Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admission v. United States

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LAWYERS FOR FAIR RECIPROCAL ADMISSION, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 22-2399

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

January 10, 2023

MEMORANDUM

Gerald Austin McHugh, United States District Judge.

This case represents yet another effort by Plaintiff's counsel, Joseph Giannini, to establish a legal right for lawyers to practice law in jurisdictions that lack bar reciprocity with the state where such lawyers are barred. Mr Giannini has filed many such cases in courts across the country over the last several decades, two of which have been before me. See NAAMJP v. Simandle, No. 14-3678, 2015 WL 13273313 (D.N.J. Sept. 1, 2015), aff'd, 658 Fed.Appx. 127 (3d Cir. 2016); NAAJMP v. Castille, 66 F.Supp.3d 633 (E.D. Pa. 2014), aff'd, 799 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2015). His efforts have almost uniformly failed. See Simandle, 658 Fed.Appx. at 130 (compiling cases). At least two courts have gone so far as to enjoin Mr Giannini from filing additional cases challenging bar admission rules without leave of court. See NAAMJP v Bush, No. 05-cv-5081, ECF No. 43, slip op. at 9 (E.D Pa. Mar. 23, 2006), aff'd sub nom. NAAJMP v. Gonzales, 211 Fed.Appx. 91, 93 (3d Cir. 2006); Paciulan v. George, 38 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1146-47 (N.D. Cal. 1999), aff'd, 229 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 2000).

In the present case, an organization named Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admissions (LFRA) challenges the local civil rules in this Court and the District of Delaware, naming the United States, the Attorney General, and an array of federal judges as defendants. LFRA alleges that the courts' rules governing the admission of lawyers to each court's bar violate various federal statutory and constitutional provisions, reasserting many of the arguments advanced against the District of New Jersey's local rules in Simandle, 2015 WL 13273313.

Subsequent case law has slightly altered the legal standard for one of Plaintiff's claims since Simandle, but Plaintiff has nonetheless failed to state a claim for relief. I will therefore dismiss the entire Complaint with prejudice.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

LFRA “is a corporation organized for public benefit under California law with offices in Los Angeles, CA” that is “engaged in interstate commerce and advocacy.” Compl. ¶ 35. Plaintiff's Complaint does not specify the purpose of its “advocacy.” Based on the contents of the Complaint and LFRA's name, however, its mission appears to be changing non-reciprocal bar admissions rules, much like the National Association for the Advancement of Multijurisdiction Practice (NAAMJP), which was the plaintiff in my previous two cases involving Mr. Giannini. See Simandle, 2015 WL 13273313, at *1; Castille, 66 F.Supp.3d at 638-39.^[1] Plaintiff asserts that it has “members and associates,” many of whom are lawyers, “who have been deprived of their citizenship rights by the challenged local Rules” in New Jersey and Delaware. Compl. ¶ 36.

Defendants in this case are the United States, Attorney General Merrick Garland, all judges on the Third Circuit Judicial Council, and all district court judges in the District of New Jersey and District of Delaware. Plaintiff alleges that the United States is a proper party because of “the Supreme Court's supervisory appellate jurisdiction” over local district court rules. Id. ¶ 37. Plaintiff alleges that the Attorney General is a proper party because he “has a constitutional duty to assure the laws are faithfully executed.” Id. ¶ 38. Plaintiff then alleges that the Third Circuit Judicial Council is properly named as defendant due to its role in reviewing the local rules of courts within its jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 39. And Plaintiff appears to have sued all judges in the District of New Jersey and District of Delaware due to their role in promulgating each district's local civil rules (though Plaintiff does not state this explicitly). See id. ¶¶ 40-41.

Plaintiff's Complaint challenges each court's adoption and “piggy-back[ing]” of their respective state supreme court's admission rules for out-of-state attorneys. See id. ¶¶ 13-14. Plaintiff notes that these local rules differ from other local civil rules, including those in the Western District of Pennsylvania, which allow for admission of any attorney previously admitted to any other federal district court. Id. ¶ 12. While Plaintiff does not identify the specific rules they challenge in their Complaint nor any of their briefs, Defendants and I assume that Plaintiff challenges District of New Jersey Local Civil Rule 101.1 and District of Delaware Local Civil Rule 83.5 (the “Local Rules”). Rule 101.1(b) states that “[a]ny attorney licensed to practice by the Supreme Court of New Jersey may be admitted as an attorney at law,” with Rule 101.1(c) allowing attorneys licensed in other jurisdictions to appear pro hac vice for a specific case, so long as they appear in conjunction with local counsel. Rule 83.5(b) similarly provides that “[a]ny attorney admitted to practice by the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware may be admitted to the Bar of this Court,” with a pro hac vice provision similar to the District of New Jersey's codified at Rule 83.5(c).

Plaintiff claims that these rules violate various federal statutes and provisions of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiff's ten counts allege that the local rules violate: (1) the separation of powers doctrine; (2) the First Amendment; (3) the Sixth Amendment right to counsel; (4) the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738; (5) rules governing the duties of the Third Circuit Judicial Council, 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(4); (6) Rules 1 and 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (7) the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-72; (8) rights to equal protection and privileges or immunities of citizenship under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (9) the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and privileges and immunities of citizenship under Article IV; and (10) the Fifth Amendment, under several procedural due process theories.

Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety. Defendants challenge the Court's ability to assert jurisdiction over the Delaware defendants, Plaintiff's standing to assert its claims against the remaining defendants, and the substantive merits of all claims.

II. Legal Standard

In this Circuit, motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) are governed by the well-established standard set forth in Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).

Motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under the remaining provisions of Rule 12(b) can be either facial or factual. Where, as here, the party bringing a 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2) motion attacks the complaint on its face,^[2] the motion is treated like a 12(b)(6) motion and the court must treat the complaint's factual allegations as true and “draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations” in the Plaintiff's favor. In Re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 633 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).

III. Discussion

I previously addressed the majority of the issues raised here in Simandle, where I dismissed a challenge to the District of New Jersey local rule that is challenged again in this case. Specifically, my opinion in Simandle addressed Plaintiff's claims regarding the separation of powers doctrine, the First Amendment, the Rules Enabling Act, equal protection, the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Plaintiff has failed to explain why I should reach a different conclusion on any of these issues in this case, nor why, even if there was jurisdiction, the District of Delaware local rule - which is functionally equivalent to the New Jersey local rule - should be treated differently. I will therefore dismiss these claims for the same reasons I dismissed the claims in Simandle.

Plaintiff also asserts three new claims involving the Sixth Amendment, the Full Faith and Credit Act, and procedural due process. Because Plaintiff fails to sufficiently establish a factual or legal basis for these claims, the new claims will also be dismissed.

But before discussing the merits of Plaintiff's claims, I must first address issues that Defendants raise regarding personal jurisdiction over the Delaware defendants and Plaintiff's standing to assert its claims.

A. Personal Jurisdiction

As a preliminary matter, Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to establish personal jurisdiction over the District of Delaware Defendants, and these judges should be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2).^[3] I agree.

This Court has personal jurisdiction over a party to the extent permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment, because the New Jersey long-arm statute permits the exercise of such jurisdiction to the “fullest limits of due process.” IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1998). That is, I have personal jurisdiction over a party so long as that party has minimum contacts with New Jersey, such that asserting jurisdiction does not “offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 283 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

The District of Delaware defendants do not have sufficient minimum contacts with New Jersey. Plaintiff does not appear to dispute this notion, but claims that I nonetheless have personal jurisdiction over the Delaware defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), a section of the venue statute which expands the permissible venues for suits against an “officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof.” There is some dispute over...