Lee v. Medicredit, Inc.

1

LISA LEE, Plaintiff, v. MEDICREDIT, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 6:21-cv-16

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Statesboro Division

January 13, 2022

ORDER

R STAN BAKER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This case arises from Defendant Medicredit, Inc.'s attempts to collect a debt for medical services rendered to Plaintiff Lisa Lee. Plaintiff initiated this action pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”), the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 et seq. (“GFBPA”), the Unfair and Deceptive Practices Toward the Elderly Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-850 et seq. (“UDPTEA”), and Georgia common law, alleging that Defendant unlawfully subjected her to efforts to collect a debt she does not owe. (Doc. 6.) Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 10.) For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (Id.)

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

The following factual allegations are contained in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint or are apparent from the face of the documents attached as exhibits thereto. Plaintiff is a natural person residing in Bulloch County, and Defendant is a debt collection company actively collecting debts from Georgians residing in this district. (Doc. 6, pp. 2-3.) On January 17, 2019, Plaintiff received medical services at Doctors Hospital of Augusta (“Doctors Hospital”) related to a pending disability claim with the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). (Id. at pp. 5-6; see also doc. 6-1, pp. 4, 6.) According to an appointment reminder sent to Plaintiff, Disability Adjudication Services (“DAS”), acting on behalf of the SSA, scheduled the appointment for “a medical examination to evaluate [Plaintiff's] physical condition.” (Doc. 6-1, p. 6; see also doc. 6, p. 6.) The appointment reminder stated that the medical appointment would be “at no cost to [Plaintiff].” (Id.)

In the months following that appointment, Plaintiff received a bill from Doctors Hospital, which is not a party to this case, and letters from NPAS, Inc. (“NPAS”), a debt collection agency that is not a party to this case, indicating that there was an unpaid balance of $97.50 for the medical services rendered to her on January 17, 2019 (“the Debt”). (See doc. 6, pp. 6-7; doc. 6-1, pp. 4, 7-8.) The letter from NPAS listed DAS as Plaintiff's “primary insurance.” (Doc. 6, pp. 6-7; doc. 6-1, pp. 7-8.) On August 6, 2019, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter indicating that the Debt had “been placed with [Defendant], ” requesting prompt payment, and notifying Plaintiff that the Debt would be assumed valid unless Plaintiff disputed it within 30 days. (Doc. 6-1, p. 3.) More than a month later, on September 10, 2019, an attorney representing Plaintiff regarding her Social Security disability claim (hereinafter “Attorney Goodman”) sent Defendant a letter advising that Plaintiff was represented by counsel and that Defendant should not contact her and should instead direct any further communications to the attorney's office. (Id. at pp. 1-2; see also doc. 6, p. 7.) The letter also stated that Plaintiff “has no liability nor responsibility for this bill” because “the [SSA], through the [DAS], made this appointment in conjunction with her Social Security Disability Claim.” (Doc. 6-1, p. 1.) The Complaint states that, soon thereafter, one of Defendant's employees contacted Attorney Goodman advising him that Defendant had received his letter and that the Debt had been marked as “in a dispute status.” (Doc. 6, p. 7.) On September 22, 2019, Attorney Goodman received a letter from Defendant, written the day before, which stated, “We have received your dispute in regards to [the Debt] and are currently investigating the matter. There is no additional information or action needed from you at this time. If it is determined that additional information is needed, someone will contact you.” (Id. at pp. 7-8; doc. 6-2, p. 1.) Six days later, on September 27, 2019, Defendant sent another letter to Attorney Goodman, this time requesting “additional information” and directing counsel to call its office to “discuss the account.” (Doc. 6, p. 8; doc. 6-3, p. 1.) Then, on October 1, 2019, Defendant sent Attorney Goodman a nearly identical letter stating that Defendant needed more information and requesting that Plaintiff's counsel call Defendant at the toll-free number provided. (Doc. 6, p. 8; doc. 6-4, p. 1.) Plaintiff does not allege that Attorney Goodman responded in any way to either of these letters. (See generally doc. 6.)

On May 8, 2020, Defendant sent a letter directly to Plaintiff which stated that “[t]his claim was filed with the insurance company and despite our efforts, we have been unable to obtain payment from them.” (Doc. 6, p. 9; doc. 6-5, p. 1.) The letter requested that Plaintiff “contact [her] insurance company and ask them to pay any benefits due” and to “call [Defendant] so that [Defendant] may update the status of the account.” (Doc. 6-5, p. 1.) The letter also stated that although Defendant was “committed to working with [Plaintiff] to obtain payment from the insurance company, ” Plaintiff “may be responsible for the entire balance of the account if the insurance company fails to pay the claim.” (Id.) Nearly four months later, Plaintiff's current counsel (hereinafter “Attorney Daniels”) sent Defendant a pre-suit demand asserting that Defendant violated federal and state law when it sent Plaintiff the May 8, 2020, letter and offering to settle the dispute. (Doc. 6, p. 10; doc. 6-6, pp. 1-3.) About a week later, Defendant sent Attorney Goodman a letter which, like the letters Defendant sent him in September and October of 2019, stated that Defendant had “received [Plaintiff's] dispute, ” was “currently investigating the matter, ” and asked for additional information. (Doc. 6, p. 10; doc. 6-7, p. 1.)

II. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed this action alleging that Defendant's efforts to collect the Debt violated federal and state laws protecting consumers from abusive debt collection and unfair or deceptive business practices. (Doc. 1.) Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 5), and Plaintiff subsequently filed the Amended Complaint, (doc 6).^[1] The Amended Complaint asserts: (1) a cause of action based on violations of various provisions of the FDCPA (Count I); (2) a cause of action based on a violation of the GFBPA (Count II); (3) a cause of action based on a violation of the UDPTEA (Count III); and (4) a common law tort claim (Count V). (Doc. 6, pp. 12-15, 17.) Plaintiff further seeks punitive damages and equitable relief under the GFBPA (Count IV).^[2] (Id. at pp. 15-16.) Accordingly, Plaintiff requests actual and statutory damages as well as reasonable attorneys' fees and costs under the FDCPA and GFBPA; “exemplary, ” punitive, and treble damages under the UDPTEA and GFBPA; equitable relief under the GFBPA; tort damages; interest; and a judgment offsetting any tax liability Plaintiff incurred in enforcing the FDCPA. (Id. at pp. 12-18.)

Concerning the FDCPA, Plaintiff specifically alleges that Defendant violated: (1) Sections 1692e(2)(A) and 1692f(1) “by seeking to collect amounts [it] was not authorized to collect”; (2) Section 1692c “by sending the May 8, 2020[, ] dunning letter directly to [her], ” and “by communicating with [her] in an inconvenient time, manner, or place” when it sent the September 18, 2020, letter to her former counsel; (3) Section 1692f “by engaging in debt collection practices designed to treat [her] in an unfair and unconscionable manner”; and (4) Section 1692g “by seeking to collect disputed amounts without first validating the debt.” (Id. at pp. 12-13.) Plaintiff's statutory state law claims under the GFBPA and UDPTEA ultimately hinge upon the alleged violations of the FDCPA. (Id. at pp. 14-15.) Concerning the GFBPA, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the GFBPA “by violating the FDCPA” and by intentionally and willfully “treat[ing] [her] in an unfair manner in connection with a consumer transaction.” (Id. at p. 14.) Concerning the UDPTEA, Plaintiff alleges that, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 10-1-853, Defendant's violation of the GFBPA constitutes a violation of the UDPTEA because Plaintiff is both a “disabled” and “elderly” person, as those terms are defined in O.C.G.A. § 10-1-850. (Id. at p. 15.) Finally, concerning Plaintiff's common law tort claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated her right to be free from “unreasonable bill-collection procedures” by attempting to collect the Debt through the use of “improper, false, deceptive, and/or misleading representations regarding the Debt.” (Id. at p. 17.)

Shortly after Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint, Defendant filed the currently pending Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 10.) Plaintiff filed a Response, (doc. 12), and Defendant filed a Reply, (doc. 14).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must . . . state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must “accept[] the allegations in the complaint as true and constru[e] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Belanger v. Salvation Army, 556 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 2009). However, this tenant “is inapplicable to legal...