Lee v. Karaoke City

BEOM SU LEE, Plaintiff, v. KARAOKE CITY et al., Defendants.

18 Civ. 3895 (PAE)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

August 31, 2020

OPINION & ORDER

PAUL A. ENGELMAYER, District Judge:

Plaintiff Beom Su Lee ("Lee"), proceeding pro se, brings this action for copyright infringement against defendants Karaoke City, Chorus Karaoke, 32 Karaoke, WOW Karaoke, NYC Karaoke, Turn Table Bar & Karaoke, Maru Karaoke, MK Karaoke, 5 Bar Karaoke Lounge, k-2 Ziller Karaoke, Gagopa Karaoke, Judy Club, and Karaoke Duet 35. Dkt. 2 ("Compl."). On October 15, 2018, certain defendants¹ moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or sought, in the alternative, a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). Dkt. 32. On April 22, 2019, the Honorable Stewart D. Aaron, United States Magistrate Judge, issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending that the Court deny defendants' motion. Dkt. 49 ("Report"). On April 30, 2019, defendants filed objections to the Report. Dkts. 51-52.

For the following reasons, the Court adopts the Report in full.

I. Background²

Lee brings this copyright infringement action alleging that defendants made unauthorized use of his copyrighted musical works in karaoke clubs in New York. The works at issue were written by Lee's late father, Jae Ho Lee, a popular Korean musician. Compl. ¶ 6. Before his death in 1960, Jae Ho Lee owned more than 2,000 copyrights in musical works registered with the Korean Music Copyright Association. Id.; id., Ex. 3. Following Jae Ho Lee's death, ownership of the copyrights transferred to Lee's mother, who then transferred them to Lee's older brother, Beom Seung Lee. Id. ¶ 8. Through a series of assignments, ownership of the copyrights was ultimately transferred to Lee. Id.

In October 1996, Lee and his mother published the "Collection of Lee, Jae Ho Lee's Compositions," (the "Collection") which included 125 of Jae Ho Lee's musical works. Id., Ex. 1 ("Certificate"). On October 12, 1999, Lee and his mother registered the Collection with the U.S. Copyright Office. Id. On August 1, 2001, Lee's older brother Beom Seung Lee executed an assignment purporting to convey to Lee the rights to Jae Ho Lee's musical works in all geographical areas except Korea and Japan. See id., Ex. 3. The U.S. copyright became effective on August 5, 2001. See Certificate.

Between April 6, 2018 and April 18, 2018, Lee allegedly visited defendants' karaoke clubs to investigate their use of TJM Media and KUMYOUNG karaoke machines. Id. ¶ 10. Lee allegedly discovered 42 of Jae Ho Lee's musical works in TJ Media Karaoke machines at defendants' venues. Id. ¶ 11; id., Exs. 4-5. At certain defendants' karaoke clubs, Lee alleges, he publicly performed protected songs, see Dkt. 43 ¶¶ 4-14; he has attached to the Complaint videos of himself playing certain songs at some of defendants' clubs, see Compl., Ex. 4. Lee further alleges that defendants did not license or otherwise obtain permission to use the works in the Collection. Id. ¶ 17.

II. Procedural History

On May 1, 2018, Lee filed the Complaint. Compl. On October 15, 2018, the moving defendants filed a motion to dismiss. Dkts. 32-34. On October 19, 2018, Lee filed an opposition to the motion. Dkt. 39. On December 4, 2018, the moving defendant filed a reply. Dkts. 46-47.

On April 22, 2019, Judge Aaron issued the Report, recommending that the Court deny defendants' motions to dismiss and for a more definite statement. Report at 16. On April 30, 2019, defendants filed an objection to the Report, Dkt. 51, and an accompanying memorandum of law in support of their objection, Dkt. 52 ("Objections"). Lee did not file a response to defendants' objections.

III. Legal Standards

A. Report and Recommendation

In reviewing a Report and Recommendation, a district court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). When specific objections are timely made, "[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objectedto." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also United States v. Male Juvenile, 121 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1997). "To accept those portions of the report to which no timely objection has been made, a district court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record." Ruiz v. Citibank, N.A., No. 10 Civ. 5950 (KPF) (RLE), 2014 WL 4635575, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2014) (quoting King v. Greiner, No. 02 Civ. 5810 (DLC), 2009 WL 2001439, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2009)); see also, e.g., Wilds v. UPS, 262 F. Supp. 2d 163, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).

To the extent that the objecting party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates the original arguments, the Court will review the Report and Recommendation strictly for clear error. See Dickerson v. Conway, No. 08 Civ. 8024 (PAE), 2013 WL 3199094, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2013); Kozlowski v. Hulihan, Nos. 09 Civ. 7583, 10 Civ. 0812 (RJH), 2012 WL 383667, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2012). Further, "[c]ourts generally do not consider new evidence raised in objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation." Tavares v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 3782 (PAE), 2011 WL 5877548, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2011) (collecting cases).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)—Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint is properly dismissed where, as a matter of law, "the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558. When resolving a motion to dismiss, the Court must assume all well-pleaded facts to be true, "drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Koch v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012).That tenet, however, does not apply to legal conclusions. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Pleadings that offer only "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

The Court is "obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally," Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), interpreting it "to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s]," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). However, pro se status "does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court may not read into pro se submissions claims inconsistent with the pro se litigant's allegations, see Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2005), or arguments that the submissions themselves do not "suggest," Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

C. Copyright Infringement

"To prevail on a claim of copyright infringement, the plaintiff must demonstrate both (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) infringement of the copyright by the defendant." Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2001). Among other rights, copyright owners retain the exclusive right to perform, or authorize others to perform, a musical work publicly. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). The Copyright Act further requires that, before an action for copyright infringement is commenced, the work must be preregistered or registered. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a); see also Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 158 (2010) ("[The Act] establishes a condition—copyright registration—that plaintiffs ordinarily must satisfy before filing an infringement claim and invoking the [Copyright] Act's remedial provisions.").

To survive a motion to dismiss, courts in this district have held that "a complaint based on copyright infringement must allege: (1) which original works are the subject of the copyrightclaim; (2) that the plaintiff owns the copyrights in those works; (3) that the copyrights have been registered in accordance with the statute; and (4) by what acts during what time the defendant infringed the copyright." BWP Media USA Inc. v. Hollywood Fan Sites, LLC, 69 F. Supp. 3d 342, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citation omitted).

IV. Discussion

Defendants raise numerous objections to the Report. Defendants object, on six grounds, to the Report's recommendation not to dismiss the Complaint's single claim of copyright infringement. The Report, they contend: (1) did not appreciate that Lee failed to include sufficient detail to sustain a claim of copyright infringement, see Objections at 4; (2) was incorrect in finding that Lee has adequately alleged ownership of a valid copyright, see id. at 4; (3) was incorrect in finding that Lee has adequately alleged infringing conduct by each defendant, see id. at 13; (4) was incorrect in finding that the copyrighted works are not in the public domain, see id. at 13; (5) was incorrect in concluding that Lee sufficiently alleged that each defendant publicly performed the copyrighted works, see id. at 18; and (6) was incorrect in finding that defendants' use of the works is not protected by the fair use doctrine, see id. at 20.

Defendants further object to the Report to the extent that it did not address defendants' argument that the complaint did not properly plead willful infringement, as required under 17 U.S.C. § 504. See id. at 21. Finally, defendants object that the Report was incorrect in finding that defendants' request for a more definite statement should be denied. See id. at...