Lawson v. Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC

194 F.Supp.3d 301

Iris LAWSON, Plaintiff,

v.AVIS BUDGET CAR RENTAL, LLC; Trish Homernuk, individually, Defendants.

15-cv-01510 (GBD)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed July 12, 2016

Jesse Curtis Rose, The Rose Law Group PLLC, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

A. Michael Weber, Joshua Daniel Kiman, Littler Mendelson, P.C., New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

GEORGE B. DANIELS, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Iris Lawson filed this lawsuit alleging that her former employer, Defendant Avis Budget Rental, LLC ("Avis"), and former supervisor, Defendant Trish Homenuk,¹ violated the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"), the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. ("FMLA"), and the New York State Human Rights Law, New York State Executive Law § 296 et seq. ("NYSHRL") by discriminating and retaliating against her due to her disabilities.² (Complaint, (ECF No. 2.) at ¶¶ 1, 77-96.) Lawson also alleged that Defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. ("FLSA") and New York State Labor Law, Articles 6 and 19 ("NYLL"), contending that after her attorney sent a letter to Avis complaining about alleged discrimination, her duties ceased being managerial, making her a non-exempt employee eligible for overtime pay, which she did not receive. (Id. at ¶¶ 2, 97-106.)

Defendants moved, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, for summary judgment to dismiss Lawson's Complaint in its entirety. (Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 30).) Defendants have established that there is no admissible evidence sufficient to allow a trier of fact to find that Defendants discriminated or retaliated against Lawson on the basis of her disabilities, or to find that Lawson was eligible for overtime pay. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety.

I. Background

On or about September 23, 2002, Lawson began working for Avis as a "Rental Sales Agent" at Avis's Manhattan locations. (Declaration of A. Michael Weber in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Weber Decl."), Exhibit 2, Certified Transcript of Videotaped/Virtual Deposition of Iris Lawson ("Lawson Dep. Tr."), (ECF No. 32-2), at 13:20-14:17.³ ) In or around 2010, after having received several promotions, Lawson was once again promoted, this time to "Senior Operations Manager." (Id. at 14:5-17:25; see Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Rule 56.1 Statement and Plaintiffs Rule 56.1 Statement ("Rule 56.1 Statement"), (ECF No. 38), at 1 ¶ 1,⁴ ) About a year later, Lawson was transferred at her own request to Avis's Westchester Airport location. (Lawson Dep. Tr. at 18:2-16; see Rule 56.1 Statement at 1 ¶ 1.) At Westchester Airport, Lawson reported to the "Airport Manager." (See Rule 56.1 Statement at 1 ¶ 2; Complaint at ¶ 27.) Defendant Homenuk became the "Airport Manager" at Avis's Westchester Airport location about six months after Lawson began working there, and at that time became Lawson's direct supervisor. (Rule 56.1 Statement at 1 ¶ 2; Complaint at ¶ 28.)

In December 2012, Lawson became severely depressed and had panic attacks several times per week. (Rule 56.1 Statement at 3 ¶ 1.) As a result, Lawson took disability and FMLA leave from December 2012 until March 2013. (Rule 56.1 Statement at 1 ¶ 3.) According to her sworn deposition testimony, when Lawson returned from leave, she retained the same job title, (Lawson Dep. Tr. at 19:10-12, 103:10-13), salary, (see id. at 103:3-9 (failing to recall any change to her salary), and material responsibilities, (id. at 103:14-16; id. at 104:4-105:2 (testifying that she did not experience any changes to her job duties upon returning from FMLA leave); id. at 120:19-20 (testifying that she was not demoted)), as she had prior to taking leave. (See also Rule 56.1 Statement at 2 ¶¶ 4-5.)

However, Lawson returned to a different work environment. While away on leave, Lawson's subordinate employees discovered that her absence was due to mental health issues. (Lawson Dep. Tr. 80:20-84:20.) When Lawson returned to work, the subordinate employees informed her that they were aware that she was "severely depressed" and had "issues." (Id. at 84:3-4.) They also made comments which alluded to Lawson's disability, calling her "unstable," "cuckoo for Cocoa Puffs," and stating that they "hope[d] she [had taken] her meds." (Lawson Dep. Tr. at 82:16-19, 84:5.)⁵

Additionally, Lawson testified that when she returned from her leave, she felt like her relationship with Homenuk had changed. (Lawson Dep. Tr. at 110:20-111:13 ("Q. How were the dynamics different between you and [Homenuk]? A. Well, we had a different relationship from before 1 left out for disability and when I came back. Q. What was the difference? A..... [T]here it was a distance there. There was, like, it was just uncomfortable.... I felt like because I took the time, our relationship changed."); id. at 106:2-12 ("[T]here was a lot of tension so I believe[d] [Homenuk] didn't like me anymore. Q. Did she ever say she didn't like you anymore. A. That's just the way that, you know, that's what I perceived to be her, our demeanor.").) Specifically, Lawson testified that after she returned from leave, she and Homenuk communicated less frequently overall, and more often via text message than in phone conversations or in person. (Id. at 111:18-21 ("There was no communication. It was always texting or tell [me] this. It was just very minimal communication between us.").)⁶ As a result, Lawson testified that she felt uncomfortable at work and that she was no longer a "part of the team." (Id. at 91:7-9 ("[I]t was just really uncomfortable working environment after that."); id. at 92:14-16 ("I was not part of the team after [the other employees found out about my condition].").)

In or around January 2014, Lawson contacted an attorney regarding her situation at work. (See Rose Decl., Exhibit E, Attorney Claim Letter and Draft Complaint, (ECF No. 37-5).) On or about January 24, 2014, Lawson's attorney mailed a letter along with a draft complaint to Avis alleging discrimination and retaliation. (See id. )

After the letter was sent, Lawson felt even more uncomfortable at work, and believed that her relationship with Homenuk had further deteriorated. (Lawson Dep. Tr. at 90:14-16 (indicating that things got really hard after the letter was sent); id. at 90:17-24 (indicating that the lack of communication with Homenuk made Lawson "fe[el] [like she] was locked out of [her] job").) Lawson felt so uncomfortable around Homenuk that she began reporting to work at the front counter at the start of her shift, preferring to wait until Homenuk had left for the day to access the computer in the manager's office to perform her managerial paperwork. (Id. at 92:5-15 ("I would try to go to the counter .... [because of] me feeling like I had to wait until later on that night to get my work done ...." (Emphasis added)); id. at 116:12-18 ("Well, when I would come in, ... before I went out on disability, you know, I was kind of able to work in the office, and then when I came back ..., I was just, you know, I would come in, go to the counter.").)⁷ At the front counter, part of Lawson's responsibilities included monitoring subordinate employees. (Lawson Dep. Tr. at 117:18-118:8).) After Homenuk left the office at 3:00 PM, Lawson had five hours, or half of every ten-hour shift, to access the manager's office outside of Homenuk's presence, as she preferred. (Id. at 119:21-120:18 ("Q. What was [Homenuk's] shift? A. Mornings, six to three. Q. So yours was ... ten to when? A. Ten to eight. Q. From three to eight, that five-hour period of time, you had full access to the office? .... A. Yes, ... I had access [from] three to eight.").)

Lawson continued to work in this environment until June 24, 2014, when she emailed Homenuk a resignation letter which reads as follows:

To: Avis Budget Group

Attn: Trish Homenuk

I would like to notify you that I am resigning from my position as Senior Operations Manager with Avis Budget Group. My last day of employment will be Wednesday July 9, 2014.

I would like to thank Avis Budget Group for the opportunities that I have been given over the last 12 years.

Sincerely,

Iris Lawson

(Weber Decl., Exhibit 1, Email from Lawson to Homenuk and Resignation Letter ("Resignation Letter"), (ECF No. 32-1).) At her deposition, Lawson testified that she resigned her employment voluntarily to start a child-care center. (Lawson Dep. Tr. at 29:2-4 ("Q. You resigned voluntarily from Avis, correct? A. Right."); id. at 79:25-80:6 ("Q. And you resigned Avis to start your childcare center, correct? A. Yes.").)

After receiving Lawson's resignation letter on or around July 3, 2014, a district manager at Avis, told Lawson that she did not need to come to work through July 9, the date Lawson had specified would be her last, but would still be paid up until that date. (Rule 56.1 Statement at 3 ¶¶ 9-10.)

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, courts must "resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Stern v. Trs. of Columbia Univ. , 131 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir.1997). The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing that a material factual dispute does not exist. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Once the moving party carries this initial burden, it shifts: the nonmoving party must then cite admissible evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial related to each claim on which summary judgment is sought. Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co....