Lawrence v. Weiner

154 Conn.App. 592

106 A.3d 963

Wilbert LAWRENCE

v.Henry WEINER.

No. 35378.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 16, 2014.

Decided Jan. 6, 2015.

Vincent F. Sabatini, Newington, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Nancy A. Brouillet, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Ann E. Lynch and Peter M. Haberlandt, assistant attorneys general, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

PRESCOTT, J.

General Statutes § 4–165 grants state employees immunity from suit from negligence claims regarding conduct arising out of the scope of their employment, but such immunity does not extend to conduct by a state employee that is alleged to be wanton, reckless, or malicious. In this appeal from the trial court's judgment of dismissal in a tort action brought by the plaintiff, Wilbert Lawrence, against the defendant, Henry Weiner, a state employee, the dispositive issue is whether the court properly concluded that the plaintiff's complaint failed, as a matter of law, to plead conduct that is wanton, reckless, or malicious. We conclude that the plaintiff's complaint failed to adequately allege conduct that is wanton, reckless, or malicious and is therefore barred by § 4–165. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are alleged in the plaintiff's complaint, which we assume to be true for purposes of this appeal. The plaintiff was the teacher of an automotive repair class at the State of Connecticut's Vinal Technical High School in Middletown. In March, 2010, he was teaching his class when he experienced “an emergency situation in which he needed to use the restroom facilities.” As required by school policy, the plaintiff had another staff member supervise his students during his absence from the classroom. While the plaintiff was in the restroom, however, a student was injured while using a piece of machinery.

Later that day, the defendant, the school's assistant principal, “falsely reported the plaintiff to the Department of Children and [Families (department) ] ... and accused the plaintiff of physical neglect.' ” In making his report, the defendant failed to disclose that the plaintiff was in the bathroom at the time of the accident, and that another staff member was supervising the plaintiff's students in his absence. The defendant also failed to wait for an investigation into the student's injury to be completed before making his report to the department. One month later, the plaintiff was terminated from his position at the school.

The plaintiff subsequently filed the present case against the defendant in his individual capacity, raising claims of defamation, vexatious litigation pursuant to General Statutes § 52–568, Unfair Trade Practices pursuant to General Statutes § 42–110a et seq., “false accusations,” negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and recklessness. The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action, arguing that he was entitled to statutory immunity pursuant to General Statutes §§ 4–165 and 17a–101e (b).¹ After hearing argument, the court granted the defendant's motion, and the plaintiff appealed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

The plaintiff raises two principal claims on appeal.² First, he claims that the court improperly concluded that the defendant was entitled to statutory immunity under § 4–165. Second, he claims that before ruling on the defendant's motion to dismiss, the court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing. For reasons we now set forth, we reject both of these claims.

I

The plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that the defendant was entitled to statutory immunity pursuant to § 4–165. Specifically, the plaintiff contends that § 4–165 does not afford the defendant immunity because the defendant acted wantonly, recklessly, and maliciously. The defendant responds that the plaintiff's action was properly dismissed because his complaint failed to allege specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant's conduct fell within an exception to the immunity provided by § 4–165. We agree with the defendant.

We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review. “A motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.... A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.”(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 650, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).

“Claims involving the doctrines of common-law sovereign immunity and statutory immunity, pursuant to § 4–165, implicate the court's subject matter jurisdiction.... A determination regarding a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. When ... the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Manifold v. Ragaglia, 94 Conn.App. 103, 113–14, 891 A.2d 106 (2006).

“When a ... court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light.... In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.”(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Filippi v. Sullivan, 273 Conn. 1, 8, 866 A.2d 599 (2005).

General Statutes § 4–165(a) provides in relevant part that “[n]o state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his or her duties or within the scope of his or her employment....” “In other words, state employees may not be held personally liable for their negligent actions performed within the scope of their employment.... State employees do not, however, have statutory immunity for wanton, reckless or malicious actions, or for actions not performed within the scope of their employment. For those actions, they may be held personally liable, and a plaintiff who has been injured by such actions is free to bring an action against the individual employee.” (Footnote omitted.) Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 319, 828 A.2d 549 (2003).

“In the posture of this case, we examine the pleadings to decide if the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts ... with respect to personal immunity under § 4–165, to support a conclusion that the [defendant was] acting outside the scope of [his] employment or wilfully or maliciously.... The question before us, therefore, is whether the facts as alleged in the pleadings, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss on the ground of statutory immunity.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Martin v. Brady, 261 Conn. 372, 376, 802 A.2d 814 (2002).

We thus turn to the matter of whether the plaintiff has alleged facts that, if proven, are sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant acted wantonly, recklessly, or maliciously. “In applying § 4–165, our Supreme Court has understood wanton, reckless or malicious to have the same meaning as it does in the common-law context.... Under the common law, [i]n order to establish that the defendants' conduct was wanton, reckless, wilful, intentional and malicious, the plaintiff must prove, on the part of the defendants, the existence of a state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of one's acts.... [Such conduct] is more than negligence, more than gross negligence.... [I]n order to infer it, there must be something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them.... It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of the action.... [In sum, such] conduct tends to take on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Manifold v. Ragaglia, 102 Conn.App. 315, 324, 926 A.2d 38 (2007).

The plaintiff bases his claim that the defendant acted wantonly, recklessly, and maliciously on his assertion in his appellate brief that the defendant knowingly made a “false report” to the department. That assertion, however, overstates the scope of the plaintiff's allegations. Although the plaintiff does allege that the defendant “falsely reported” him to the department, his complaint is devoid of any specific factual allegation that the defendant did so knowingly or with knowledge of facts that would have revealed to him that his report was false. See Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 832, 836 A.2d 394 (2003) (“[r]ecklessness requires a conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man” [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Consequently, we have no basis on which to conclude that the defendant's conduct was not, for example, the result of justifiable ignorance, or that it amounted to “something more than a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of watchfulness to avoid danger to others or to take reasonable precautions to avoid injury to them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Manifold v. Ragaglia, supra, 102 Conn.App. at 324, 926 A.2d 38. The allegation that the defendant either knew, or recklessly disregarded that his report was false is, in the present case, essential to demonstrating the requisite “state of consciousness with reference to the consequences of...