Leavens v. Nat'l Credit Sys., Inc.

CORISSA LEAVENS, behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL CREDIT SYSTEMS, INC., Defendant.

17-CV-7354 (SJF)(AYS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

March 29, 2019

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

FEUERSTEIN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Corissa Leavens ("Plaintiff" or "Leavens") commenced this action against defendant National Credit Systems, Inc. ("Defendant" or "NCS"), alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. Presently before the Court is NCS's motion seeking judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Motion, Docket Entry ("DE") [16]. Plaintiff has opposed the motion. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual History¹

Plaintiff is a citizen of New York and is a "consumer" as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(3). Compl. ¶¶5-6. Defendant, a Georgia corporation with its principal place of business in Fulton County Georgia, is a "debt collector" as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6). Id. ¶¶7, 9. According to the Complaint, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff owes a "debt," and as that debt was primarily for personal, family or household purposes, it is a debt as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5). Id. ¶¶10-11. Plaintiff fell behind on payments owed and at some subsequent point, the debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection. Id. ¶¶12-13.

In an effort to collect the debt, Defendant sent Leavens a debt collection letter dated December 15, 2016 (the "Letter"). Compl. ¶14 & Ex. 1. The Letter appears on NCS letterhead and includes the following lines in the upper left-hand corner:

Client: STONE GATE APTS / [redacted]1-306

Client Account Number: [redacted]1-306

NCS Account Number [redacted]1178

Balance: $3878.52

The body of the letter reads in its entirety as follows:

Per your request, enclosed you will find documentation provided to us by STONE GATE APTS / [redacted]1-306.

Should you have any additional questions or need assistance in resolving this matter, please contact us at your earliest opportunity. Your representative will review and explain the charges assessed.

We encourage you to take advantage of this opportunity, so we may settle this debt amicably.

Id.

B. Procedural History

On December 18, 2017, Leavens commenced this action against NCS alleging that the letter violates §1692e of the FDCPA prohibiting false, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection with the collection of a debt. She alleges that the Letter is unfair and deceptive because, inter alia, it fails "to clearly and accurately identify the creditor to whom the debt is owed [and] is unfair and deceptive to the least sophisticated consumer. Compl. ¶21. She claims that the Letter fails to identify by name the "creditor," "original creditor," "current creditor," "account owner," or "creditor to whom the debt is owed." Id. ¶27. It also fails to indicate, inter alia, who referred the account to Defendant and who Defendant represents. Id. ¶¶34-35.

Defendant has moved for judgment on the pleadings arguing that the Letter clearly identifies Stone Gate Apartments as the creditor, especially when read in conjunction with a second document which Defendant urges the Court to consider on this motion. It further argues that Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to establish that the "debt" is subject to the FDCPA.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Judgment on the Pleadings

Pursuant to Rule 12(c), a party may move for judgment on the pleadings "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). Motions pursuant to Rule 12(c) are decided using "the familiar standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." Polanco v. NCO Portfolio Mgmt., Inc. 930 F. Supp. 2d 547, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010)). Therefore, to survive a motion pursuant to Rule 12(c), the complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). The court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556).

The determination of "whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief" is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S at 679. A pleading that does nothing more than recite bare legal conclusions, however, is insufficient to "unlock the doors of discovery." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-679; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (holding that a "formulaic recitation "formulaic recitation of cause of action's elements will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.").

In deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, "the court considers the complaint, the answer, any written documents attached to them, and any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case." L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Consideration of additional materials outside the complaint may be permitted in limited circumstances, particularly when documents are "integral" to the complaint such that "the complaint relies heavily upon its terms and effect." Goel v. Bunge, Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002)). "In most instances where this exception is recognized, the incorporated material is a contract or other legal document containing obligations upon which the plaintiff's complaint stands or falls, but which for some reason—usually because the document, read in its entirety, would undermine the legitimacy of the plaintiff's claim—was not attached to the complaint." Glob. Network Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2006). Even where a document is integral to the complaint, it may only be considered if it is "clear on the record that no dispute exists regarding authenticity or accuracy of the document" and that "there exist no material disputed issues of fact regarding the relevance of the document." Faulkner v. Beer, 463 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

B. FDCPA Standard

In enacting the FDCPA, Congress intended to eliminate "abusive practices in the debt collection industry, and also sought to ensure that 'those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged.'" Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §1692(e)). "Because the FDCPA is "remedial in nature, its terms must be construed in liberal fashion if the underlying Congressional purpose is to be effectuated." Vincent v. The Money Store, 736 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted).

Plaintiff claims that the Letter fails to comply with §1692e which broadly bars debt collectors from using "any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt." 15 U.S.C. §1692e; see Cohen v. Rosicki, Rosicki & Assocs., P.C., 897 F.3d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 2018) (defining liability under the FDCPA "in terms of whether the debt collector's communication with the consumer is in connection with that consumer's obligation to pay money" (emphasis in original)). A communication is deceptive "within the meaning of section 1692e(10) if: (1) the terminology used is vague or uncertain ... or (2) it can reasonably be read to have at least two different meanings, one of which is inaccurate." Pifko v. CCB Credit Servs., Inc., 09-CV-3057, 2010 WL 2771832 at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2010) (citations omitted).

"In this Circuit, the question of whether a communication complies with the FDCPA is determined from the perspective of the least sophisticated consumer." Jacobson, 516 F.3d at 90. It is an objective standard, "measured by how the 'least sophisticated consumer' would interpret the notice received from the debt collector." DeSantis v. Computer Credit, Inc., 269 F.3d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 1996)). Applying this standard, courts analyze collection letters "from the perspective of a debtor who is uninformed, naïve, or trusting, but is making basic, reasonable and logical deductions and inferences." Dewees v. Legal Servicing, LLC, 506 F. Supp. 2d 128, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Spira v. Ashwood Fin. Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d 150, 156 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)). Ultimately, a determination of whether a communication violates the FDCPA depends upon "whether the notice fails to convey the required information clearly and effectively and thereby makes the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to the meaning of the message." Weiss v. Zwicker & Assocs., P.C., 664 F. Supp. 2d 214, 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Consideration of Documents Outside the Pleadings

Defendant urges the Court, in deciding this motion, to consider a document that it claims was sent to Plaintiff along with the Letter. In support of its motion, Defendant has provided a declaration from Ron Sapp, NCS Vice President of Operations, setting forth NCS's procedure for keeping notes on its accounts. Declaration of Ron Sapp, ¶2, DE [16-3]. Sapp states that a review of...