Lee v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.

912 F.Supp.2d 375

Charles T. LEE, Plaintiff,

v.NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.

Civil Case No. 1:11cv245.

United States District Court,

W.D. North Carolina,

Asheville Division.

Dec. 12, 2012.

Limited on Preemption Grounds

42 U.S.C.A. § 1981

William Cox Tucker, Jr., Petway, Tucker & Barganier, LLC, Birmingham, AL, Rachel Scott Decker, Carruthers & Roth, PA, Greensboro, NC, for Plaintiff.

Max Daniel McGinn, Nicole A. Crawford, Greensboro, NC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

MARTIN REIDINGER, District Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 27].

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Plaintiff Charles T. Lee (Lee) initiated this action for employment discrimination on September 21, 2011. [Doc. 1]. Lee has been employed by Norfolk Southern Railway Company (NS) since 1998 and remains so employed. [ Id. at 2]. Lee, who is African American, is required by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to be a member of a union in connection with his employment by NS. [ Id.]. The union and NS have entered into a collective bargaining agreement, pursuant to which NS is obligated to offer training and to develop and implement a seniority system to offer and award job assignments. [ Id. at 4]. Lee claims that the collective bargaining agreement was improperly applied by the Defendant at its Asheville location. He asserts that this resulted in his being the object of racial discrimination in that he was refused training and seniority. [ Id.]. He also asserts that he complained about other NS employees violations of the FRA's “Blue Flag Regulations” by failing to keep switches locked while inspecting trains, but that these complaints were ignored. [ Id. at 6]. Finally, Lee claims that he was disciplined for drinking alcohol while on duty while a Caucasian employee was not disciplined. [ Id. at 7]. In addition to these claims relating to training, seniority and discipline, Lee also alleges acts of racial harassment by co-workers and a supervisor. [ Id. at 4–6].

The Complaint asserts racial discrimination on the basis of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 rather than Title VII. [ Id. at 7]. Section 1981 guarantees equal rights to make and enforce contracts; that is, “the making, performance, modification and termination of contracts and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). The discrimination, Lee claims, interfered with his rights under his employment agreement.¹ [ Id. at 8]. This claim therefore also relates to the collective bargaining agreement, the terms of which Lee claims NS violated. Finally, Lee alleged a claim for negligent retention of co-workers and supervisors. [ Id. at 9–10]. He seeks both compensatory and punitive damages. [ Id.].

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment shall be awarded “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, ... show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As the Supreme Court has observed, “this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”

Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 519 (4th Cir.2003), cert. denied541 U.S. 1042, 124 S.Ct. 2171, 158 L.Ed.2d 732 (2004) (emphasis in original).

A genuine issue of fact exists if a reasonable jury considering the evidence could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied513 U.S. 814, 115 S.Ct. 68, 130 L.Ed.2d 24 (1994) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). “Regardless of whether he may ultimately be responsible for proof and persuasion, the party seeking summary judgment bears an initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 522 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). If this showing is made, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party who must convince the Court that a triable issue does exist. Id.

A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment

may not rest upon the mere allegations or denial of [his] pleadings, but rather must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Furthermore, neither “[u]nsupported speculation,” nor evidence that is “merely colorable” or “not significantly probative,” will suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment; rather, if the adverse party fails to bring forth facts showing that “reasonable minds could differ” on a material point, then, regardless of [a]ny proof or evidentiary requirements imposed by the substantive law, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered.

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Nonetheless, in considering the facts for the purposes of a summary judgment motion, the Court will view the pleadings and material presented in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

DISCUSSION

Does the Railway Labor Act preempt 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

NS has a collective bargaining agreement (Agreement) with the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen Division–TCU (the Union). [Doc. 28–1 at 36–45]. ² At all times relevant to this case Lee was employed as a carman with NS, and as such was required to be a member of this union. [Doc. 1 at 2]. Lee has at all times been so employed. [ Id.]. The Agreement specifies the manner in which an employee and union member, such as Lee, may bring claims and file grievances, outlines the procedures for promotions and training, and details the seniority system. [Doc. 28–1 at 36–45]. It also addresses rates of pay for employees in Lee's position and the circumstances under which such pay may be increased. [ Id. at 44–45]. The Agreement prohibits discrimination on the basis of race and requires grievances related to such discrimination to be made in the manner provided therein. [ Id. at 36–45; Doc. 33 at 12; Doc. 35–1].

Lee filed three grievances with NS pursuant to this Agreement: one claiming discriminationin not being allowed electrician training; one claiming a single instance of discrimination in rate of pay; and one asserting that his seniority had been calculated incorrectly. [Doc. 28–1 at 6]. Each grievance was resolved through the procedures prescribed by the Agreement. [ Id.].

Lee alleges in his Complaint that due to an erroneous application of the collective bargaining agreement to his situation that he was discriminated against on the basis of his race in that he was refused training, seniority, the opportunity for promotion and thus denied higher pay. [Doc. 1 at 2–4]. In addition, Lee alleges specific acts of racial harassment by co-workers as well as a supervisor, allegations which are treated separately below. [ Id. at 4–6].

Congress' purpose in passing the [Railway Labor Act] RLA was to promote stability in labor-management relations by providing a comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes. To realize this goal, the RLA establishes a mandatory arbitral mechanism for the prompt and orderly settlement of two classes of disputes. The first class, those concerning rates of pay, rules or working conditions, are deemed major disputes. Major disputes relate to the formation of collective [bargaining] agreements or efforts to secure them. The second class of disputes, known as minor disputes, grow out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. Minor disputes involve controversies over the meaning of an existing collective bargaining agreement in a particular fact situation. Thus, major disputes seek to create contractual rights, minor disputes to enforce them.

Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252–53, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Lee's allegations in the Complaint specifically refer to the Agreement which, he claims, required NS “to train its employees in each and every aspect of their respective crafts.” [Doc. 1 at 2]. “Part of the craft of the carman is to receiv[e] training on the rip track[.]” [ Id.]. Lee claims that Caucasian carmen received this training while he did not, and that he was deprived of electrician training although Caucasian employees with less seniority were allowed such training. [ Id. at 3]. He also alleges that his supervisor refused to allow him to train for a commercial drivers license (CDL) which would qualify him for a vacation relief job, which afforded higher pay. [ Id.].

Lee also asserts that NS failed to follow the seniority system required by the Agreement. By failing to train him, Lee maintains, he could never be qualified for higher paying positions and advancement. [ Id.]. He was also allegedly passed over for first shift jobs in favor of Caucasian employees with less seniority. [ Id. at 4].

Defendant and its union, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement contract, developed a seniority system that Defendant was supposed to use to award or offer assignments. Defendant and its employees did not apply the seniority system as developed. Instead, Defendant in 2008 adjusted how the seniority system was calculated at the Asheville yard, and Caucasian employees ... were given credit unfairly under the seniority system.... [T]his misapplication of contractual seniority system rules was perpetrated by Defendant and its employees including supervisors.

[ Id. at 4].

Finally, Lee alleged that Caucasian employees were...