Lawson v. PA. Dep't of Corr. -Sec'y George Little

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Tyree Lawson, Petitioner v. PA. Department of Corrections -Secretary George Little, SCI Phoenix's Mailroom Supervisor/Inspector Kelly Long, Deputy Superintendent of Security Shawn Bradley, Security Lieutenant J. Wright, Library Assistant David Medina, Kitchen Stewardress E. Davis, PA Department of Corrections Policy DC ADM 803, and Attorney General of Pennsylvania Josh Shapiro, Respondents

No. 486 M.D. 2021

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

June 21, 2023

OPINION NOT REPORTED

Submitted: February 17, 2023

BEFORE: HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge, HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge, HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

Tyree Lawson (Lawson), pro se, an inmate at the State Correctional Institution in Collegeville, Pennsylvania (SCI Phoenix), filed an amended petition for review (Petition)^[1] in this Court's original jurisdiction. Presently before us for disposition are Respondents' preliminary objections to the Petition, as well as Lawson's preliminary objections to Respondents' preliminary objections.

We sustain in part and overrule in part Lawson's preliminary objections to the preliminary objections of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC), Secretary George Little (Little), SCI Phoenix's Mailroom Supervisor/Inspector Kelly Long (Long), Deputy Superintendent of Security Shawn Bradley (Bradley), Security Lieutenant J. Wright (Wright), Library Assistant David Medina (Medina), Kitchen Stewardess E. Davis (Davis), and DOC Policy DC ADM 803 (Policy 803) (collectively DOC Respondents). We sustain in part and overrule in part the DOC Respondents' preliminary objections to the Petition and dismiss the DOC Respondents from the action.

We sustain in part Lawson's preliminary objections to the preliminary objections of former Attorney General of Pennsylvania Josh Shapiro (Attorney General). We sustain in part the Attorney General's preliminary objections to the Petition and dismiss the Attorney General from the action.

Accordingly, as no Respondent remains a party to the action, we dismiss the Petition in its entirety.

I. Background

Lawson has styled the Petition as "[i]n the Nature of [a] Complaint seeking Omni-bus [sic] Relief [and] Declaratory, Injunctive and Appellate Review in the Nature of an Appeal." He alleges generally that the conduct of the various Respondents could "bring the Governor's Office Code of Conduct into criminal disrepute." Pet. at 2. He does not explain how this allegation relates to his claims.

Lawson pleads facts and claims falling generally into three categories. First, he alleges mishandling of both his incoming and outgoing mail and challenges a mail policy change to Policy 803 implemented by the DOC. Further, he alleges that his phone calls were repeatedly disconnected.^[2] Additionally, Lawson alleges that a Deputy Attorney General in a separate federal action acted improperly in his handling of Lawson's deposition in that case and that the transcript of the deposition was fraudulently altered.^[3] By his own description, Lawson filed "an onslaught" of grievances as well as several other civil actions, including at least one federal suit. Pet., ¶¶ 12 & 41; see also Petr's's Prelim. Objs. to DOC Respondents' Prelim. Objs., New Matter, ¶ 23 (stating that Lawson "has a grievance history well over several hundred"). He avers that the same Deputy Attorney General told him, through his criminal attorney, to stop filing lawsuits or an upcoming criminal hearing would not go well. Lawson alleges generally that Respondents' conduct violated his First Amendment rights, including his right of access to the courts. See U.S. Const. amend. I.^[4]

II. Preliminary Objections

A. DOC Respondents' Preliminary Objections to the Petition

The DOC Respondents advance several preliminary objections to the Petition. First, the DOC Respondents posit that Lawson is asserting civil rights claims under Title 42, Section 1983 of the United States Code, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983).^[5] They argue that a two-year statute of limitations applies to those claims. Because Lawson first filed his original petition on December 28, 2021, the DOC Respondents maintain that all claims related to conduct occurring on or before December 28, 2019 are barred.

Second, the DOC Respondents demur to the Petition as it applies to each of them. Regarding Bradley, Medina, and Davis, the DOC Respondents contend that the Petition fails to plead any personal involvement by any of them in any alleged wrongful conduct. As Section 1983 does not support claims under the doctrine of respondeat superior, they are not proper Respondents. Regarding Policy 803, the DOC Respondents observe that a policy is not a person and therefore is not subject to a Section 1983 action alleging a constitutional violation. Further, regarding the alleged amendment of that policy by Little, the DOC Respondents assert that Lawson has pleaded no facts or law to explain how the amendment violated his constitutional rights. Regarding Lawson's claim that Wright disconnected Lawson's telephone calls for retaliatory reasons, the DOC Respondents argue that Lawson has failed to plead any connection between any pleaded facts and the legal elements of a retaliation claim. Specifically, he has not adequately pleaded that he was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, that prison officials took adverse action against him, and that his protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse action. Finally, regarding Long, the DOC Respondents maintain that Lawson has not pleaded any viable constitutional claim arising from Long's alleged mishandling of his mail.

Finally, the DOC Respondents demur to the extent that the Petition seeks relief sounding in mandamus.

Lawson has filed preliminary objections to the DOC Respondents' preliminary objections. Regarding the statute of limitations, Lawson asserts that a statute of limitations defense cannot be raised in preliminary objections, but rather, must be filed as new matter along with the answer to the Petition. Moreover, Lawson maintains he is not asserting a Section 1983 claim, and therefore, the statute of limitations applicable to such a claim is irrelevant.

Lawson also preliminarily objects to the DOC Respondents' preliminary objection asserting that mandamus relief is unavailable. Lawson avers that he is not asserting a mandamus claim, and therefore, any preliminary objection to such a claim is also irrelevant.

B. Attorney General's Preliminary Objections to the Petition

The Attorney General also advances several preliminary objections to the Petition. First, regarding the alleged threat by a Deputy Attorney General in a separate case, the Attorney General demurs to this allegation and posits that it is "at best, fantasy." Att'y Gen.'s Prelim. Objs., ¶ 25. The Attorney General asserts that a court considering preliminary objections need not accept irrational or nonsensical averments in a complaint or petition. In addition, the Attorney General contends that Lawson has not pleaded any facts indicating that the alleged threat hindered his exercise of any right.

Next, the Attorney General demurs to Lawson's claim seeking declaratory relief. The Attorney General suggests there is no case or controversy for a declaratory judgment or a mandamus action. The alleged acts of the Deputy Attorney General related to separate litigation. Moreover, a federal court already rejected the same averments that Lawson is advancing here. Further, the Attorney General does not make or enforce DOC mail policies.

In a related preliminary objection, the Attorney General also demurs on the basis that Lawson's claim arising from alleged conduct of the Deputy Attorney General is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The Attorney General asserts that a federal court in separate litigation considered and rejected Lawson's claims that the Deputy Attorney General falsely certified service of a summary judgment motion and produced a "manipulated misleading" transcript of Lawson's deposition in that litigation and that Lawson cannot relitigate those claims here. Lawson v. Banta, Civ. Action No. 18-3670, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198210, *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2020), aff'd sub nom. Lawson v. Superintendent, No. 20-3444, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 15007 (3d Cir. May 26, 2022).

Finally, the Attorney General preliminarily objects that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him because Lawson did not properly serve the Petition.

Lawson has filed preliminary objections to the Attorney General's preliminary objections. Regarding the Attorney General's demurrer to any claim in mandamus, Lawson avers that he is not seeking relief in mandamus. Regarding the Attorney General's service objection, Lawson contends that the Attorney General relies on the wrong rule of court and that service by certified mail was proper.

Lawson has also filed New Matter with his preliminary objections to the Attorney General's preliminary objections,^[6] in which he seeks to disqualify the Deputy Attorney General from litigating in this action, based on "gross abuse of civil process." Pet'r's Prelim. Objs. to Att'y Gen.'s Prelim. Objs., New Matter, ¶ 20.

III. Discussion

Rule 1028(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure,^[7] governing preliminary objections, provides:

(a) Preliminary objections may be filed by any party to any pleading and are limited to the following grounds:

(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or the person of the defendant, improper venue or improper form or service of a writ of summons or a complaint;

. . . .

(2) failure of a pleading to conform to law or rule of court or inclusion of scandalous or impertinent matter;

(3)

...