Leach v. Dist. of Columbia

MICHAEL LEACH, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., Defendants.

No. 19-cv-947 (APM)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

May 3, 2022

AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Amit P. Mehta United States District Court Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

On the afternoon of March 22, 2017, officers of the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) responded to a call about a shooting in an apartment building. They encountered Plaintiff Michael Leach standing alone on a first-floor landing in front of an open apartment door. Plaintiff had a gun in his right hand. In a rapidly escalating confrontation lasting mere seconds, one officer, John Bewley, shot Plaintiff five times. Another officer-identified only as Officer Doe One- repeatedly struck Plaintiff in the head after he had been shot. Plaintiff survived and filed this action seeking damages for the injuries he sustained.

Plaintiff asserts claims against the District of Columbia, Officer Bewley, and sixteen other MPD officers who were present that day, including two unknown “Officer John Does.” Plaintiff also names MPD Chief Robert J. Contee III as a defendant in his official capacity. Specifically, Plaintiff raises three constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: use of excessive force by Officer Bewley and Officer Doe One (Count 1); municipal liability against the District for Officer Bewley's actions (Count 2); and failure to intervene by all Defendant Officers (Count 3). Plaintiff also raises parallel common law and statutory claims: gross and common-law negligence against Officer Bewley and the District of Columbia (Counts 4 and 5); assault and battery against Officer Bewley, Officer Doe One, and the District of Columbia (Count 6); and negligent training and supervision against the District of Columbia and Chief Contee (Count 7).

All Defendants except the John Doe Officers have moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. For the reasons below, the court grants Defendants' motion as to all counts. However, the District remains a defendant in this action insofar as it is alleged to be vicariously liable for the acts of Officer Doe One.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

On the afternoon of March 22, 2017, Plaintiff went to visit an acquaintance-referred to in the record only as John Roe-at his apartment at 4363 Barnaby Road, S.E., Washington, D.C. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss or in the Alternative Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 73 [hereinafter Defs.' Mot.], Defs.' Stmt. of Material Facts as to Which There Is No Genuine Issue [hereinafter Defs.' Undisputed Facts], ¶ 1. Plaintiff and Roe listened to music in Roe's truck before Plaintiff went to the apartment to use the bathroom. Id. ¶ 2. A second unnamed person with whom Roe shared the apartment came out to the truck and told Roe that Plaintiff had not come out of the bathroom and was not responding or opening the door. Id. ¶ 3. Roe returned to the apartment, knocked on the bathroom door, and he too received no response. Id. ¶ 4. He then forced open the door. Id. Plaintiff was lying in the bathtub, and Roe smelled PCP. Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff pulled out a gun, pointed it at Roe, and then fired a shot that missed. Id. Plaintiff eventually would plead guilty to assault with a dangerous weapon for firing at Roe.^[1]

Multiple MPD officers arrived on the scene and encountered Plaintiff on the apartment building's first-floor landing in front of an open apartment door. Id. ¶ 7.^[2] Plaintiff was standing with his left side toward the officers, with his right hand out of view. Id. ¶ 9(b). Upon seeing Plaintiff, Officer Bewley said to him, “What's up?” and then, “What are you doing, bro?” Id. ¶ 9(c). Plaintiff did not respond. Id. Officer Bewley then said, “Let me see your hand; put your hand out, ” while another officer asked, “What's on the other hand?” Id. ¶ 9(d). Officer Bewley again said, “Put your hand out” and “Bro, put your hand out, ” while another officer asked, “What's on the other hand?” Id. ¶ 9(e).

When Plaintiff moved closer to the officers, Officer Bewley saw that Plaintiff was holding a gun. Id. ¶ 9(f). Bewley reached for the gun while shouting, “Drop the fucking gun! Drop the gun!” Id. ¶ 9(g). Bewley then fired five shots at Plaintiff in rapid succession, striking him in the stomach, groin, buttocks, and legs. Pl.'s Mem. of P. & A. in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot., ECF No. 80 [hereinafter Pl.'s Opp'n], Pl.'s Counter-Stmt. of Material Facts as to Which There Is a Genuine Issue, ECF No. 80-1 [hereinafter Pl.'s Disputed Facts], at 5-6. Plaintiff fell to the floor. The officers took almost a minute to handcuff him. Id. at 6, 8. During that time, Officer John Doe One punched Plaintiff's head repeatedly, both before and after Bewley secured the gun. Id. at 7-8.

Plaintiff was hospitalized and, as a result of the shooting, “suffers from physical injuries that necessitate a walking cane.” Id. at 9.

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff initially filed this action pro se in March 2019, proceeding against the MPD and an “Officer Clay, ” whom he believed to be the officer that shot him. Prisoner Compl., ECF No. 1. The MPD moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was not amenable to suit, and that substituting the District would be futile because body-worn-camera (“BWC”) footage of the incident showed that the officers had not used excessive force. Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 16. The court denied the motion under Rule 56(d)(1), following Plaintiff's contention that he could not adequately respond without discovery. Order, ECF No. 39. The court substituted the District of Columbia as the proper defendant, id. at 3, and appointed counsel, Minute Order, Jan. 5, 2021.^[3]

Court-appointed counsel then filed an amended complaint, naming as defendants the District of Columbia; MPD Chief Contee in his official capacity; and sixteen MPD officers in their individual capacities, including Officer Bewley and two John Doe Officers.^[4] First Am. Compl., ECF No. 70 [hereinafter FAC], at 4. All but the unnamed Doe Defendants moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. See Defs.' Mot.; Notice Regarding Def. Officer Krishaon Ewing, ECF No. 88 (joining motion); Notice Regarding Def. Artavius Williams, ECF No. 101 (same); Notice Regarding Def. Anthony La Bruno, ECF No. 103 (same).

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

In support of their motion, Defendants offered two copies of BWC footage showing the events at issue. Because this footage resolves some factual disputes, the court relies on it to make factual determinations, see supra n. 2, as to certain counts; therefore, the court treats Defendants' motion in part as one for summary judgment, FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). Specifically, the court evaluates Counts 1 and 3 through 6 under the summary-judgment standard. However, because the BWC footage has little or no bearing on the § 1983 municipal-liability (Count 2) and the negligent-training-and-supervision (Count 7) claims against the District, the court evaluates both of those counts under the motion-to-dismiss standard. The court briefly reviews both standards below.

A. Motion to Dismiss

To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must find that the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[N]aked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” are not sufficient to support a complaint. Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Factual allegations are not required to be “detailed, ” but pursuant to the Federal Rules, they must be more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not shown-that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” and the case can be dismissed. Id. at 679 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a court should grant summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that is capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of” the record that “it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323.

Once the moving party has made an adequate showing that a fact cannot be disputed, the burden shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (internal quotation marks omitted). The nonmoving party may oppose the motion using “any of the kinds...