Leahy-Lind v. Me. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.

SHARON LEAHY-LIND, Plaintiff, v. MAINE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROLAND PREVENTION, and DR. SHEILA G. PINETTE, Defendants.

Docket no. 1:13-cv-00389-GZS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE

September 19, 2014

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS AND MOTION TO AMEND

Before the Court are a series of motions related to Plaintiff Sharon Leahy-Lind's allegations concerning conduct at Defendant Maine Department of Health and Human Services, Center for Disease Control and Prevention (the "CDC") from the spring of 2012 to the spring of 2014. On October 21, 2013, Leahy-Lind filed her Complaint (ECF No. 1), naming the CDC and Defendant Dr. Sheila G. Pinette as defendants. On December 20, 2013, the CDC and Pinette filed their Motion To Dismiss In Part And Incorporated Memorandum Of Law (ECF No. 5) ("Motion to Dismiss"). On that date, Pinette also filed a Motion for a More Definite Statement (ECF No. 6).

On February 21, 2014, Leahy-Lind moved to amend her complaint. (Pl.'s Mot. to Amend Compl. with Incorporated Mem. of Law (ECF No. 27) ("Motion to Amend").) Through the Motion to Amend, Leahy-Lind seeks to add Katie N. Woodbury as a plaintiff, Christine Zukas and Lisa Sockabasin as defendants and to assert several additional counts on her and on Woodbury's behalf. The CDC and Pinette oppose the Motion to Amend (ECF Nos. 32 & 33). In addition,Zukas and Sockabasin filed Motions to Intervene in order to object to the Motion to Amend. (See Mot. of Prospective Def. Christine Zukas for Leave to Intervene or Specially Appear for Purpose of Filing Attached Objection to Pl.'s Mot. to Amend Compl., and Incorporated Mem. of Law (ECF No. 31) ("Zukas Motion to Intervene"); Mot. of Prospective Def. Lisa Sockabasin for Leave to Intervene or Specially Appear for the Purpose of Filing Objection to Pl.'s Mot. to Amend Compl. with Incorporated Mem. of Law (ECF No. 34) ("Sockabasin Motion to Intervene").)

For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion to Amend, adding Katie N. Woodbury as a plaintiff and Christine Zukas and Lisa Sockabasin as defendants. The Court finds that Count III of the Original and Amended Complaint fails to state a claim and is futile, and, therefore, GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss as to Count III. The Court finds that Count VII of the Original and Amended Complaint asserting defamation against Pinette fails to state a claim and is futile, in part. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as to Count VII. As to the remaining Counts, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. Plaintiffs shall file their Amended Complaint, without Count III for violations of the federal Family Medical Leave Act, as a separate entry on the docket by October 3, 2014. The Motion for a More Definite Statement (ECF No. 6), the Zukas Motion to Intervene (ECF No. 31) and the Sockabasin Motion to Intervene (ECF No. 34) are DENIED.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiff Leahy-Lind has moved to amend her complaint to add three parties and additional counts pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2). (Motion to Amend at 1.) Rule 15(a)(2) provides that after certain deadlines have passed, "a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). In this case, the opposing parties do not so consent. (See Def. Maine Dep't of Health and Human Servs.,Center for Disease Control and Prevention's Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. to Amend Compl. (ECF No. 32) ("CDC Opp'n") at 1; Def. Pinette's Objection to Pl.'s Mot. to Amend Compl. with Incorporated Mem. of Law (ECF No. 33) ("Pinette Opp'n") at 2.) Pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2), leave to amend a pleading "should freely give leave when justice so requires," Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), unless the amendment "would be futile, or reward, inter alia, undue or inintended delay." Steir v. Girl Scouts of the USA, 383 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 2004). Accordingly, because denial of the Motion to Amend as futile would be appropriate where the amended complaint failed to state a claim, the Court analyzes the Motion to Amend pursuant to the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Platten v. HG Bermuda Exempted Ltd., 437 F.3d 118, 132 (1st Cir. 2006). In addition, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff Sharon Leahy-Lind's original Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) & (6).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and a demand for the relief sought[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(3). On a challenge under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court assumes the truth of the complaint's well-pleaded facts and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor. Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court "may consider only facts and documents that are part of or incorporated into the complaint." United Auto., Aero., Agric. Impl. Workers of Am. Int'l Union v. Fortuno, 633 F.3d 37, 39 (1st Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted).

A viable complaint need not proffer "heightened fact pleading of specifics," but in order to survive a motion to dismiss it must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In considering a motionto dismiss, the Court should "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Plaintiffs must include enough facts supporting a claim for relief that "nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "If the factual allegations in the complaint are too meager, vague, or conclusory to remove the possibility of relief from the realm of mere conjecture, the complaint is open to dismissal." Haley v. City of Boston, 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting SEC v. Tambone, 597 F.3d 436, 442 (1st Cir. 2010)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating that the Court need not accept "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements"). At this point in the litigation, "the determination of whether an issue is trialworthy simply is not the same as the determination of whether a plaintiff states a claim upon which relief can be granted." Bodman v. Maine, Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 720 F. Supp. 2d 115, 121 (D. Me. 2010) (denying motion to dismiss a hostile work environment claim).

II. BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff Sharon Leahy-Lind

On January 1, 2012, Plaintiff Sharon Leahy-Lind was promoted to serve as the Director of the Division of Local Public Health for the Defendant the Maine Department of Health and Human Services, Center for Disease Control and Prevention (the "CDC"). (Compl. ¶ 7; Am. Compl ¶ 11.)¹ Defendant Sheila G. Pinette is the Director of the CDC. (Compl. ¶ 3; Am. Compl. ¶ 4.) Christine Zukas is the Deputy Director of the CDC. (Am. Compl. ¶ 5.) Lisa Sockabasin is the Director of the Office of Health Equity at the CDC. (Am. Compl. ¶ 6.) At all material times,Leahy-Lind performed her job at a high level and was recognized for outstanding abilities, attitude and professionalism. (Compl. ¶ 9; Am. Compl. ¶ 13.)

In the spring of 2012, in connection with a major reduction in state funding for the Healthy Maine Partnerships ("HMP") programs, Leahy-Lind was told by her supervisor, the Deputy Director of the CDC, Zukas, to shred public documents that would have disclosed irregularities and possible illegal activity by the CDC. (Compl. ¶ 11; Am. Compl. ¶ 15.) The records in question showed certain scoring results, among other things, purportedly used to designate nine "lead" HMP programs that were awarded large sums of public funding while other HMPs' funding was radically reduced. (Compl. ¶ 12; Am. Compl. ¶ 16.) What was described as an "objective" test on which awards were allegedly based was in fact manipulated by Pinette, Zukas and the Director of Minority Health, Sockabasin, so that certain HMPs were favored over others. (Compl. ¶ 12; Am. Compl. ¶ 16.)

Leahy-Lind refused to shred any documents because she believed that disposing of public records was illegal and highly inappropriate. (Compl. ¶ 13; Am. Compl. ¶ 17.) Instead, Leahy-Lind reported to high-level officials at the CDC, including Pinette and Sockabasin, that she was told to shred documents and that she refused. (Compl. ¶ 13; Am. Compl. ¶ 17.) In August and September of 2012, Leahy-Lind provided Pinette with details of what Zukas had been doing since Leahy-Lind took the position, and how it became worse after Leahy-Lind refused to shred documents. (Compl. ¶ 16; Am. Compl. ¶ 20.) Pinette responded by saying that Zukas did "the same things" to her, and that, "Chris Zukas is a miserable and hateful person." (Id.) Pinette also said she would have to report the harassment to the Commissioner. (Compl. ¶ 16; Am. Compl. ¶ 20.) Sockabasin later said to Leahy-Lind, "[Zukas] can never know that you came forward. If she finds out she will destroy you—things will get much worse for you." (Compl. ¶ 16; Am. Compl.¶ 20 .) When Zukas found out that Leahy-Lind had not shredded the documents, she physically assaulted her and ordered her to take the documents home and destroy them there. (Compl. ¶ 15; Am. Compl. ¶ 19.) Leahy-Lind refused. (Compl. ¶ 15; Am. Compl. ¶ 19.)

After refusing to shred the documents, Leahy-Lind was repeatedly ordered to discipline a disabled minority employee who was targeted by Zukas and Sockabasin as part of a systematic effort by the CDC to harass and discriminate against minorities and was threatened with being disciplined herself if she failed to follow orders. (Compl. ¶ 18.a.; Am. Compl. ¶ 22.a.)...