Lawless v. Town of Freetown

DIANE LAWLESS., Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF FREETOWN, by and through its Treasurer/Collector, JESSICA THOMAS,PAUL SADECK, individually and in his official capacity as member of the Board of Selectmen,LEE BAUMGARTNER, individually and in his official capacity as member of the Board of Selectmen,and LISA A. PACHECO, individually and in her official capacity as member of the Board of Selectmen, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-cv-11089-IT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

March 9, 2021

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

TALWANI, D.J.

Plaintiff Diane Lawless, a former municipal employee, brought this action against the town of Freetown ("Freetown" or "town") and the three members of its Board of Selectmen (collectively, "Board members") in their individual and official capacities. In her Amended Complaint [#42], Lawless alleges libel against the Board members (Count I); violation of her due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983") (Count II) and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (Count III) against Freetown and the Board members; ultra vires acts against Freetown and the Board members (Count IV); and breach of contract against Freetown (Count V). Now pending before the court is Freetown and the Board members' joint Motion for Summary Judgment [#93]. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED as to the section 1983 claim (Count II) and the breach of contract claim (Count V) and is GRANTED as to all other claims.

I. Standard of Review

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material when, under the governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Baker v. St. Paul Travelers, Inc., 670 F.3d 119, 125 (1st Cir. 2012). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This burden can be satisfied in two ways: (1) by submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's claim or (2) by demonstrating that the non-moving party failed to establish an essential element of its claim. Id. at 331.

Once the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth facts demonstrating that a genuine dispute of material fact remains. Id. at 314. The non-moving party cannot oppose a properly supported summary judgment motion by "rest[ing] on mere allegations or denials of [the] pleadings." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Rather, the non-moving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his or] her own affidavits, or by 'the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). Disputes over facts "that are irrelevant or unnecessary" will not preclude summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must take all properly supported evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990). "Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] he [or she] is ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

II. Factual Background

A. The Defendants

Freetown is a Massachusetts town that operates with a town meeting form of government. Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Pl's SOF Resp.") ¶ 9 [#107]. Town meeting acts as Freetown's legislative body,¹ while the executive branch consists of an elected Board of Selectmen ("Board") together with a Town Administrator. Id. at ¶¶ 9-11; Freetown Charter 1-8 [#95-11]. At the time of the events at issue in this case, Paul Sadek, Lee Baumgartner, and Lisa Pacheco comprised the Board. Pl's SOF Resp. ¶¶ 2-4 [#107]; Sadek Aff. [#95-5]; Baumgartner Aff. [#95-6]; Pacheco Aff. [#95-7]. Pacheco served as the Board's chair of personnel. Pl's SOF Resp. ¶ 46 [#107].

B. The Plaintiff and the Terms of her Employment

In June 2013, the Board appointed Lawless as Freetown's "Treasurer/Collector" ("Treasurer") for a three-year term running from July 1, 2013 to June 20, 2016. Pl's SOF Resp.¶¶ 1, 17-18 [#107]. According to the job posting for the position, "[t]he Treasurer-Collector shall have such powers and duties as may be vested in those offices expressly by general or special law, but shall otherwise report to and be under the direction and supervision of the Town Administrator." Disciplinary Hrg. Exhibits 29 [#95-16].

Lawless' employment agreement stated that the Board agreed to employ Lawless as Treasurer "to perform all required functions and duties of the position . . . as required by State Law and/or Town By-laws or the Board." Employment Agreement 1 [#95-4]. The agreement provided that she was to work a minimum of thirty-six hours per week, to be scheduled Monday through Friday, and that she would be available to the town at all times, except during periods of illness or approved vacation or other leave. Id.

In addition, the agreement specified that, after an initial six-month probationary period, Lawless was terminable only for cause. Id. It further provided that the Board was required to give Lawless written notice of the grounds for discipline or dismissal at least five days prior to any vote to terminate her employment; that any such vote would take place at a meeting of the Board at which Lawless had the right to be represented by an attorney, to examine witnesses, and to present evidence; and that the Board recognized the principle of progressive discipline and would afford Lawless prior notice of shortcomings and an opportunity to correct the same, where reasonably possible. Id. at 1-2.

Lawless served as treasurer for two years, until her termination in June 2015, discussed further below. Pl's SOF Resp. ¶¶ 149-51 [#107].

C. Lockbox Contract

Shortly after her appointment as Treasurer, Lawless implemented a "Lockbox" program to help Freetown process its tax payments. Id. at ¶ 19.² She signed a contract with a local financial institution on November 25, 2013. Lockbox Agreement [#95-14].

D. Cheryl Estrella's Complaints to the Town Administrator and His March 2014 Notices to Lawless

Cheryl Estrella, who at the time was the senior clerk in the Treasurer's office and was Lawless' subordinate, began complaining about Lawless to Town Administrator Richard Brown³ in February 2014. Pl's SOF Resp. ¶ 5 [#107]; Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Facts ("Pl's SOF") ¶ 51 [#110]. At some point, Estrella complained to Brown that Lawless had allowed her husband to come into the office for extended periods of time. Estrella Dep. 84-85 [#109-15]. In response, in March 2014, Brown directed Lawless via email to cease allowing her husband to be present in her office. Disciplinary Hrg. Exhibits 31 [#95-16]. Later that month, Brown sent Lawless another email instructing her that transfers of payments to Lockbox needed Board approval. Id. at 32. Brown took no further action regarding these matters. Pl's SOF ¶ 51 [#110].

Brown also told Estrella that she should not complain to him every time she had a disagreement with Lawless. Id. Estrella then made complaints about Lawless directly to Sadeck and Baumgartner. Id. at ¶ 52.

E. April 2, 2014 Executive Session

On April 2, 2014, the Board held an executive session, attended by the Sadeck, Pacheco, Baumgartner, and Town Counsel.⁴ Apr. 2, 2014 Exec. Session Minutes [#95-17]. During this executive session, Sadeck stated that, while paying his tax bill, he noticed that a Lockbox program had been implemented despite the program not having been authorized by the Board. Id. Baumgartner raised a concern about Lawless' husband having been in her office. Id. Sadeck said that he had also received a report that Lawless had behaved unprofessionally toward another town employee. Id. Baumgartner then said that he did not trust Lawless, and Pacheco and Sadeck agreed. Id. Pacheco suggested that the Board hold a disciplinary hearing, and Sadeck stated that Lawless was appointed, not elected, and that "is the end of story." Id. Town Counsel responded that the Board could not hold a disciplinary hearing until Lawless had been given a directive about her behavior and then violated it. Id. At the end of the executive session, the Board voted to hold an executive session with Lawless to discuss these issues. Id.

F. April 15, 2014 Executive Session

That executive session was held on April 15, 2014. Apr. 15, 2014 Exec. Session Minutes [#95-19]. Lawless was present with her attorney, and Brown and Town Counsel were also in attendance. Id. Sadeck confronted Lawless about implementing Lockbox without Board approval and asked whether she had signed a contract with a bank. Id. Lawless responded that she had filled out forms but did not know whether there was a contract. Id. Sadeck also said that he believed Lawless to have provided incorrect information to a newspaper in response to a publicrecords request. Id. Lawless, through her attorney, responded that she had never previously been made aware of this issue. Id.

Next, Sadeck expressed his concerns about Lawless' husband having been in her office and having access to sensitive town records. Id. Lawless stated that her husband had, on several occasions, come to pick her up and spent a few minutes in the office while waiting for...