Ledbetter v. United States

1

SANDY DARNELL LEDBETTER, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent

Nos. 5:20-CV-622-D, 5:16-CR-111-D

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division

December 6, 2021

ORDER

James C. Dever, United States District Judge

On November20, 2020, Sandy Darnell Ledbetter (“Ledbetter” or “petitioner”) moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct his 240-month sentence [D.E. 576] and filed a memorandum exhibits, and an affidavit in support [D.E. 576-1 through 576-10; 584]. On March 12, 2021, the United States moved to dismiss and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 591, 592]. On May 10, 2021, Ledbetter responded in opposition [D.E. 599 600]. As explained below, the court grants the United States' motion to dismiss and dismisses Ledbetter's section 2255 petition.

I.

On September 11, 2017, a jury convicted Ledbetter of conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute a quantity of cocaine (count one) and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime (count five). See [D.E. 248, 366]. On December 13, 2017, the court held Ledbetter's sentencing hearing. See PD-E. 450, 461, 485] At the hearing, the court adopted the facts set forth in the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”). Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A)-(B); PSR [D.E. 431]; Sent. Tr. [D.E. 485] 6. After an extensive discussion, the court applied a two-level enhancement to Ledbetter's base offense level for obstruction of justice for attempted witness tampering. See Sent. Tr. at 7-14. After applying that enhancement and ruling on the objections to the PSR, the court calculated Ledbetter's offense level to be 34, his criminal history category to be n, and his advisory guideline range on count one to be 168 to 210 month's imprisonment followed by 60 months' consecutive imprisonment on count five. See id. at 46-47; [D.E. 462] 1, 4. After thoroughly considering the arguments of counsel and all relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court sentenced Ledbetter to 180 months' imprisonment on count one and 60 months' consecutive imprisonment on count five, for a total term of imprisonment of240 months. See Sent. Tr. at 64-70.

Ledbetter appealed. See [D.E. 455]. On appeal, Ledbetter challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for count five and argued the district court improperly allowed the jury to hear hearsay testimony. On July 9, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. See United States v. Ledbetter, 781 Fed.Appx. 154 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (unpublished). On August 23, 2019, the Fourth Circuit denied Ledbetter's petition for a rehearing. See [D.E. 531].

On November 20, 2020, Ledbetter moved to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under section 2255 [D.E. 576]. On March 12, 2021, the government moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) [D.E. 591]. Ledbetter opposes the motion.

II.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” tests a complaint's legal and factual sufficiency. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-63, 570 (2007); Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd, 566 U.S. 30 (2012); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). In considering a motion to dismiss, a court need not accept a complaint's legal conclusions. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Similarly, a court “need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302 (quotation omitted); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-79. Moreover, a court may take judicial notice of public records without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Fed.R.Evid. 201(d); Tellabs, Inc, v. Makor Issues & Rts. Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). In reviewing a section 2255 motion, the court is not limited to the motion itself. The court may consider “the files and records of the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); see United States v. McGill, HF.3d 223, 225(1st Cir. 1993). Likewise, a court may rely on its own familiarity with the case. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 n.4 (1977); United States v. Dyess, 730 F.3d 354, 359-60 (4th Cir. 2013).

In his section 2255 motion, Ledbetter argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel because (1) trial counsel failed to object to the court's jury instructions on count five; (2) trial counsel failed to object to the court's alleged violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h) at Ledbetter's sentencing hearing; (3) appellate counsel failed to raise the jury instruction and Rule 32(h) issues on direct appeal; and (4) pretrial counsel failed to advise Ledbetter that he could enter an open plea without a plea agreement. See [D.E. 576-1] 10-23; [D.E. 600] 10-23.^[1]

The “Sixth Amendment entitles criminal defendants to the effective assistance of counsel—that is, representation that does not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness in light of prevailing professional norms.” Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 7 (2009) (per curiam) (quotations omitted). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to all critical stages of a criminal proceeding, including plea negotiations, trial, sentencing, and appeal. See, e.g., Lee v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 1958, 1964-65 (2017); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 164-65 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140 (2012); Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 202-04 (2001). “[S]entencing is a critical stage of trial at which a defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel, and a sentence imposed without effective assistance must be vacated and reimposed to permit facts in mitigation of punishment to be fully and freely developed.” United States v. Breckenridge, 93 F.3d 132, 135 (4th Cir. 1996); see Glover, 531 U.S. at 202-04. To state a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, Ledbetter must show (1) that his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that he suffered prejudice as a result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-91 (1984).

When determining whether counsel's representation was objectively unreasonable, a court must be “highly deferential” to counsel's performance and must attempt “to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.” Id. at 689. Therefore, the “court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. A party also must show that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the party. See id. at 691-96. A party does so by showing that there is a “reasonable probability” that, but for the deficiency, “the result of the proceeding would have been different” Id. at 694.

A.

As for trial counsel's alleged failure to object to the court's jury instructions on count five, Ledbetter has failed to plausibly allege deficient performance. On count five, the court instructed the jury that to find Ledbetter guilty, the jury had to find that the government proved two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: “[f]irst, the defendant, Sandy Darnell Ledbetter, committed the drug trafficking crime charged in Count 1 of the indictment; and second, the defendant, Sandy Darnell Ledbetter, aiding and abetting at least one other person, knowingly possessed a firearm in furtherance of [a] drug trafficking crime charged--of the drug trafficking crime charged in Count 1.” Trial Tr. [D.E. 405] 116. The court also instructed the jury that “Count 1 of the indictment is a drug trafficking crime.” Id. at 117. The court also defined the terms “knowingly, ” “possess, ” “firearm, ” . and “in furtherance of' for the jury. See Id. at 108-09, 117-18.

These instructions were proper. See United States v. Miltier, 882 F.3d 81, 89 (4th Cir. 2018) (stating a jury instruction is not erroneous if “in light of the whole record, [the instruction] adequately informed the jury of the controlling legal principles without misleading or confusing the jury to the prejudice of the objecting party.” (quotation omitted)); Noel v. Artson, 641 F.3d 580, 586 (4th Cir. 2011) (same). The elements of a section 924(c)(1) offense are that the defendant “(1) committed a drug trafficking offense and (2) possessed a firearm (3) in furtherance of that drug offense.” United States v. Moody, 2 F.4th 180, 192 (4th Cir. 2021); see United States v. Pineda, 770 F.3d 313, 316-17 (4th Cir. 2014); United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 704-05 (4th Cir. 2002). As for the drug-trafficking predicate, a defendant need not be convicted of that offense “as long as all of the elements of that offense are proved and found beyond a reasonable doubt” United States ' v. Nelson, 484 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted); see United States v. Crawley, 2 F.4th 257, 264 (4th Cir. 2021), petition for cert, docketed (U.S. Nov. 19, 2021) (No. 21-6361); United States v. Crump, 120 F.3d 462, 466 (4th Cir. 1997).

The court ensured that the jury found all elements of the predicate offense in count one) beyond a reasonable doubt before convicting Ledbetter on count five. Before instructing the jury on count five, the court instructed the jury on count one (a drug-trafficking offense) and fully explained the elements necessary for a conviction on count one. See Trial Tr. at 110-15. After thoroughly instructing the jury on count one, the court then separately instructed the jury on count five. In so doing, the court expressly...