdiction may be found to exist,’ the Rule 12(b)(2) motion will be denied." Pope v. Elabo GmbH , 588 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1014 (D. Minn. 2008) (quoting Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Diversified Metals Corp. , 564 F.2d 1211, 1215 (8th Cir. 1977) ). The party seeking to establish personal jurisdiction bears the burden of proof, and "the burden does not shift to the party challenging jurisdiction." Epps , 327 F.3d at 647. For purposes of a prima facie showing, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Westley v. Mann , 896 F. Supp. 2d 775, 786 (D. Minn. 2012).

II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND DUE PROCESS

The Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant only if doing so (1) is consistent with the Minnesota's long-arm statute, Minn. Stat. § 543.19, and (2) comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pope , 588 F. Supp. 2d at 1014–15. Because Minnesota's long-arm statute extends as far as the Due Process Clause allows, "the Court need only consider whether exercising personal jurisdiction over [Defendants] is consistent with due process." Id. at 1015. "The touchstone of the due-process analysis remains whether the defendant has sufficient ‘minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ’ " Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., KG , 646 F.3d 589, 594 (8th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) ).

There are two kinds of personal jurisdiction; general and specific. General jurisdiction is sometimes called "all-purpose" jurisdiction because when a court has general jurisdiction over a defendant it may hear any claim brought against them, "even if all the incidents underlying the claim occurred in a different State." Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco Cty. , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780, 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017). General jurisdiction is only appropriate when the defendant is "at home" in the forum State.

Daimler AG v. Bauman , 571 U.S. 117, 137, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014). For an individual, this is typically the State of domicile. Id. For a corporation, the paradigm is the State of incorporation and principal place of business. Id.

Specific personal jurisdiction is sometimes called "case-linked" jurisdiction because it is only proper when the plaintiff's cause of action "arise[s] out of or relate[s] to the defendant's contacts with the forum" State. Bristol-Myers , 137 S. Ct. at 1780 (alterations accepted) (quoting Daimler , 571 U.S. at 137, 134 S.Ct. 746 ). Put another way, for specific personal jurisdiction to be consistent with the Due Process Clause, there must be a nexus between the forum state itself, the defendant, and the cause of action. Walden v. Fiore , 571 U.S. 277, 283–84, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014). The plaintiff may not be the only link between ...