Lawson v. Plantation Gen. Hosp.

704 F.Supp.2d 1254

Barbara LAWSON, Plaintiff,v.PLANTATION GENERAL HOSPITAL, L.P., Defendant.

Case No. 08-61826-CIV.

United States District Court S.D. Florida.

March 30, 2010.

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Dana Mason Gallup, Hollywood, FL, for Plaintiff.

Alexander D. Del Russo, Allison Oasis Kahn, Carlton Fields, P.A., West Palm Beach, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER

ROBIN S. ROSENBAUM, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion for Summary Judgment”). [D.E. 31, 32]. The Court has carefully considered the Motion, Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts [D.E. 33], Plaintiff's Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment [D.E. 48], Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts in Dispute [D.E. 49], and Defendant's Reply [D.E. 57], as well as the attached exhibits, deposition transcripts, and affidavits of various witnesses in this case. After a full review, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

On November 12, 2008, Defendant Plantation General Hospital, L.P., (“Defendant”) ¹ filed its Notice of Removal [D.E. 1] with the Court. In its Notice, Defendant indicated that Plaintiff Barbara Lawson (“Plaintiff” or “Lawson”), had filed an action in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit. Defendant asserted that this Court has original jurisdiction over the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because the Complaint sets forth facts which, if true, would constitute a violation of federal law. Indeed, the Complaint alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 et seq., the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq., the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. The Complaint also sets forth various claims under the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”) stemming from allegations of discrimination due to Plaintiff's race, age, handicap, national origin, and gender.

Plaintiff is a Black Jamaican female who suffers from sickle cell disease ² and who was formerly employed by Defendant as an executive secretary in the Administrative Offices of the Hospital. Plaintiff claims that following a sickle cell crisis that required hospitalization and then bed rest, Defendant involuntarily transferred Plaintiff to another position in the Hospital-as Medical Staff Administrative Assistant. Plaintiff contends that the transfer constituted a demotion and asserts that a less qualified, younger Hispanic male, Miguel Cruz, was promoted to her former executive secretary position. Following this transfer and an allegedly unfair evaluation of Plaintiff, Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff contends that Defendant's actions were discriminatory and were made in retaliation for Plaintiff's taking of FMLA leave. Defendant responds that it did not discriminate or retaliate against Plaintiff and that it had legitimate non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory reasons for its actions. Defendant also emphasizes that Plaintiff's termination was based upon a reduction in force (“RIF”).

MATERIAL FACTS³

The Court notes that it must take the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,⁴ but sets forth the events from each party's perspective so that it may establish a complete picture of the parties' positions. Plaintiff is a Black female of Jamaican descent who suffers from sickle cell disease and who was fifty-eight years old at the time of the filing of the Motion for Summary Judgment. In September of 1995, Defendant hired Plaintiff to work as an executive secretary in the Hospital's Administrative Offices, where she worked with the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), the Chief Operations Officer (“COO”), and the Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”). Plaintiff served as the Hospital's Executive Secretary in Administration until February of 2007, when the Hospital transferred Plaintiff to its Medical Staff Office. When Plaintiff first began serving as the Executive Secretary in Administration, she reported to Pat Johnsen (“Johnsen”), Administrative Assistant to the CEO. Sometime after 1997, Plaintiff began reporting to David Hughes (“Hughes”), who was the CFO at the time.

After Hughes left the Hospital in December of 2005, Elizabeth Izquierdo (“Izquierdo”), a younger Hispanic female, became the Hospital's new CFO. From late 2005 until late January of 2007, Plaintiff worked directly for Izquierdo and indirectly for the COO, Shana Sappington (“Sappington”). At that time, Johnsen also worked in the Administrative Office with Plaintiff, where Johnsen served as an administrative assistant to Sappington and the CEO Barbara Simmons (“Simmons”). Thus, the Administrative Office was comprised of Izquierdo, Sappinton, Simmons, and their two support staff-Plaintiff and Johnsen.

In her role as Executive Secretary in Administration, Plaintiff performed administrative duties for committees that were chaired by the CFO. Although Plaintiff assisted with other committees, the Ethics and Compliance Committee accounted for approximately 25% of Plaintiff's work. Plaintiff also answered phones, scheduled meetings, filed, and performed clerical tasks, among other work.⁵ Plaintiff received consistently good performance reviews as well as pay raises each year that she performed her duties as Executive Secretary in Administration.

As noted previously, Plaintiff suffers from sickle cell disease, a permanent condition with which she was first diagnosed in 1972. Plaintiff asserts that sickle cell disease is a qualifying disability under the ADA and FCRA or, alternatively, that Defendant knew about the condition and perceived the disease to be a disability, or that she had a record of disability. Defendant disagrees that Plaintiff's sickle cell disease qualifies her as disabled under the ADA and FCRA. During Plaintiff's twelve years of employment at the Hospital, Plaintiff suffered at least five major sickle cell crises-in 1998, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2006.⁶ All of the crises required hospitalization, during which Plaintiff received oxygen and pain medication, followed by bed rest. In addition to these crises, Plaintiff experienced non-major crises that required bed rest and prescription medication.

Plaintiff states that she receives ongoing treatment for her sickle cell disease. Plaintiff takes folic acid and multiple vitamins on a daily basis for her sickle cell disease, and her primary care physician, Dr. Richard McClean (“McClean”), prescribed Darvocet for Plaintiff to take when she feels a sickle cell crisis coming on. Plaintiff also asserts that she has been prescribed Plavix, HCT2 (hydroshlorothiazide), Amlodipine for hypertension, Metaprolol for angina, and Protonix for hiatial hernia. Many of Plaintiff's conditions are complications of her sickle cell disease.

Plaintiff has a treating hematologist, Dr. Jolly Varki (“Dr. Varki”), whom Plaintiff sees approximately every six months. Although Dr. Varki's records reflect extended periods of time during which Plaintiff is without significant symptoms, the records also reveal that Plaintiff suffers weakness, weight loss, and shortness of breath. Plaintiff indicates that she experiences joint/muscle weakness and fatigue on a daily basis. Plaintiff also states that she suffers from chronic anemia, her gall bladder has been removed, and she has a heart murmur, gout, an enlarged spleen, and elevated bilirubin, which she asserts are all complications of sickle cell disease. Plaintiff also notes that she had a stroke and continues to suffer from hypertension. In connection with her sickle cell disease, Plaintiff indicates that she must avoid stress, cannot engage in extreme physical activity such as running, and is not able to care for herself when she has a major crisis. Defendant, on the other hand, emphasizes that Plaintiff can care for herself, perform daily tasks, and work on a full time basis.

Plaintiff's last major sickle cell crisis occurred in December of 2006, when she worked for Izquierdo. During this major crisis, Plaintiff was hospitalized for ten days and then ordered to bed rest for an additional period of time before returning to work on January 15, 2007. As a result of the major crisis, Plaintiff requested and was granted FMLA leave. Plaintiff claims that this is the only time that she officially applied for FMLA leave, but Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has never been denied request for time off as a result of her illness. Both parties agree that Plaintiff has been able to work since her return to work on January 15, 2007, through April 2, 2009 (the date of her deposition).

Following Plaintiff's FMLA leave in December of 2006, she returned to her position as Executive Secretary in Administration on January 15, 2007. According to Plaintiff, within days of returning to work, Izquierdo transferred Plaintiff to another unit in the Hospital. Hospital documents reflect that effective February 4, 2007, Plaintiff was transferred from Executive Secretary in Administration to a new position as Administrative Assistant in the Hospital's Medical Staff Office. At the same time, Miguel Cruz (“Cruz”), a younger Hispanic male, was transferred from Administrative Assistant in the Medical Staff Office to Executive Secretary in Administration. Defendant claims, however, that Plaintiff's Executive Secretary position was eliminated and when Cruz transferred into Administration, a new position was created which included Plaintiff's former job responsibilities and the additional responsibility of handling physician contracts.

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's transfer was based on legitimate business reasons. According to CFO Izquierdo, her duties included, among other things, auditing...