Leaf v. Lane, Civil Action No. 14-cv-04126

FAHEEM LEAF, Petitioner v. JAY LANE; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY;and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondents

Civil Action No. 14-cv-04126

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

October 20, 2016

APPEARANCES:

FAHEEM LEAF,

Petitioner pro se

CATHERINE KIEFER, ESQUIRE,

Assistant District Attorney

for the County of Philadelphia,

On behalf of Respondents

OPINION

JAMES KNOLL GARDNER United States District Judge

The matter before the court is the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody ("Habeas Corpus Petition") which was filed by petitioner Faheem Leaf pro se on June 27, 2014. Respondents filed a Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on August 13, 2015. On September 29, 2015 petitioner filed Petitioner's Traverse to State[']s Response [of] August 13, 2015. Thereafter, on October 28, 2015, United States Chief Magistrate Judge Linda K. Caracappa filed a Report and Recommendation, which recommended that petitioner's Habeas Corpus Petition be dismissed on procedural grounds and, in the alternative, because petitioner's claims are meritless. On January 11, 2016 petitioner filed Petitioner's Objections to the United States Magistrate's Report and Recommendation Entered October 27, 2015.

For the reasons expressed in this Opinion, I approve and adopt the Report and Recommendation of United States Chief Magistrate Judge Linda K. Caracappa, overrule petitioner's objections, and deny petitioner's Habeas Corpus Petition.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 7, 2009 petitioner Faheem Leaf pled guilty to third-degree murder, criminal conspiracy and possessing an instrument of crime. Petitioner was sentenced to twenty to forty years imprisonment on December 7, 2009 by Judge Carolyn Engel Temin of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.

On December 14, 2009 petitioner filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied by the trial court on December 22, 2009.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal, which the Superior Court of Pennsylvania dismissed on July 12, 2010 for failure to file a brief.

On November 24, 2010,¹ petitioner filed a petition pursuant to Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") alleging that his guilty plea was not voluntary, knowing and intelligent and that his trial counsel was ineffective.

On April 10, 2012 and June 11, 2012 the PCRA court held evidentiary hearings. On August 10, 2012 the PCRA court dismissed petitioner's PCRA petition.

On June 12, 2013 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's PCRA petition.

On November 19, 2013 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied allocatur.

On June 27, 2014 petitioner filed the within Habeas Corpus Petition. Respondents filed their Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on August 13, 2015.

On September 29, 2015 petitioner filed Petitioner's Traverse to State[']s Response [of] August 13, 2015 ("Traverse").

On October 28, 2015 the Report and Recommendation of United States Chief Magistrate Judge Linda K. Caracappa ("Report") was filed.

On January 11, 2016 petitioner filed Petitioner's Objections to the United States Magistrate's Report and Recommendation Entered on October 27, 2015 ("Petitioner's Objections").

Hence, this Opinion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The extent of review of a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation is committed to the discretion of the district court. Jozefick v. Shalala, 854 F.Supp. 342, 347 (M.D.Pa. 1994); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 2413, 65 L.Ed.2d 424, 433 (1980), stating "Congress intended to permit whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose to place on a magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations."

However, the district court must review de novo those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the magistrate's findings or recommendations." Brophy v. Halter, 153 F.Supp.2d 667, 669 (E.D.Pa. 2001) (Padova, J.) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises two objections to the Report and Recommendation of United States Chief Magistrate Judge Linda K. Caracappa.

First, petitioner objects to Judge Caracappa's determination that his Habeas Corpus Petition should be denied for failing to set forth any facts supporting his claims, as required by Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.²

Subsection (2) of Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases expressly requires that a habeas corpus petition must "state the facts supporting each ground". See also Mayberry v. Petsock, 821 F.2d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 1987). Moreover, the standardized form filed by petitioner in this case specifically instructed him to:

12. State concisely every ground on which you claim that you are being held unlawfully. Give specific facts supporting each ground. CAUTION: . . . If you fail to set forth all such grounds in this petition, you may be barred from presenting them at a later date . . . If you select one or more of these grounds for relief, you must allege facts.

Habeas Corpus Petition at page 8 (emphasis in original).

Although petitioner concedes that he failed to allege any facts in his Habeas Corpus Petition to support the claim that his "plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily entered; counsel was ineffective" as is required, he argues that he remedied this omission by filing his Traverse which set forth the factual allegations and legal arguments underpinning his claim.³

However, "[a]ny instrument other than pleadings, be it a traverse or motion for reconsideration, is not a proper vehicle to set forth Petitioner's claims and facts." Caldwell v. Miner, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58494, at *7 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2006)(emphasis in original)(citing Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 125 S.Ct. 2562, 162 L.Ed.2d 582 (2005)); see also Adams v. Armontrout, 897 F.2d 332, 333-334 (8th Cir. 1990); Bibby v. Sherrer, 2006 WL 2711641, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 2006). This is because, as the Supreme Court has explained,

[u]nder Habeas Corpus Rule 4, if "it plainly appears from the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in district court," the court must summarily dismiss the petition without ordering a responsive pleading. If the court orders the State to file an answer, that pleading must "address the allegations in the petition."

Mayle, 545 U.S. at 656, 125 S.Ct. at 2570, 162 L.Ed.2d at 593-594. In other words, the habeas corpus petition alone is the operative pleading that determines the boundaries and scope of the habeas corpus proceeding -- including whether and to what the government needs to respond.

Petitioner's reliance on Lambert v. Blackwell, 175 F.Supp.2d 776 (E.D.Pa. 2001) (Dalzell, J.), is misplaced. In Lambert, the only deficiency in the habeas corpus petition the government sought to strike was that it was not filed on the proper form. See id. at 781. As the court noted, requiring petitioner to reformulate and refile her petition on the standard form "would elevate form over substance and require counsel . . . to engage in additional, repetitive work to duplicate . . . material already painstakingly covered in the pending petition." Id. In this case, the Habeas Corpus Petition is on the correct form but it lacks the necessary substance -- the inverse of the situation in Lambert.

Despite determining (correctly) that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 2(c), Judge Caracappa nonetheless addressedhis Habeas Corpus Petition on its merits and ultimately concluded that "the [Pennsylvania] Superior Court was [not] unreasonable in upholding the [Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA")] court's implicit findings that petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims were not meritorious."⁴

Petitioner also objects to this conclusion on the merits of his petition.⁵ Specifically, petitioner contends that Judge Caracappa erred in finding the Pennsylvania Superior Court's upholding of the PCRA court's determination of facts reasonable for two reasons.

Petitioner avers that Judge Carolyn Engel Temin, who presided over the PCRA court, failed to consider statements she made in her robing room that supported petitioner's contention that his plea was part of a package deal.⁶ Petitioner also contends that the PCRA court improperly relied on the testimony of Mary T. Maran, Esquire, who petitioner alleges lacked personal knowledge of the facts.⁷

Title 28 United States Code Section 2254(e)(1) establishes a presumption of correctness for a state court'sdetermination of factual issues. A petitioner can only rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). "[E]ven if '[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might disagree' about the finding in question, 'on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court's . . . determination.'" Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301, 130 S.Ct. 841, 849, 175 L.Ed.2d 738, 747 (2010) (quoting Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341-342, 126 S.Ct. 969, 976, 163 L.Ed.2d 824, 833 (2006)).

Petitioner correctly notes that "the state-court fact-finding process is undermined where the state court has before it, yet apparently ignores, evidence that supports petitioner's claim." Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004). However, "a state court need not make detailed findings addressing all the evidence before it." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 347, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1045, 154 L.Ed.2d 931, 956 (2003). "To fatally undermine the state fact-finding process, and render the resulting finding unreasonable, . . . the evidence in question must be sufficient to support petitioner's claim when considered in the context of the full record bearing on the issue presented in the habeas petition." Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1001.

Here, petitioner contends that Judge Temin's...