Lee v. Bd. of Educ. for Prince George's Cnty.

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LASHEIK LEE v. BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, et al.

Civil Action No. 22-957

United States District Court, D. Maryland

January 31, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DEBORAH K. CHASANOW UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this action brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., are a motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff LaSheik Lee (“Plaintiff”), (ECF No 44), and a cross-motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Board of Education for Prince George's County and Dr. Monica Goldson (“Defendants”), (ECF No 47). The issues have been briefed, and the court now rules no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment will be denied, and Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment will be granted.

I. Background

A. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

The IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., and its accompanying regulations, 34 C.F.R. §§ 300 et seq., require states that receive federal education funds to make available to each child between the ages of three and twenty-one who has a disability a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). Maryland also has regulations governing the provision of FAPEs to children with disabilities in accordance with the IDEA. Md. Code Regs. 13A.05.01. A FAPE is satisfied if a local education agency^[1]provides “specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child.” Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 (1982). The United States Supreme Court has established a two-part inquiry to analyze whether a local education agency satisfied its obligation to provide a FAPE:

First, has the State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act? And second, is the individualized educational program developed through the Act's procedures reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits? If these requirements are met, the State has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more.

Id. at 206-07. Thus, to receive relief, a plaintiff must show both that the school district procedurally violated the IDEA and that the defect “had an adverse effect on [the child's] education.” T.B., Sr. ex rel. T.B., Jr. v. Prince George's Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 897 F.3d 566, 573 (4^th Cir. 2018).

To ensure delivery of a FAPE, local education agencies are required to prepare and implement an appropriate individualized education program (“IEP”) for each child determined to have a disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d). An IEP is a “written statement for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised” by the child's “IEP Team,” which is composed of the child's parents, teachers, a representative of the local education agency, and others. § 1414(d)(A)-(B). The IEP must contain statements about the child's current educational performance, the annual goals for the child's education, the special educational services and other aids that will be provided to the child, and the extent to which the child will spend time in school environments with non-disabled children, among other things. § 1414(d)(1)(A). The IEP must be “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child's circumstances.” Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 399 (2017). Additionally, the child must be educated in the “least restrictive environment,” which means that the child must be “educated with children who are not disabled” “[t]o the maximum extent appropriate” and only removed from the “regular educational environment . . . when the nature or severity of the disability of a child is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.” § 1412(a)(5).

The IDEA requires that states establish certain “Procedural Safeguards” that are “designed to ensure that the parents or guardian of a child with a disability are both notified of decisions affecting their child and given an opportunity to object to these decisions.” Gadsby ex rel. Gadsby v. Grasmick, 109 F.3d 940, 956 (4^th Cir. 1997) (citing § 1415). These safeguards include a process by which parents can file a complaint “with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.” § 1415(b)(6). Once they have filed a complaint, parents are entitled to an “impartial due process hearing, which shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by the local educational agency.” § 1415(f)(1)(A). In Maryland, due process hearings are conducted by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) at the Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings. See Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 8-413; Md. Code Regs. 13A.05.01.15(C). If parents are dissatisfied with the findings and decision made by the ALJ, they have a right to bring a civil action with respect to their due process complaint in state or federal court. § 1415(i)(2)(A). Under those circumstances, the parents bear the burden of proof both in the administrative hearing and before the state or federal court. See Weast v. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 456 (4^th Cir. 2004) (“[P]arents who challenge an IEP have the burden of proof in the administrative hearing.”); Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery Cnty. v. Hunter ex rel. Hunter, 84 F.Supp.2d 702, 705 (D.Md. 2000) (“[P]arties aggrieved by the administrative decision may file suit in federal district court, [and] [t]he burden of proof is on the party challenging the administrative decision.”).

When a court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that a local education agency has failed to provide a FAPE to a child with a disability, the court is authorized to “grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). Courts enjoy “broad discretion” in fashioning relief, and “equitable considerations are relevant” in doing so. Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369, 374 (1985). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that “[a]vailable relief includes the discretionary remedy of compensatory education, which is intended to remedy an ‘educational deficit' caused by a school's prior failure to provide a FAPE to a disabled student.” Johnson v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch. Bd. of Educ., 20 F.4th 835, 840 (4^th Cir. 2021) (quoting G ex rel. RG v. Fort Bragg Dependent Schs., 343 F.3d 295, 309 (4^th Cir. 2003)).

Plaintiff raises a long list of issues with the decision of Administrative Law Judge Michael R. Osborn (“the ALJ”), including that the administrative due process hearing was not regularly made and that the ALJ erred when he determined that the student was not in need of compensatory services because the school district failed materially to implement the IEPs during the period from March 13, 2020, through January 11, 2021; the school district denied Plaintiff the opportunity to participate meaningfully prior to reducing the special education and related services in the November 12, 2019 IEP; the school district failed to consider private evaluations provided in August 2020 when developing the October 29, 2020 IEP; the school district failed to develop appropriate IEPs addressing the student's anxiety, school avoidance, and academic needs; the school district failed to address appropriately the student's school avoidance and anxiety behaviors during the period of March 2020 through January 11, 2021; and the school district failed to grant Plaintiff's request for independent education evaluations or file for due process. She seeks, in addition to a declaration of various violations, an order requiring Defendants to fund compensatory education, damages for expenses incurred, costs, expenses, and attorney's fees.

B. Factual Background

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are drawn from the ALJ's Findings of Fact.^[2] (ECF No. 1-1, at 17-105). The relevant facts are not in dispute. C.L.-W. was enrolled in Prince George's County Public Schools (“PGCPS”) by his mother, Plaintiff, starting in pre-kindergarten. He attended Suitland Elementary School (“SES”) for elementary school and Drew Freeman for middle school. At a December 16, 2015 IEP meeting, PGCPS created C.L.-W.'s first IEP, which stated that his learning disability was “Specific Learning Disability.” The areas affected by the C.L.-W.'s learning disability were cognitive and academic, including math calculation, reading phonics, speech and language expressive language, speech and language receptive language, and written language expression. Among others, accommodations and modifications included: small group instruction, use of graphic organizers, use of online reading and writing programs, and use of shorter passages of text.

Prior to February 23, 2016, C.L.-W.'s pediatrician referred him to Dr. Karen Alexis Spencer, M.D., of Children's National Medical Center (“Children's National”), for evaluation due to his language development issues. On March 4, 2016, Dr. Spencer recommended that C.L.-W. participate in speech therapy weekly with speech therapist Pappas at Children's National, school-based speech therapy at least twice weekly, and behavioral therapy.

In the fall of C.L.-W.'s fifth grade year, he took the SLO and MAP-R standardized tests. His scores showed he was performing below grade level in reading, writing, and mathematics. On October 2, 2018, Rose Idris, M.Ed., a special educator conducted an...