Lawson v. Hilderbrand

88 F.Supp.3d 84

Duncan LAWSON and Jane Doe, A Minor Child, PPA Duncan Lawson, Plaintiffs

v.Timothy HILDERBRAND, Gary Hoffkins, Richard Stook, Joseph Rondini, Frederick Quezada, and Town of Greenwich, Defendants.

No. 3:13–cv–00206 JAM.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

Signed Feb. 23, 2015.

William Sylvester Palmieri, Law Offices of William S. Palmieri, LLC, New Haven, CT, for Plaintiffs.

Andrew M. McPherson, William J. Kupinse, Jr., Goldstein & Peck, Bridgeport, CT, Valerie Maze Keeney, Town of Greenwich, Greenwich, CT, for Defendants.

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JEFFREY ALKER MEYER, District Judge.

When Scott Lawson was arrested by the Greenwich police one night for selling OxyContin pills, he told them that he had a few more pills in his bedroom at home. Scott was 21 years old. He lived at home with his father, his 16–year–old brother, and his 11–year–old sister. Four police officers promptly decided to go to Scott's house in search of the pills that he said were there. It was late at night. The police did not have a warrant. They resorted instead to a classic knock and talk? routine: presenting themselves at the Lawson home to ask Scott's father to invite them in for a talk and then, once inside, asking Scott's father to consent to a search of Scott's bedroom for what contraband might be found.

The knock-and-talk strategy has long featured prominently and controversially in the playbook of law enforcement practices. See generally Craig M. Bradley, ‘ ‘Knock and Talk” and the Fourth Amendment, 84 Ind. L.J. 1099 (2009) ; Andrew Eppich, Note, Wolf at the Door: Issues of Place and Race in the Use of the “Knock and Talk” Policing Technique, 32 B.C. J.L. & Soc. Just. 119 (2012). On its face, a knock-and-talk is often a sound law enforcement tactic. Many homeowners will readily consent to cooperate with the police, and the police may save valuable time that would be expended on applying for and obtaining a search warrant.

Still, knock-and-talk encounters may also be ripe for manipulation and abuse. To begin with, police may be less than forthcoming with homeowners about the reasons they want the owner to let them into the home. They may ask the homeowner to let them in to talk, when in reality they want to search; a knock-and-talk may be a guise for a knock-and-search. If the homeowner decides not to let the police search and asks them to leave, the police may exploit the fact that the homeowner has already granted them entry. They may insist now on occupying the home and detaining all its occupants for hours unless the homeowner relents or until a judge can be found to issue a search warrant.

This is a case about a knock-and-talk encounter that allegedly went quite wrong. According to plaintiffs, the police tricked their way into the Lawson family home on the pretense that they just wanted to talk to Scott's father about Scott's drug problems. Scott's father let them in but then declined to consent to a search of Scott's room for evidence. He asked the police to leave, but they refused. And instead they punished the innocent Lawson family with a battery of police-state-style tactics. They threatened to report Scott's father to the Department of Children and Families (DCF) and to have his children taken away. They threatened to seek a search warrant for the entire house if the father would not allow them to search only Scott's bedroom. Purportedly needing to secure? the house pending their application to a judge for a search warrant, they forced Scott's father to wake up his sleeping children and then corralled the entire family into a single room of the house late into the night. When Scott's father insisted that the children be allowed to go back to bed, the police arrested him and took him away. The Greenwich police did all this with no indication that the father or children intended to destroy evidence or that they posed any threat of harm to the police.

Plaintiffs are Scott's father and 11–year–old sister. They filed this federal lawsuit against the police officers involved and the Town of Greenwich, and defendants have all moved for summary judgment. I conclude that genuine issues of fact remain for trial on most of the counts alleged in plaintiffs' complaint: genuine issues of fact remain to suggest that the Greenwich police illegally searched the Lawson family home, that they illegally detained the Lawson family while seeking a search warrant, that they illegally arrested Scott's father when the police had no right to be in the home in the first place, and that they intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the Lawson family as a consequence of the father's insistence on the family's constitutional rights and his refusal to go along with an errant knock-and-talk scheme.

Background

In light of the standards governing defendants' motion for summary judgment, the following facts are set forth on the basis of the parties' submissions and as viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. On November 18, 2010, a confidential informant advised the police in Greenwich, Connecticut that Scott Lawson was actively selling OxyContin tablets. Scott was 21 years old, and he lived in Greenwich with his father Duncan Lawson, his 16–year–old brother, and his 11–year–old sister.

The informant told the police that Scott had just received a shipment of pills and that he would be driving around in his blue VW Beetle to distribute them. The police set up surveillance outside Scott's home, and after they saw him leave in his VW Beetle, they stopped him and placed him under arrest for drug distribution. Scott promptly told the police that he was a drug addict, that he sold pills to support his addiction, that his mother had died in the last year, and that he was not dealing with it very well. Doc. # 64–11 at 3. He said he had “a few more illegal pills at home in his bedroom.” Ibid.; Doc. # 64–4 at 3; Doc. # 64–10 at 1.

It was then about 10:30 p.m., and four of the defendant police officers—Sergeant Timothy Hilderbrand, Detective Gary Hoffkins, Officer Richard Stook, and Officer Frederick Quezada—decided to go to Scott's home in search of the pills he had said were there. The police had not applied for a search warrant. Scott's father—Duncan Lawson—answered the door. The police told him that Scott had been arrested, that he had a drug addiction problem, and that—according to Duncan's sworn affidavit—“it would be better to discuss the sensitive matter of Scott's drug problem and arrest inside my home rather than outside with an audience.” Doc. # 646 (Duncan Aff.) at 2.

Once inside, the four officers asked for the first time for consent to search Scott's bedroom. Duncan declined to consent, after making a phone call for legal advice. The police told Duncan that if he would not provide consent for the warrantless search of Scott's bedroom, they would seek a warrant to search the entire residence. Duncan then told the officers to leave and that he would cooperate if they came back with a warrant.

But this was not good enough for the police, who were now evidently bent on occupying the home—perhaps long into the night—until Duncan might change his mind or until they could find a judge to issue a late-night search warrant. According to Duncan's sworn affidavit, Hilderbrand—who was the ranking officer on the scene and in charge of the other defendants—threatened to arrest Duncan if he would not permit a warrantless search of his home; the officers told Duncan that “[he] was making it hard on [him]self.” Id. at 7. Thereafter, according to Duncan, “the defendants threatened to take my children away from me, and to report me to the Department of Children and Families for this purpose because I would not agree to the warrantless search.” Ibid.¹

In the meantime, the police also decided that they must secure the premises. That meant waking sleeping children to collect them in the family living room until a search warrant could be obtained and executed. One or more of the officers escorted Duncan upstairs to wake the children. They were sleeping in bedrooms separate from Scott's bedroom. Duncan and his children were ordered to remain in the living room,² and two of the four officers— Hoffkins and Stook—left to apply for a search warrant. At some point, a fifth Greenwich police officer—Officer Joseph Rondini—arrived. He entered the residence without Duncan's consent.³

Evidently angry and frustrated by the police occupation of his home, Duncan instructed his children several times to return upstairs to their bedrooms to sleep. But the officers told the children to disregard their father, and they blocked them from going upstairs. Duncan also asked his son to retrieve his Blackberry smartphone from upstairs, so that Duncan could electronically record the officers' actions. But the officers physically prevented the son from doing so.

Eventually, because Duncan repeatedly instructed his children to go upstairs, the police arrested him for police interference in violation of Connecticut General Statutes section 53a–167a(a). He was handcuffed and taken to the Greenwich police station. While he was on the steps of his home being taken away, the police again “threatened me that they would contact DCF to have my children taken from me.” Doc. # 64–6 (Duncan Aff.) at 8.

The children were left alone for hours in the family living room with three of the officers (Hilderbrand, Quezada, and Rondini). At some point around 1:30 a.m., Stook and Hoffkins returned with a search warrant for the entire residence. The police then executed the search warrant, resulting in the recovery of dozens of apparently illicit pills from Scott's bedroom. Doc. # 62–2 (Hilderbrand Aff.) at 4; Doc. # 62–3 (Quezada Aff.) at 4; Doc. # 62–4 (Rondini Aff.) at 3; Doc. # 62–5 (Stook Aff.) at 3; Doc. # 62–6 (Hoffkins Aff.) at 3; Doc. # 64–10 at 2.

At about 4:00 a.m., Duncan returned home after having been booked on the arrest charge and after the police had...