Layman Lessons Church & Welcome Baptist Church, Inc. v. Metro. Gov't

LAYMAN LESSONS CHURCH andWELCOME BAPTIST CHURCH, INC., Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OFNASHVILLE/DAVIDSON COUNTY, Defendant.

NO. 3:18-cv-0107

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE NASHVILLE DIVISION

April 18, 2019

JUDGE RICHARDSON

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 52). Defendant Metropolitan Government of Nashville/Davidson County asks the Court to dismiss all claims in the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 50).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Layman Lessons Church and Welcome Baptist Church, Inc. ("Plaintiff") alleges that it is a religious institution registered by the IRS as a 501(c)(3) organization. Plaintiff asserts that it provides charitable and disaster relief assistance in the form of food, clothing, shelter, a mobile shower and laundry center, transportation, life skills training, and spiritual and recovery counseling to the homeless and needy in Nashville and surrounding areas. Plaintiff also asserts that it regularly provides donated food to faith-based groups in fifteen states.

This action concerns Plaintiff's use of certain property at 1455 Neelys Bend Road, Madison, Tennessee. Plaintiff claims that, as of January 3, 2018, it was owner of the property. Plaintiff contends that, at all relevant times, this property was zoned CN (Commercial Neighborhood). Plaintiff alleges that the property consists of 3,120 square feet of paved parking adjacent to a 2,100 square foot concrete block barn-style building (the "storage barn"). This case arises from a dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant over what uses can be made of the subject property. Plaintiff claims that Defendant blatantly discriminated against Plaintiff through arbitrary and capricious enforcement of Defendant's codes, ordinances, regulations and laws. The alleged discriminatory acts include:

(1) illegal denial of Plaintiff's use of its land for any religious activities;

(2) illegal denial of Plaintiff's use of its paved parking area for mobile food pantries;

(3) illegal refusal to correct an illegal storm water pipe that flooded Plaintiff's storage barn on the property;

(4) preparation and use of a fraudulent 2017 Inspector Report recommending demolition of Plaintiff's storage barn;

(5) denial of Plaintiff's legal right to make minor repairs to its storage barn with volunteer labor and donated materials;

(6) illegal refusal to implement a May 2, 2018 final ruling of the Property Standards Board to allow Plaintiff to make minor repairs to the storage barn;

(7) fabrication of a non-existent "blue-line stream" on Plaintiff's property to justify a Stop Work Order from Defendant's Storm Water Department to prevent use of the property;

(8) illegal and retaliatory issuance of fraudulent Stop Work Orders with full knowledge that no actions were being conducted in violation of any code, ordinance or regulation;

(9) retaliatory tortious interference with Plaintiff's existing contract with a landlord to conduct religious activities, operate mobile food pantries and mobile showers, and provide laundry services for the homeless; and (10) arbitrary and capricious enforcement of Defendant's codes, ordinances and regulations against Plaintiff and not against other properties in the same community without just cause or reason. Doc. No. 50.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"); the First and Fourteenth Amendments; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986; and Tennessee's Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-1-407, et seq. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees and costs.

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 1950. A legal conclusion, including one couched as a factual allegation, need not be accepted as true on a motion to dismiss, nor are mere recitations of the elements of a cause of action sufficient. Id.; Fritz v. Charter Township of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010), cited in Abriq v. Hall, 295 F. Supp. 3d 874, 877 (M.D. Tenn. 2018). Moreover, factual allegations that are merely consistent with the defendant's liability do not satisfy the claimant's burden, asmere consistency does not establish plausibility of entitlement to relief even if it supports the possibility of relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

In determining whether a complaint is sufficient under the standards of Iqbal and its predecessor and complementary case, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), it may be appropriate to "begin [the] analysis by identifying the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680. This can be crucial, as no such allegations count toward the plaintiff's goal of reaching plausibility of relief. To reiterate, such allegations include "bare assertions," formulaic recitation of the elements, and "conclusory" or "bold" allegations. Id. at 681. The question is whether the remaining allegations - factual allegations, i.e., allegations of factual matter - plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Id. If not, the pleading fails to meet the standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and thus must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 683.

As a general rule, matters outside the pleadings may not be considered in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) unless the motion is converted to one for summary judgment under Rule 56. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). When a document is referred to in the pleadings and is integral to the claims, it may be considered without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Doe v. Ohio State Univ., 219 F.Supp.3d 645, 652-53 (S.D. Ohio 2016); Blanch v. Trans Union, LLC, 333 F. Supp. 3d 789, 791-92 (M.D. Tenn. 2018).

RLUIPA

RLUIPA provides that no government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on the person, assembly or institution is in furtherance of a compelling government interest and isthe least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). Count I of the Second Amended Complaint alleges a violation of this provision.

In addition, RLUIPA provides that no government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious denomination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2). Count II of the Second Amended Complaint alleges a violation of this provision.

RLUIPA also provides that no government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1). Count III of the Second Amended Complaint alleges a violation of this provision.

Finally, RLUIPA states that no government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that totally excludes religious assemblies from a jurisdiction or unreasonably limits religious assemblies, institutions or structures within a jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(3). Count IV of the Second Amended Complaint alleges a violation of this provision.

"Land use regulation" is defined as a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant's use or development of land (including a structure affixed to land). 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5). RLUIPA provides that its terms shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the Act and the Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g). The statute expressly applies in situations in which the substantial burden is imposed by the implementation of a land use regulation or system of land use regulations, under which a government makes (or has in place formal or informal procedures or practices that permit the government to make) individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C). Here, there is no dispute that Defendantimplements land use regulations under which it may make individualized assessments of the proposed uses for property.

Defendant argues that RLUIPA applies only to zoning regulations, not building regulations. Defendant claims that Plaintiff has no "live controversy" involving Defendant's zoning laws and that Plaintiff's RLUIPA claims are moot because, on May 21, 2018, Defendant's Zoning Administrator granted Plaintiff's request to use the property for religious purposes. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that from December of 2017 until at least the May 2018 meeting with the Zoning Administrator, Plaintiff was not allowed to use the property for the religious activity of storing and disseminating donated goods. Plaintiff seeks retroaction relief for that alleged past misconduct. Plaintiff also argues that, even in November of 2018, after the pending motions were filed, Defendant was still insisting that Plaintiff complete more work on the storage barn in...