Lebaron v. O'Brien

Dates: June 14, 2016

Present:

County: WORCESTER, ss.

Keywords: OMNIBUS MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, ET AL.

INTRODUCTION

The Court is here tasked with demarcating the scope of the freedom of free exercise of religion within the confines of the Massachusetts prison system. The plaintiffs, all inmates incarcerated at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk ("MCI-Norfolk")^[3] and members of the Church of the Firstborn Kahal Hab'Cor (the "CFB"), petition the Court, pro se, for several forms of relief from perceived violations of their rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the defendants, officials of the Massachusetts Department of Corrections (the "DOC").

Foremost among the plaintiffs' motions is a motion for summary judgment on all counts of the First Amended Complaint (the "complaint"). Also before the Court are several motions for temporary restraining orders ("TROs") and a host of other miscellaneous motions. The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and a cross motion for summary judgment. The Court's disposition on these motions is listed in its omnibus ORDER, infra.

BACKGROUND^[4]

1. Procedural History

Plaintiff Nathan Marquis LeBaron ("Plaintiff LeBaron") filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, seeking several forms of relief for alleged violations of his free exercise of religion. See LeBaron v. Spencer, 527 Fed. Appx. 25, 27 (1st Cir. 2013). The district court granted summary judgment to the prison defendants,[5] mistakenly believing that the parties had settled Plaintiff LeBaron's claims. Id. The case was heard by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, which, on July 22, 2013, ruled that Plaintiff LeBaron's retaliation, equal protection, and conspiracy claims were nevertheless without merit. However, the First Circuit remanded summary judgment for Plaintiff LeBaron's claims under RLUIPA and the First Amendment because questions of fact remained unanswered. Id. These claims concerned the defendants' refusal to provide a synagogue for daily prayer, the ability to engage in group prayer, access to a kosher diet, and certain religious materials. Id. at 29. Following the First Circuit's decision, Plaintiff LeBaron opted to file a new lawsuit in this Court. Paper # 100, Ex. 2, p. 2. Other inmates, alleging the same violations, expressed interest in joining the renewed claim.

Several developments materialized in the time between the First Circuit's decision and the instant action, filed on February 27, 2015. The significant events included: Carol Higgins O'Brien replaced Luis Spencer as the commissioner of the DOC; Plaintiff LeBaron formed the CFB, and filed Articles of Organization with the Secretary of the Commonwealth pursuant to G. L. c. 180; and the CFB was certified and recognized as an official religious organization in the Commonwealth on November 7, 2013. As time passed, a growing number of inmates joined the CFB. Plaintiff LeBaron appointed himself the CFB president, as well as "Chief Judge" of the church's "Beit Din" (religious court). Similarly, he appointed other inmates to act as church officers.

Initially, five plaintiffs filed the first complaint. See Paper # 1. Ultimately, many additional inmates joined, and the Court allowed a motion to list all current CFB members on the docket. See Paper # 66. There are now forty-five plaintiffs

2. Basis of the Complaint

The CFB adheres, in large part, to the precepts of Messianic Judaism, which "is a hybrid religion that includes both Christian and Jewish culture and laws and [differs from] Orthodox Judaism ... on a few technical points[.]" Paper # 140.1, Ex. 1, Attachment 1. Its mission includes administering the ministry of "Yeshua" to the imprisoned. Religious practices include: daily attendance to a Messianic synagogue; liturgical prayer; study of Scripture and the Hebrew language; observance of the Shabbat (Sabbath day) and other holy days; adherence to a special religious diet (the "Holy Diet"), and obedience to local "halacha" (religious law).

An inmate seeking a religious accommodation must submit a "religious services request" to the DOC Religious Service Review Committee (the "RSRC"). The RSRC is comprised of the Assistant Deputy Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner of Classification, and the Director of Program Services, and makes global assessments of security concerns that might arise at the prisons if the DOC permits a new religious practice, use of a religious item, or participation in a religious feast. The RSRC reviews religious service requests and then makes a formal recommendation to the Commissioner of Correction ("Commissioner"). The plaintiffs submitted numerous religious services requests, primarily concerning access to a Messianic Judaism synagogue, the Holy Diet, and observance of holy days. The Commissioner approved many of the plaintiffs' requests for access to a kosher diet, but denied their Holy Diet requests. The Commissioner also denied the plaintiffs' request for synagogue space and certain religious items pending location of a Messianic Jewish volunteer to lead the inmates in corporate worship.

Plaintiff LeBaron submitted another religious services request seeking appointment of the Catholic chaplain of the Souza-Baranowski Correctional Center ("SBCC") as the chaplain for the Messianic Jewish inmates at MCI-Norfolk. The Commissioner denied this request because the chaplain could not assume additional responsibilities on top of his full-time schedule.

Plaintiff LeBaron submitted an additional religious services request for forty-four religious items and books necessary for a Messianic synagogue, creation of a ritual bath known as a mikva, over one hundred different types of food items, and construction of a garden for Messianic Jewish inmates to grow fresh fruits and vegetables. The Commissioner also denied these requests.

On December 18, 2015, the Court heard arguments on the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and the defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. The Court took these motions under advisement. While these motions and several of the plaintiffs' motions for TROs remained pending, the plaintiffs submitted several other motions. These motions are discussed throughout the Court's discussion. Additional relevant facts are set out in the discussion below, as needed.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1. Summary Judgment^[6]

When reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court must assess each motion on its own merits. See Federal Ins. C. v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Group, 415 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 2005). The fact that both parties have filed motions for summary judgment "does not necessarily mean that an award of summary judgment is appropriate." Beck v. City of Cleveland, 390 F.3d 912, 917 (6th Cir. 2004).

Under Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(c), either the plaintiffs or the defendants will be entitled to summary judgment if they can show that no dispute exists as to any material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cassesso v. Commissioner of Corr., 390 Mass. 419, 422 (1983). Either party may satisfy its burden of demonstrating the absence of triable issues by submitting affirmative evidence demonstrating entitlement to relief (or the opposing party's lack of entitlement), or by demonstrating that the opposing party has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of their case. Flesner v. Tech. Comm. Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 809 (1991). If one party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the other party must demonstrate, through admissible evidence, an issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment. Godbout v. Cousens, 396 Mass. 254, 261 (1985). Neither party may rest on conclusory statements or bare assertions in opposing a motion for summary judgment. LaBrecque v. Parsons, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 766, 768 (2009). The Court's function is to peer beyond the formal allegations and determine whether further exploration of the facts is necessary. Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Abernathy, 393 Mass 81, 87 (1984).

2. Temporary Restraining Order

The Court considers, simultaneously with the cross motions for summary judgment, several motions for TROs. In order for the plaintiffs to succeed on these motions, they must show "(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable harm will result from denial of the injunction; and (3) that in light of the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits, the risk of irreparable harm to the plaintiff outweighs the potential harm to the defendant[s] in granting the injunction." Tri-Nel Mgmt., Inc. v. Board of Health of Barnstable, 433 Mass. 217, 219 (2001). "When, as here, a party seeks to enjoin governmental action, the [C]ourt also considers whether the relief sought will adversely affect the public." Id., citing Commonwealth v. Massachusetts CRINC, 392 Mass. 79, 89 (1984). The Court will not grant this "significant remedy ... unless the plaintiffs have made a clear showing of entitlement thereto." Student No. 9 v. Board of Educ., 440 Mass. 752, 762 (2004).

DISCUSSION

1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Before it reaches the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, the Court considers the defendants' argument that Plaintiffs Costa, Eisenman, and Serrano are barred from seeking relief in this Court under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42...